The Role of Formal and Structured Methods in Product Development by Varnes, Claus J.
 
 
 
 
Managing Product Innovation through Rules 
- 
The Role of Formal and Structured Methods in Product Development 
 
 
By 
 
Claus J. Varnes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ph.D.serie 2005-01 
 
Copenhagen Business School 
PhD School of Technologies of Managing 
 
2005 
 
  
 
 
RESUMÉ 
Ledelse af innovation gennem regler 
 
 
 
 
 
Formålet med nærværende studie er at analysere hvordan det mest almindelige ledelses-
værktøj, Stage-Gate, for produktudvikling kommer til anvendelse i en organisatorisk 
praksis. Flere kilder peger på relevansen af styring af innovationsprocessen i forhold til 
performance kriterier, men den eksisterende litteratur har ikke haft en sociologisk til-
gang til forståelsen af dette område og dermed peget på en mulig forklaring for denne 
sammenhæng. Det problem som adresseres hér, er, således orienteret omkring en forstå-
else hvordan Stage-Gate som repræsentant for forskellige versioner af faseopdelt og 
strukturerede måde at bedrive produktudvikling virker. 
 I den første version af Stage-Gate er dette system designet med et projektsyringsfor-
mål i NASA men har haft stor udbredelse og udvikling, og er i dag det mest gængse 
system for at drive produktudvikling (i USA), men har muligvis ligeså stor udbredelse i 
Danmark. I sin ideal form opdeles produktudviklingsprocessen i en række standardise-
rede og formaliserede faser adskilt af beslutningspunkter med henblik på at reducere 
usikkerheden samtidig med ressourcerne øges. Som påpeget af den tilgængelige littera-
tur er Stage-Gate et beslutningstagningsværktøj, men værktøjet skal selvsagt leves ud 
gennem aktører som skal omsætte de standardiserede forskrifter til konkret handling. 
Cyert and March (1992) adresserede allerede i 1963 standardprocedurer for beslut-
ningstagning, men omtalte i epilogen til A behavioral theory of the firm en yderligere 
teori af en adfærdsmæssig karakter, som senere blev udbygget af March (1994), hvor-
igennem aktører antages at handle ud fra hvad som er passende ved at matche den situa-
tion som de befinder sig i med deres identitet. Dette rationale, beskrevet som teorien om 
appropriateness antager således at reglers anvendelse ikke nødvendigvis er identisk 
med foreskriften men skal fortolkes i en kontekst dersom regler i deres normativitet er 
akontekstuelle. Regler kan derfor fornuftigvis afviges af aktøren, hvis de ikke er passen-
de i forhold til hvordan aktøren fortolker situationen og sin identitet. Stage-Gate har en 
række ligheder med Webers ideal bureaukrati som endvidere kan kategoriseres indenfor 
de fire regeltyper som beskrevet af Cyert og March (1992). Disse analyserede dog ikke 
implikationerne af teorien om appropriateness for standardiserede beslutningsprocedu-
rer (og regeltyperne) i produktudvikling, hvilket selvsagt derfor er et af bidragene med 
nærværende studie. Her udvikles dette i en model. Både det instrumentelle (Weber) og 
adfærdsmæssige perspektiv (appropriateness) applikeres i analyserne af fem udvalgte 
case-virksomheder hvoraf PLASTIC blev udvalgt for nærmere analyse. Hovedvægten 
af studiet er på den adfærdsmæssige forståelse hvorved studiet af hvordan regler bidra-
ger til at gøre innovation ledelsesbar får en sociologisk karakter.  
Det instrumentelle perspektiv afslører, at en række af de organisatoriske effekter som 
Weber (og ledelsesværktøjet) lovede kan opnås, herunder stabilitet på kort sigt, men 
samtidig at der er stor variation i måden hvorpå regler applikeres. Den videre analyse 
gennem appropriateness-perspektivet afslører imidlertid at regler mere applikeres 
som ’guidelines’ end egentligt ufravigelig regler. Regler påvirker den organisatoriske 
identitet, skaber et sprog og giver fokus på eksempelvis kalkulation lige som politisk 
inerti kan reduceres. Den multiple-case analyse afslørede endvidere, at applikationen af 
regler i faserne er mere formaliseret end i beslutningspunkterne hvor formaliseringen 
angiveligt fastholdes. Netop fordi, at dette var i fokus, blev næste trin i empirien at ud-
vælge PLASTIC for nærmere analyse af disse beslutningspunkter.  
Her afslørede analysen af reglerne, at regler også betragtes som guidelines og yder-
mere kræver fortolkning fordi reglerne skaber inkonsistente krav på aktørerne i pro-
duktudvikling, men også fordi andre regelregimer uden direkte tilknytning til produkt-
udvikling gør det mere passende at mobilisere disse regler end dem som ideelt foreskri-
ves af det normative regelsystem (Stage-Gate). Endvidere bliver den objektive beslut-
ningstagning ’kompromitteret’ af, at al information ikke er tilgængelig, men selv i de 
tilfælde, hvor der er information til rådighed omkring et produktudviklingsprojekt, an-
vendes den ikke. Information kan også indsamles efterfølgende for at bekræfte en be-
slutning og generelt tillægges selve kalkulationen som et entydigt tal ikke stor vægt i 
den formelle beslutningssituation. På baggrund af disse analyser blev appropirateness-
perspektivitet konstrueret i en model, som illustrerer, hvordan en række variable påvir-
ker hvordan regler bliver anvendt, herunder for eksempel aktørernes ønske om at være 
socialt pålidelige er mere centrale end at følge de rationelle regler.  
 Konklusionen, er, at regler faktisk har en organisatorisk indflydelse, men ikke fordi 
regler automatisk følges af medarbejdere i produktudvikling. De regler, som anses om 
passende, anvendes og fortolkes af aktører, hvorfor Stage-Gate i sin normative form 
mere er et styringsværktøj end et ledelsesværktøj, fordi det ikke tager højde for hvordan 
aktører agerer i en organisatorisk sammenhæng. Aktørerne skal motiveres til at følge 
regler og i de tilfælde hvor kontrolsystemer overvåger regeloverholdelse, bliver disse 
mere fulgt som en pligt uden nogen afgørende adfærdsmæssige ændringer. Ledelse me-
re end styring er derfor påkrævet, hvis regler skal have en organisatorisk effekt. Endelig 
indikerer observationerne, at regler ikke stopper innovation og kreativitet. Tværtimod. 
PLASTIC har store problemer med at få nye projekter frem, hvilket tilskrives den 
manglende mobilisering af regler af aktørerne, og samtidig må det fastslås at Stage-Gate 
mere er et innovationssystem end et kreativitetsværktøj, idet formålet ikke er at produ-
cere produktidéer men at implementere og vælge blandt disse. Paradoksalt nok kunne 
kreativitet og innovation i PLASTIC have været fremmet, men som antydet skulle reg-
lerne have været mobiliseret, hvilket havde krævet opmærksomhed på appropriateness 
og de ledelsesmæssige implikationer herved. 
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INTRODUCTION 1
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
This is a study of the role of formal and structured approaches to managing Product De-
velopment (PD), and the first chapter of the study is concerned with setting ‘the stage’. 
The chapter includes an introduction to the understanding of PD in this study and the 
theoretical perspectives used for the analysis, formal and structured approaches and 
rules in Stage-Gate as a management technology, and following these motivational sec-
tions of the chapter is the formulation of the problem statement guiding the present 
study. Subsequently, the research strategy and methods and the organization of the 
study are introduced. 
 
 
1.1 PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT 
 
Often, new products are the output of an innovation process of which PD can be re-
garded as a sub-process (Trott 2002: 12) in line with organizational innovation (e.g. a 
new communication system), a management innovation (e.g. an introduction of SAP), 
or a production innovation (e.g. just-in-time manufacturing). Trott (2002: 14) argues 
product innovation is a type of innovation and can be defined as “the development of a 
new or improved product”. To many firms, PD can be considered a requisite for busi-
ness survival (Ayers et al 2001) and also a source of competitive advantage (Hamel 
2000; McDermott, 1999). Brown and Eisenhardt (1995: 343) argue: 
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Product development is critical because new products are becoming the 
nexus of competition to many firms. 
 
Compared to acquisitions and mergers, PD is also a critical means by which members of 
the organization diversify, adapt and even reinvent their firms (Brown and Eisenhardt 
1995: 344): 
 
Thus, product development is among the essential processes for success, 
survival, renewals or organizations, particularly for firms in either fast-
paced or competitive markets. 
 
The aim of PD projects is to transform product ideas into launch in the marketplace 
where the needs of customers are met and, in addition, are technologically feasible. Al-
though the needs may not be articulated and the boundaries of the technical feasibility 
can be challenged, a central issue to many managers, and a subject of many PD schol-
ars, is to address the process in which the ideas materialize. The specific PD activities 
include idea generation, concept development, prototypes, design specifications, engi-
neering, screening, production, business analysis, test marketing, etc. Managing innova-
tion concerns the conditions that have to be in place in order to ensure that the organiza-
tion is given the opportunity to develop new products, and the actual development of 
products is the process of transforming business opportunities into tangible products or 
services (Trott 2002), as also suggested by Ayers et al (2001: 133-134). 
 
Indeed, the magic in new product development efforts lies not in an organi-
zation’s ability to generate new product ideas, for they are a dime a dozen, 
but rather in an organization’s ability to nurture and manage the product de-
velopment process. 
 
Thus, PD encompasses the management of various disciplines involved in the develop-
ment of new products, including marketing, economics, production management, and 
design and engineering (Trott 2002). Accordingly, production management participates 
in PD with a manufacturing perspective in terms of an effective production of the prod-
uct in question, whereas marketing takes the perspective of understanding the needs of 
the customer or user and of how the business could best meet these needs (ibid.). 
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1.2 FORMAL AND STRUCTURED APPROACHES 
 
Formal and structured methods were questioned by Clark and Wheelwright (1992) sug-
gesting that too much bureaucracy is the reason why the US cannot compete with Japan. 
More recently, Hamel (2000: 202) has criticized the formalization of PD and has sug-
gested that innovation has to be led by rule breakers. In other words:  
 
To grow, new opportunities need to escape bureaucratic controls and ortho-
dox thinking.  
 
By contrast, Baker and Hart (1999) suggest that formal and structured methods influ-
ence the product development process in a facilitating manner. On the basis of the Miles 
and Snow strategy typology, Simons (1987) argues that prospectors are more likely to 
apply management control systems than companies applying a defender strategy; Baker 
and Hart (1999) suggest that companies with a structured development process do have 
a higher survival rate; and Davila (2000) addresses the question of whether management 
control systems have a decisive role in relation to managing PD or whether management 
control systems can be considered an impediment for PD. Davila (2000: 405) suggests 
in this respect that:  
 
Management control systems are important for the performance of the pro-
ject, but the research does not reveal why, nor provides detail on how these 
systems are designed.  
 
Despite the differing opinions, the debate on the relevance of the formal and structured 
approaches seems to be more an issue of the implementation and intensity of the ‘bu-
reaucracy’ rather than a direct dismissal of these methods’ general ability to contribute 
to making PD manageable. One the other hand, only a few have addressed how to make 
formal and structured PD approaches a managerial technology in everyday organiza-
tional life through the very rules of the formal and structured approaches, particularly 
with respect to the interplay between decision-making and management control systems 
in the form of rules for PD. 
Griffin et al (1997) categorize process types into a sequence based on five levels of 
sophistication, suggesting that some process types are less sophisticated and that third-
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generation stage gate is the most sophisticated and characterize it as “fuzzy” with, e.g., 
overlapping development activities. The “others” category is not categorized as sophis-
ticated but does include companies applying an informal approach to making the PD 
process manageable. “Sophistication” is not defined by the authors, but does include 
whether there is formal process ownership and whether the process is facilitated (Griffin 
et al 1997). The 1997 PDMA Handbook (Griffin et al 1997) disclosed that 60 percent of 
the investigated firms apply a formal NPD process and that all these formal PD-
processes are versions of a Stage-Gate (SG in the following) approach, making it the 
most widely dispersed approach in product development (Griffin et al 1997). The re-
maining companies applied an informal process or no process at all. The existence of 
both informal and formal ways of making the NPD process manageable raises the issue 
of whether PD rules exist in Danish companies and how these systems use and influ-
ence PD. In order to develop an understanding of the workings of formal and structured 
methods in an organizational context, a study of how these systems of rules work within 
an organization needs to be undertaken.  
In its generic form, the SG approach, as described and defined by Cooper (e.g. 2001), 
divides the product development process into five decision-making opportunities suc-
ceeded by five information-generating stages. All five decision-making opportunities 
are structured according to the same format required for documenting the information 
gathered: a decision-making format in the form of an evaluation against a set of prede-
fined criteria measured on a ten-point Likert scale, and five types of decision-making 
outcomes. SG departs from the recognition of an inherent uncertainty in product devel-
opment and is designed to decrease this uncertainty by generating information in paral-
lel with a gradual increase in product development costs. The reasoning underlying 
SG’s design can therefore be characterized within the limited rationality perspective 
where it is assumed that uncertainty can be decreased through information gathering 
until the costs of gathering information exceed the benefit of the additional information.  
The claimed advantages of the SG system include efficiency, effectiveness, reduction 
of time-to-market and increased commercial success according to the intentions. The 
early work of Cooper and De Brentani (1992), Cooper (1992), Cooper and Klein-
schmidt (1993a), Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1993b), Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1993c) 
focuses on the activities (stages) required to be undertaken, whereas the more recent 
INTRODUCTION 5
work (Cooper 2001; Cooper and others 2002a; Cooper and others 2002b) emphasizes 
decision-making opportunities (gates). The SG approach can be regarded as a ‘rationali-
zation’ of the product development process and contains three elements for achieving 
the intended advantages. First, Cooper (e.g. 2001) is concerned with decision-making as 
a gradual allocation of resources as the likelihood of succeeding increases with an in-
creasing amount of new information. The product development process must, therefore, 
be regarded as a gradual decision-making process in which at the moment the antici-
pated commercial success of a project is negatively evaluated, the project is either 
killed, approved for continuation, made to hold or ordered to be reworked. Second, the 
other element of the SG approach is to prescribe different types of activities (market, 
technical and financially-related) that must be carried out so that qualities of the deci-
sions are not compromised. Finally, the information must be produced in the activities 
of the stages before the decision-making point is documented and made available to the 
decision-makers in the decision-making situation (gates). 
 
 
1.3 RULES IN SG AS A MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY 
 
Structured and formal approaches to product development, like the Stage-Gate approach, 
consist of a set of rules, and rules can be regarded – among other things – as a manage-
rial technology, employed by organizations for one purpose or another.  
Organizational rules have been studied for a long time within organizational theory, 
as early as Weber (1968), but also in terms of administrative rules as argued by Cyert & 
March (1992) who defined four types of rules and discussed how standard operational 
procedures provide organizations with stability and coordination mechanisms (ibid.). 
Moreover,  
 
[I]n a broad perspective, rules consist of explicit or implicit norms, regula-
tions, and expectations that regulate the behavior of individuals and interac-
tions among them (March et al 2001: 11).  
 
March et al (ibid.: 11ff) argue that we can distinguish between four images of rules in 
the literature: a) rules as rational efforts to organize; b) rules as proliferating mecha-
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nisms governed by self-evolving processes (the idea that bureaucratization is expanding 
and producing even more rules); c) rules as constructions of meaning and presentations 
of what the organization wants to be or be known for (a signal and a symbol) and how it 
meets the expectation of what a proper organization does (e.g. to manage NPD); and 
finally d) rules can be seen as the coding of history-bearing experiences from the past 
and represent a learning process. These perspectives might also explain some of the 
various views on formal, structured NPD methods, as reported in previous research on 
the SG approach1. While the intention of rules might represent a rational effort to organ-
ize, some might criticize rules for being a "spreading disease", while others in turn 
might focus on the learning inherent in the rules. In the present analysis, we will only 
focus on the formal, explicit PD rules and how they are constructions of meaning, since 
they represent the structured approaches that companies have implemented, modified 
and changed according to their needs. Rules spread from one company to another, but 
over time they are often changed for numerous reasons.  
PD rules2 can be seen as a managerial technology (Miller et al 1993; Mouritsen 
1999; Hatchuel and Weil 1995) used to manage product development at a distance by 
means of factual and calculable knowledge of the product development process, its 
situation and status. Managerial techniques, such as SG approaches, include an impor-
tant promise of neutrality, objectivity and calculability, which enables cooperation to be 
governed and administered according to facts, as expressed by writers on other manage-
rial technologies (Hopwood 1984; Loft 1986; Miller et al 1993 and Miller 1991). Gate 
approaches, for instance, hold the promise of mastering and handling the complex, deli-
cate and ambiguous undertaking of PD from a distance. Such managerial techniques are 
intermediaries and facilities that help to mobilize, support and implement systems of 
management control. Managerial techniques3, such as gate approaches, might be intro-
duced and implemented for a number of reasons, but become a management technology 
through the interpretation of local managers, employees in product development and 
others in the company who influence the practical design and application of the general 
                                                 
1 Chapter three addresses and summarizes previous research on the SG approach. 
2 Please note other tools (e.g. QFD) also generally are available in PD but the object of analysis here are 
the rules defined by the SG approach which is the managerial attempt to intervene in the innovation proc-
ess. 
3 Hatchuel and Weil, (1995) proposes a management technique is constituted by three interrelated ele-
ments, which all can be identified with the SG approach including: 1) a technical substratum, 2) a man-
agement philosophy, and 3) a simplified view of organizational relations. 
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concept through modifications and translations (Latour 1991; Mouritsen 1999) or what 
Hatchuel and Weil (1995: 100) refers to an intense process of contextualization where 
 
…modeling is not an object and in itself not aimed exclusively at decribing 
certain bjects. It is mostly guided by potential material and relational stakes 
which it progressively makes credible and which each management tech-
nique has to express, represent or imagine in order to become a mobilizing 
project (Hatchuel and Weil, 1995: 97) 
 
According to Latour (ibid.), a gate model is a non-human "actant" that needs to be 
communicated, interrelated, linked and mobilized in order to be translated by "human 
actants" (not transmitted) within a context of use and woven into what Latour labels a 
strong technology. Management technologies, such as gate models, compete with other 
actant "programs" in the context, as will be become apparent in the analyses to come. 
To generate “strong” managerial technologies, supporting elements must be added to 
the initial statement: we want PD employees to use the structured approach. The reason 
is that the "listeners" of the message (the employees involved in product development) 
normally call for “anti-programs” (other interests and issues on the agenda) that com-
pete with the official “program” of structured methods. Such supporting elements may 
come in many forms, such as explicit top-management support, communication of the 
structured approach, facilitation of user tools for the methods in various ways, consult-
ing services, training in structured approaches, etc. Structured approaches in the form of 
rules must also be adapted to the situation, as rules are general and situations are spe-
cific (March et al 2001). Thus, formal rules prescribe activities that must be carried out 
in order to make management at a distance possible, but rules, however, are translated 
by actors in an organizational context and practice through interpretation of what is ap-
propriate (March 1994). By so doing, attention is directed to problematization (Miller 
and O’Leary 2002) and the relationship between problem and solution, which in this 
study we assume to be indirect rather than direct Miller and O’Leary (2002: 92). Solu-
tions might not be direct, functional responses to “problems”.  
 
“By technologies, we mean devices for intervening, instruments for acting, 
upon people, objects, and processes so as to shape or influence them […]” 
(ibid.), and moreover “[…] seeking to transform the identities of the indi-
viduals” (ibid: 93) [italics emphasized]. 
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In the terminology of Miller and O’Leary (2002) this study is about the shaping of ac-
tors and investigates how they translate the formal rules (program) in an organization 
into context and practice (Latour 1991) whereby the management technique (the SG ap-
proach) becomes a management technology. As a consequence, the anti-programs mobi-
lized by actors are revealed through the perspective of appropriateness, suggesting that 
the application of rules results from an interpretation of the situation and an actor’s per-
ceived multiple identities constituting the actor’s collective self (March 1994). 
 
 
1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Although management control is decisive to innovation (Davila 2002; Baker and Hart 
1997; Simons 1987), little research has examined the use of these systems in an organ-
izational context, which is crucial, however, when attempting to manage what is one of 
the most complex processes of a company (Hustad 2000), in which ambiguity is an ex-
istential condition (Martin and Meyerson, 1998; McKaskey, 1982). Disciplining man-
agement control systems claims to facilitate the management of PD processes by objec-
tive decision-making, for instance, and the conformation of actions into programmed 
activities (Simon et al 1954) to the extent where the most common of these systems 
share similarities with the ideal Weberian bureaucracy. Nevertheless, March (1994) 
questions these systems since ambiguity is prevalent in an organization. Programmed 
actions must also be comprehended through a construction of appropriateness, making 
the management of innovation a behavioral issue, through the use of rules, and a matter 
of how this managerial technology is adapted, made sense of and applied. Wheelwright 
and Clark (1992) and Hamel (2000) criticize innovation for being too ‘bureaucratic’, 
which suggests that the disciplining systems can become a bureaucracy and, therefore, 
also rigid when applied in an organizational context (Ottossen 1996 and Jenkins and 
Others 1997a; 1997b; Olin and Wickenberg 2001). So, does a management control sys-
tem become a bureaucracy? And if so, does this impede the facilitation of the PD proc-
ess otherwise claimed by the normative literature as the most frequently applied ap-
proach (Griffin 1997), i.e. stage gate (Cooper and De Brentani 1992; Cooper 1992; 
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Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1993a; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1993b; Cooper and Klein-
schmidt 1993c; Cooper 2001; Cooper and others 2002a; Cooper and others 2002b)? 
What are the managerial implications of PD rules? Are the assumptions underlying the 
structured and formalized approaches compromised? These are some of the fundamental 
puzzles motivating the present study.  
Management of the PD process is attempted through formal and structured ap-
proaches, and the (main) question arises: how is a specific, formal and disciplining man-
agement tool applied to PD and how does it become a managerial technology through 
appropriate rule application? This main question can be substantiated through four 
questions:  
 
(1) What constitutes the SG approach and what issues have been raised regarding 
the approach in previous literature? 
 
(2) How can rules in organizations be studied? 
 
(3) What are the implications of rules in an instrumental perspective? 
 
(4) What are the implications of rules in a perspective of appropriateness? 
 
 
1.5 RESEARCH STRATEGY AND DATA GATHERING  
 
The overall structure of this study is to undertake two analyses based on two different 
perspectives on rules, as previously suggested. The first analysis concerns what is re-
ferred to as the instrumental rule perspective in which activities are assumed to be con-
formed and aligned with what is prescribed by the rules. Within the perspective of in-
strumentality, theoretical analysis suggests that the SG approach (Cooper 2001) resem-
bles the ideal Weberian bureaucracy (Weber 1968; Weber 1972), and consequently, the 
SG approach can be understood as a set of rules, since the primary characteristic of a 
bureaucracy is rules4. Moreover, the set of rules normatively defined by Cooper (2001)5 
                                                 
4 The analyses are carried out in chapter four. 
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can be compared to the four types of rules assumed to constitute a Standard Operating 
Procedure (SOP) by Cyert and March (1992). This first perspective can be associated 
with the open-rational models of Scott (2003). The second perspective applies the ap-
propriateness perspective to rules used within a specific context by matching the situa-
tion recognized by the actor with how the actor defines himself. The second perspective 
of appropriateness challenges the instrumental perspective by claiming that rule-
following is not automated (Simon et al 1954). This perspective can be aligned with the 
open-natural model (Scott 2003: 119-120) and more specifically within the institutional 
theory perspective: 
 
[…] it is not only competitive and efficiency forces that are at work. So-
cially constructed belief and rule systems exercise enormous control over 
organizations – both how they are structured and how they carry out their 
work. 
 
A number of things could be argued in this respect. On the one hand, it might seem 
unfair to take the normative theory as proclaimed by Cooper (2001) into another para-
digm, but on the other, this triangulation (Yin 2003) of analytical tools does enhance the 
understanding of the phenomena compared to only applying one perspective. The prem-
ise of this study is that subscribing to one of the models presented by Scott (2003) can 
be one-sided. Yet even though keeping the two perspectives separate in the analytical 
process has been difficult, I believe that the second perspective in particular has con-
tributed to new understandings of the workings of the SG approach in an organizational 
context and also enhanced an understanding of the fragility of normative systems when 
exposed to the ambiguity and complexity intrinsic in PD. Moreover, as will be dis-
cussed in the last chapter of this study, the implications for management can be different 
when attempting to manage the PD process with actors characterized by March (1994: 
10): 
 
1. Problems of attention. Time and capabilities for attention are limited. Not every-
thing can be attended to at once […] 
                                                                                                                                               
5 The SG approach is described in chapter two. 
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2. Problems of memory. The capabilities of individuals and organizations [for stor-
ing] information [are] limited […] 
3. Problems of comprehension. Decision makers have limited capacities for com-
prehension. They have difficulty organizing, summarizing, and using informa-
tion to [make] inferences about the causal connections of events and about rele-
vant features of the world […]. 
4. Problems of communication. There are limited capacities for communicating in-
formation, for sharing complex and specialized information […] 
 
As a consequence, it makes sense to the actors not to follow rules, for instance, and the 
perspective of appropriateness offers understanding rather than judging and claiming 
irrationality of organizational members. 
Furthermore, each analysis poses a two-fold structure. An empirical study of five 
case companies was carried out through a cross-case analysis based on Yin’s (2003) 
methodology. Subsequently one company, PLASTIC, was singled for further case 
analysis based on the same methodology, because this company insisted on formaliza-
tion and most recently had employed a new set of rules. Therefore, it was assumed that 
the actors were more aware of the formal rules influencing their behavior. The cross-
case analyses are undertaken at what can be characterized as an ‘organizational level’ of 
analysis, suggesting that the set of PD generally was investigated whereas the single-
case analysis focused on decomposing the set of rules of the SG approach into gates, 
information and documentation, and stages, and as such added closer proximity to the 
empirical phenomena. As will be described in the forthcoming section, the instrumental 
perspective and the two levels of analysis are framed in one chapter, whereas the per-
spective of appropriateness is framed separately in two chapters. Thirty interviews with 
a variety of respondents employed in R&D have been undertaken to collect evidence 
(Yin 2003). All recordings from observations and the majority of interviews were tran-
scribed in full for subsequent analysis (Yin 2003), and approximately 1,062 pages of 
transcription together with 100 pages of written material were available for analysis in 
QSR Nvivo ® 2.0.163, see appendix A for contact points of activities. The total obser-
vation time was eleven hours for two gate meetings. Please note that not all interviews 
could be transcribed within the timeframe and that only the first gate meeting was ana-
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lyzed in detail due to time limitations (see appendix A). This was accommodated, how-
ever, by listening to the recordings, which fortunately were digital at this point. Other 
limitations to the study include a lack of observations of the milestone meetings at a 
project management level, but comprehensive secrecy agreements prohibited a close 
proximity to the actual project work and content of the individual project, a factor which 
restricted the study and added extra complexity. Furthermore, access to company data-
bases and intranets was not opened up for investigation. PD was generally considered 
an area shrouded in secrecy and raised great concerns. 
The first empirical probe involved the multiple-case analysis and focused on general 
PD rules, whereas the second empirical investigation analyzed the gate meetings and 
not only the participants participating in the meeting, but also the project managers sub-
ject to these decisions from the gate meeting. As will be discussed in the analyses, the 
decision-making meeting (gates) became particularly interesting since the literature 
available on the SG approach highlights the decision-making functionality and the first 
empirical investigation pointed to gates as a focus of attention. Three interview guides 
were designed to accommodate this successive data-gathering strategy covering the 
multiple-case study (one interview guide) and the single-case study (two interview 
guides), the latter separated whether being involved in stages or gates, see appendices C 
and D accordingly. The wish to validate (Yin 2003) the relevance of the study was a 
central motive of this two-part data gathering, which made it appropriate to undertake 
an initial probe before developing the study and investigating a specific company in de-
tail. In order to address validity, the main findings were presented before an “Innovation 
Process Steering” meeting at PLASTIC seven days before submission, and the immedi-
ate response was that some of the findings were already in the process of being cor-
rected, but also that some of the findings should be elaborated further and made avail-
able to the executive committee6. 
The coding in QSR Nvivo ® 2.0.163 was set up founded on the research questions 
and the theoretical framework. Code no. 47 is of the type “tree” (see appendix B) and is 
descriptive in nature encompassing the normative rules in PLASTIC (codes 9-11) based 
                                                 
6 Because of the close proximity to the submission of the thesis, it was not possible to transcribe these 
discussions, but recordings are available. 
7 Please note codes 1-3 not are listed in appendix B. The appendix is taken from a “list all nodes” in QSR 
Nvivo ® 2.0.163 and redesigned in Word for presentation purposes. However, due to technicalities the 
codes were not numbered from 1 and codes 1-3 is thus not listed. 
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on a three-fold structure: gates (code 9), stages (code 10) and what is labeled informa-
tion and documentation rules (11) according to the general decision-making structure of 
the SG approach where gates are supplied with information documented through the 
activities in the stages but also analytic with an analysis of the two normative set of 
rules described in chapter two and PLASTIC in main code 5 and sub-codes 6-8 respec-
tively (see appendix B). Based on the same structure code 12 (and sub-codes 13-15) 
analysis how these normative rules are used or applied by the respondents whether be-
ing part of the formal decision-making situation (gates) or taking part in the stage-
activities as project managers. Code 16 (and sub-codes 17-26) is concerned with the or-
ganizational influence of rules with respect to competence (code 17), identity (code 18), 
decision-making (code 19), rule-regime competition (code 20), innovation rules compe-
tition (code 21), and new rules (code 22), which all are based on the theory of appropri-
ateness (see chapter four). Code 23 on bureaucracy, code 25 on implementation, and 
code 26 originates from the criticizing literature in chapter three. Code 24 was also in-
cluded to be aware of distinct comments made respondents on ambiguity. Finally, code 
27 on the Portfolio Management Meeting (PFMM) or gate meeting, September 12, 
2003, is based on the empirical data so that the discussions made on the various projects 
has been coded accordingly. This proved, however, to be a real challenge since the par-
ticipants not during the meeting stated for instance that ‘we now are going to discuss 
project no. 14’. Some of the discussions were very technical and although my work ex-
perience has provided me with a broad technical understanding it was difficult to follow 
some of the specific discussions on for instance polyethylene properties.  
Griffin et al (1997) suggest that 60 percent of all US companies apply versions of the 
SG approach when attempting to make the PD process manageable, and since the focus 
of the study is on formal rules, it proved useful to select companies that use the SG ap-
proach since they would have formal rules in place (replication logic8). Surprisingly, a 
company was interviewed (that initially indicated that it not applied any formal and 
structured approach), but it turned out that they did not employ any formal approach in 
the organization. Nevertheless, the company was forced to adapt a phased development 
process due to official requirements, since the company developed drugs for human use. 
This company is referred to as CONTROL in appendix A but is not included in the 
                                                 
8 Voss et al. (2002: 203). 
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analyses, however. If companies without a formal and structured approach in the PD 
process were to have been included in the empirical basis, the problem statement fram-
ing this study should have been formulated differently and, for instance, should have 
centered instead on informal vs. formal ways of managing PD with respect to yielding 
the highest profits or the highest number of radical new products. 
Triangulation provides stronger substantiation (Yin 2003) and has been applied to 
this study not only through the two perspectives (analytical tools) described above but 
also through several sources of evidence. The research instruments include semi-
structured interviews, direct observation and archival sources, particularly documents 
where the formal rules were written down and formal reports from the gate meetings 
observed. My role in the gate meeting was that of a passive observer, but whether I in-
tervened in the meeting anyway is naturally open to question, particularly since the par-
ticipants in the second meeting made much more eye contact (with me) than in the first 
meeting. Generally, however, I made a great effort not to intervene, although I was 
asked to sit next to the table with an approximate area of 5 m2 or more. I have the dis-
tinct impression, though, that I would have intervened more by sitting away from this 
table, since this was quite uncommon and would have attracted more attention. Two 
meetings in September and November 2003 were selected in order to reduce causal va-
riety (Yin, 2003) and to reduce the risk of misjudging a single event (Voss et al 2002). 
Yet since the analysis of just one meeting proved to be extremely resource-consuming 
and the second meeting (November) had many similarities, the first meeting was singled 
out for investigation. Even so, a limited number of observations from the November 
meeting are referred to in the forthcoming analyses. In this study, ambiguity is assumed 
to be a condition that underlies PD (Martin and Meyerson, 1998; McKaskey, 1982), but 
it is also assumed to be possible to analyze through triangulation, for instance, between 
an observation and interviews, but also with a single source, since it is assumed that re-
spondents are able to express concerns in this regard. The meeting participants were 
also interviewed subsequent to the meeting, however, in order to cope with post-
rationalization (March 1994; Voss et al 2002) and enable an analysis. Still, it should be 
noted that it proved somewhat difficult to interview all the participants shortly after the 
meeting, since I decided to transcribe the September meeting before interviewing the 
respondents. The transcription was necessary in order to comprehend when the partici-
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pants addressed a specific project and where the discussion was headed in terms of the 
agenda, since the portfolio contained 62 projects, 34 of which were discussed at the 
September meeting. Furthermore, as already noted, being a non-technician, the under-
standing of a discussion relating to a project was to some extent cognitively prohibited 
when the character of the discussion became too technical, but also because of an 
agreement with the company not to investigate the content of the projects themselves. 
The study is guided by a “how” question focusing on explaining the application of 
formal, structured approaches and investigating how it becomes a management technol-
ogy through appropriate rule application. Case studies in particular are recognized by 
Yin (2003) as suitable for examining precisely this type of question. The use of surveys 
was also contemplated as part of the case analyses, but this approach was abandoned 
since exploratory surveys are difficult and very time-consuming to implement and thus 
start out with an in-depth understanding. Had time allowed, it would have been interest-
ing to develop a survey based on the findings in order to validate the findings further 
and explore the limits to the inherent generalizations of the conclusions. New theory 
was never an ambition of this study, which sought instead to understand phenomena. It 
could be argued, however, that the model of appropriateness (figures 8.1 and 8.2) is a 
development or an elaboration of existing theory for which the case study research 
method is also suitable (Yin 2003; Eisenhardt 1989). Voss et al. (2002) argue that single 
cases have limitations, which was attempted to be accommodated by undertaking a mul-
tiple-case study with five case companies before a company was singled out for in-
depth analysis and, importantly, to use the findings with care.  
 
 
1.6 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
 
The first questions involving the SG approach and the issues it raises in previous litera-
ture are examined in two separate chapters. In chapter two, the most common, formal 
and structured PD approach (Stage-Gate) is described on the basis of normative litera-
ture, including the content of the SG functionality specified in stage and gate activities, 
historical context, the most recent version of this approach, and the claimed advantages 
of the approach. The chapter is the first part of the frame of analysis and aims to explain 
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the content of the management tool for PD. In chapter three, the previous literature on 
SG is addressed with respect to a number of issues including idea generation, rigidity, 
stages, management control and strategy, but the chapter also presents a minor review 
of the literature on PD decision–making, since decision-making is emphasized by the 
literature when discussing the SG approach. As the second part of the frame of analysis, 
the objective is to frame a number of issues for further exploration in the analytical 
chapters.  
 The second question of how rules in organizations can be studied is answered in 
chapter four where the SG approach is discussed with respect to the Weberian bureauc-
racy, similarities and differences and finally translated into a set of PD rules to be ex-
plored in organizational practice. Subsequently, March (1994, 1999) and March et al 
(2000) present two different perspectives on rule-following: 1) instrumental: rule-
following where actors are shaped by the rules and instrumentally undertake the pre-
scribed activities required; 2) appropriateness: ‘rule-following’ instead based on rules 
emphasizing their influence, rather than assuming that behavior is subdued and auto-
mated actions are shaped in accordance with rules. Rules, identities, and situations are 
constructed, and the calculable rules mentioned by Weber (1968) as being central to ob-
jective decision-making are subject to interpretation, however. As the last part of the 
frame of analysis, each of these two perspectives ends up with a number of research 
questions to guide the analysis. 
 The third question departs from the instrumental perspective and investigates the im-
plications for the PD process. The first empirical probe is undertaken on the basis of an 
instrumental view of rules through a multiple-case analysis and a single-case analysis of 
which rules can be identified in an organizational practice surrounding PD. One com-
pany, PLASTIC, is singled out in order to analyze the PD rules in depth. Both analyses 
in this chapter discuss the issues raised in chapter three on the previous SG literature. 
The level of analysis is organizational in the multiple-case study and local in the in-
depth case study. 
The final question of the implications of rules in a perspective of appropriateness for 
the PD process departs from an analysis of the extent of rule-following, since some rules 
are mandatory whereas others are rather laxly applied. Therefore the question discusses 
the first understanding of PD appropriateness by analyzing the interplay between rules 
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and the organization in chapter six. The level of analysis is organizational. In chapter 
seven, the same theory of appropriateness is applied in order to understand the use of 
rules at a local level in PLASTIC, singled out in chapter five, with respect to analyzing 
the extent of rule-following in terms of the three elements of the SG approach: gates, 
information (and documentation) and stages. Decision-making is analyzed in the second 
part of chapter seven by adding observation as a data-gathering technique to compre-
hend ambiguity in a decision-making situation. The multiple-case analysis is based on 
data gathered through interviews and formal documents, which makes it difficult to 
comprehend how actors interpret situations. A gate meeting lasting five hours is ob-
served in order to understand the influence of rules, especially the calculable rules. 
Chapter eight summarizes the two perspectives on rules with respect to PLASTIC. 
The first section summarizes chapters six and seven, whereas the second section of 
chapter eight discusses how decision-making in practice is constructed on the basis of 
chapter four where the SG approach is broken down into the types of administrative 
rules as defined by Cyert and March (1992), but explained and understood within the 
context of behavioral issues in terms of appropriateness. In chapter nine, the conclusion 
answers the problem statement framed in this chapter, and in the second part of chapter 
nine, some managerial implications of the findings are pointed out. The chapter ends by 
suggesting a number of issues for further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Stage-Gate: a selected structured and formal approach  
 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe a selected formal and structured approach and 
identify new ways to analyze such an approach. The SG approach is the most common 
way to manage the product development process (Griffin 1997a), and therefore it has 
been selected as an example of formal and structured methods. To establish a frame of 
reference for the subsequent chapters, this chapter looks at the content and history of the 
SG approach as described by Cooper, Kleinschmidt et al.9. As mentioned in the intro-
ductory chapter, the normative SG approach is seen as an installation of rationalization 
in the product development process. It includes three fundamental mechanisms to 
achieve the promised advantages.  
First, the SG approach focuses on decision-making as a gradual allocation of re-
sources in addition to an increase of information on the project. Ideally, this procedure 
should reduce the risk. Therefore, the product development process must be seen as a 
gradual process where the project will be killed or reworked as soon as the evaluation of 
its commercial success is negative. Second, uncertainty is part of product development 
and information is normatively a means to deal with the uncertainty of a product’s 
                                                 
9 Cooper 1975; Cooper 1979a; Cooper 1979b; Cooper 1982; Cooper 1985; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 
1986; Cooper 1988; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1988; Cooper 1990; Cooper and De Brentani 1991; Cooper 
and Kleinschmidt 1991b; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1991a; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1991c; Cooper and 
De Brentani 1992; Cooper 1992; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1993a; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1993b; 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1993d; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1993e; Cooper 1993; Cooper and Klein-
schmidt 1993c; Cooper 1994a; Cooper 1994c; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1994; Cooper 1994b; Cooper 
and Kleinschmidt 1995; Cooper 1996; Cooper and Edgett 1997; Cooper 1997; Cooper 1998; Cooper and 
others 1998; Cooper and others 1999; Cooper and others 2000; Cooper 2000b; Cooper 2000a; Cooper 
2001; Cooper et al. 2001; Cooper et al. 2002a; Cooper et al. 2002b. 
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physical materialization, which is unknown from the outset of the process just as the 
product cannot be tested until it has been designed conceptually. Information produced 
in the stages must therefore be made available at the gates, which in turn must apply the 
documented information in a standardized manner. Third, a mechanism of the SG ap-
proach is to prescribe the performance of a number of different activities to ensure that 
the qualities of the decisions in the system are not compromised through a lack of suffi-
cient information. This applies particularly to marketing related activities where Cooper 
identified a number of shortcomings and consequently a negative influence on perform-
ance. The SG approach was initially developed on the basis of research into factors de-
termining success and failure of product development projects in a number of industrial 
companies. The functionality of the stage-gate approach is illustrated in figure 2.1 
where documented information is the link between gates and stages.  
 
Figure 2.1: The generic SG approach (Cooper 2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The SG approach is divided in five gates and five stages. Initially, the approach started 
with a gate or evaluation of a product idea as illustrated in figure 2.1, but later idea gen-
eration or a discovery stage was added to the initial stage. As indicated in subsequent 
sections, the description of the SG approach goes into more details about the gates, 
whereas the description of the activities in the stages can be characterized as a checklist 
outlining activities to be performed by the organization. Gate 1, stage 1, gate 2, and 
stage 2 include the predevelopment activities before the physical development is ap-
proved in gate 3 and developed in stage 3. Post-development activities in gate 4, stage 
4, gate 5, and stage 5 deal with testing and launching the product into the market. 
Predevelopment: The initial stage may involve basis research, seeds or unfounded 
projects, and a variety of customer-based and creativity techniques. The stage is labeled 
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‘ideation’ and is followed by the first gate, which is the first formal decision setting (or 
gate review) screening the idea and deciding whether to commit initial resources to the 
project: “The project is born at this point” (Cooper 1993). If the decision is go, the 
process is now in the first preliminary investigation of the idea. This stage basically 
comprises a quick scope of the project, often done in less than a month's time (Cooper 
1993). A market and technical assessment must be made together with a first-pass fi-
nancial analysis. The screen in gate 2 is more rigorous involving a re-evaluation of the 
project in the light of the new information obtained in stage 1. The financial return is 
assessed again at gate 2, but it is only a quick and simple financial calculation (e.g. the 
pay-back method). A go-decision leads to stage 2 where the project is investigated in 
more detail and a business case is formulated and put forward. At this point, the defini-
tion "[…] protocol for the winning product" (Cooper, 1993) is a major facet of stage 2. 
A detailed technical appraisal is conducted with focus on the "do-ability" of the project. 
The result of stage 2 is a business case in combination with the development of a thor-
ough project justification and detailed plan.  
Development: The final gate prior to the development stage is gate 3, and it is the last 
point at which the project can be terminated before the costs will increase significantly 
(Cooper 2001). After gate 3, financial commitments become substantial. The results of 
the financial analysis at this gate are an important part of the entire process. If the deci-
sion is go, gate 3 includes the commitment to the product definition and an agreement 
on the project plan that charts the path forward (Cooper 1993). Plans for development, 
preliminary operations and marketing plans are reviewed and approved at this gate. A 
project team and a team leader are assigned to the project at this point. The subsequent 
third stage will witness the physical development of the product. The outcome of stage 
3 is therefore an in-house-tested prototype of the product. The emphasis in stage 3 is on 
technical work, but marketing and manufacturing activities proceed in parallel, e.g. 
market analysis and customer-feedback activities continue concurrently with the techni-
cal development. Customer opinions on the product are sought on an ongoing basis as 
the product is developed.  
Post-development: Gate 4 is characterized as the "post-development" review (Cooper 
1993) and involves a continued evaluation of the product’s attractiveness. Development 
activities are reviewed and checked ensuring that the work has been completed in a 
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quality fashion and that the developed product is consistent with the original definition 
specified at gate 3. Another important activity is a revised financial analysis based on 
the new and more accurate data. Stage 4 tests and validates the entire viability of the 
project: the product itself, the production process, customer acceptance, and the eco-
nomics of the project. Several activities are conducted, which will later be described in 
detail. The final gate, gate 5 is labeled the “go to launch”-stage and can metaphorically 
be described as “the door to full commercialization” (Cooper 2001). Stage 5 includes 
the implementation of both the marketing launch plan and the production or operation 
plan. Finally, the project must be terminated within a period of 6-19 months after which 
the new product will become a “regular product” in the firm’s product line (Cooper 
1993).  
The chapter continues as follows: First, the historical context will be addressed 
briefly. The second and third section of the chapter will include a detailed description of 
the gates and stages respectively, whereas the final section will focus on the third gen-
eration, which (Cooper 1994c; Cooper 2001) has only described briefly. 
 
 
2.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
NASA developed the first generation model in the 1960's and termed the process 
Phased Project Planning (PPP). PPP was a detailed planning scheme for cooperating 
with contractors and suppliers and broke development into discrete phases with review 
points (Griffin et al 1997)10. According to Cooper (1994c), the method focused on con-
trol and measurement to ensure that the project proceeded according to schedule and 
that every activity was completed in time. The PPP-method was engineer driven and 
applied to the physical design and development of the project. Therefore, it did not in-
clude any of the business disciplines as e.g. marketing. Cooper (1994c: 5) describes a 
NASA-executive, who  
 
                                                 
10 Addressing the origin of SG, Richard Anderson argues, "Historically, the PPD approach derives its 
conceptual firepower from the Phased Program Planning (PPP) used by NASA to develop missiles and 
other large-scale development programs. Today's industry users have modified NASA's PPP approach, 
variously calling the resulting system "Phased Development Process, "Structured Development Process, 
"Stage-Gate, or sometimes "Phase Review Process" (Anderson 1996). 
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[…] claims that the bureaucracy inherent in the method meant that NASA's 
PPP-method managed to double the development time of every project it 
was used on. 
 
 The second-generation SG process resembles the first-generation method to the extent 
that it also includes identifiable and discrete stages preceded by review points or gates 
(Cooper 1990; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1991b). The second-generation SG process 
was described in detail in (Cooper’s 1993) first book. It was based on extensive research 
into which factors separate the successful projects and firms from less successful ones 
(Cooper 1994c). The second-generation SG process differs from PPP primarily in two 
ways: First, the process is cross-functional involving activities from many different de-
partments within the firm. No stages are "owned" by one function. Cooper argues that 
the "nature of the activities virtually forces the use of a cross-functional project team 
approach" (ibid, p. 5). Second, marketing and manufacturing are integral parts of the 
product development process contrary to the PPP method, which tended to focus solely 
on engineering or technical schemes (Cooper 1994c). Subsequently, Cooper (1994c) 
and Cooper (2001: 8) introduced the third generation process with  
 
[…] particular emphasis on efficiency: on speeding up an already effective 
second-generation stage-gate process and on more efficient allocation of de-
velopment resources.  
 
The third generation differs from the second generation with respect to a number of 
"fundamental F's" (Cooper 1994c), which have developed from five to a total of seven 
(Cooper 2001). The F's will be described in detail in a later section of the chapter, but 
deal e.g. with the effect of making the SG approach more ‘fluid’ with overlapping and 
fluid stages. The SG approach described in this study will primarily be based on the 
second generation, but it will also include the latest generation11.  
Cooper developed NewProd III in the eighties, a database containing more than 203 
retrospective analyses of new product projects in 125 industrial product firms. Here, the 
success of a new product was analyzed with respect to whether the product's profit ex-
pectations were met or exceeded the company's financial or profitability criterion for 
success, the profitability level, the new product's market share after year three, and the 
                                                 
11 Material on the third generation SG approach is scarce. Some firms may experience the effects of a 
second generation without considering the claimed extra benefits from the third generation SG process. 
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degree to which the product met the company’s profit and sales objectives (Cooper 
1997). Some of the products were successes and others failures. Based on these find-
ings, Cooper (1993; 1994a) identified a pattern for success summarized in the following 
factors for product success (Cooper 1993) in a descending order of importance: 1) Supe-
rior products that deliver real and unique advantages to users tend to be far more suc-
cessful than "me too" products. Superior products meet customer needs better than 
competitive products and have a relatively higher product quality. A primary condition 
for gaining superiority is working with the goal of superiority and advantage, 2) suc-
cessful products must have a sharper definition prior to development. Cooper (1993) 
claims that the projects with a sharp definition were 3.3 times more likely to be success-
ful with NPD, 3) quality of execution of technological activities, 4) NPD must be at-
tacked from a position of technological strength, 5) quality of execution in predevelop-
ment activities, 6) a strong link between the sales force, distribution, advertising re-
sources and skills, marketing research, intelligence resources, and the firm’s customer 
service capabilities, 7) NewProd III showed that many companies were particularly de-
ficient in the way they handled the marketing side of projects. Products that targeted 
more attractive markets were more successful, 8) market attractiveness, and finally 9) 
the competitive situation and top management support (Cooper, 1993).  
According to Cooper (1993), these lessons are exploited in the SG approach. They 
constitute a “blueprint” or “process template” for management of NPD leading to suc-
cess. The effects on performance are several: increased success, reduced time-to-market 
and improved cross-functional activities within the organization.  
 
 
2.2 GATES 
 
The following section is concerned with the activities of the stages, thus providing the 
basis for decision-making at the gates by making information available through docu-
mentation. According to Cooper (2001), the quality of the stages is concerned with “do-
ing projects right” (p. 213) and intimately linked to effectiveness. Effective innovation 
project management prioritizes quality by making as much information available as 
possible on market, technology and finance issues, which is reflected in the criteria that 
do not emphasize time. The second theme of this section focuses on “doing the right 
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projects” (Cooper 2001), which to Cooper (ibid.) is equivalent with the issue of effi-
ciency. The SG approach consists in the generic form of 5 gates and the purpose of each 
gate is the same: to assess the quality of the project: “[…] ensuring that your business, 
do them right” (Cooper 2001: 213). Accordingly, gates deal with three quality issues:  
 
a. Quality of execution: have the steps in the previous stage been executed in a 
quality fashion? 
 
b. The quality of the business rationale: is the project still attractive from an eco-
nomic and business standpoint?  
 
c. The quality of the action plan (are the requested resources sound).  
 
Gates are similar in format and consist of three basic components for quality decision-
making: deliverables (basis for decision-making), evaluation of deliverables compared 
with criteria, and output (ibid.). Cooper (2001: 232) argues that it is a typical problem 
that project managers do not understand the expectations of senior management at the 
gates:  
 
[…] hence they arrive at gate meetings lacking much of the information that 
senior management needs in order to make timely go/kill decisions. To 
avoid this situation, deliverables must be defined in advance for each gate. 
These are what the project leader and team must deliver to the next gate; 
they are the results of activities in the preceding stage. The list of deliver-
ables for a gate becomes the set of objectives for the project leader and 
team. A standard menu of deliverables is specified for each gate. Also, at 
the preceding gate both the path forward and the deliverables for the next 
gate are decided.  
 
Each gate has its own list of criteria to be used by the ‘gatekeepers’, which top-
management’s participants at the gates are called. The gate decision is based on these 
criteria that include go/kill and/or project prioritization criteria. Gate criteria include two 
types: must-meet and should-meet. First, must-meet criteria entail yes/no questions; a 
single ‘no’ might signal a kill decision. Checklists are based on the usual format for 
must-meet criteria. Second, should-meet criteria are highly desirable, but a ‘no’ to one 
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question will not kill the project. Rather, these questions score, and a point count or pro-
ject score is determined; “Scoring models handle the should-meet criteria well" (Cooper 
2001: 233). The criteria may be quantitative as well as qualitative. The design of the 
scheme for must-meet criteria or checklist questions is typically related to strategic is-
sues, feasibility questions, and resource availabilities such as does the new product pro-
ject fit the strategic direction of the business? Is its development technically feasible? 
Are the required resources available? A ‘no’ to these questions - for example, a lack of 
strategic fit – should be enough to kill the project. A gate 3 situation is illustrated in ta-
ble 2.1: 
 
Table 2.1: Documentation, criteria and output in gate 3 (Cooper 2001) 
Documentation Criteria (must meet) Output 
o User needs and wants 
o Competitive analysis 
o Market analysis 
o Detailed technical 
assessment 
o Concept testing 
o Financial/business 
analysis 
o Plans of actions 
o Strategic alignment 
o Market Need Existence 
o Reasonable likelihood of 
technical feasibility 
o Product advantage 
o Meets environmental heals 
o Positive return vs. risk 
o No show stopper 
 
o Go 
o Kill 
o Hold 
o Recycle 
o Cond. go 
 
 
By contrast, the should-meet criteria or scoring model questions describe the relative 
attractiveness of the project (Cooper 2001).  A negative answer in terms of a no will not 
kill the project with these criteria. A range of low scores may indicate an unattractive 
project that is not interesting enough to pursue. The gate-criteria are designed to enable 
gatekeepers to evaluate a project or several projects at a gate meeting. Following the 
presentation, the project is debated and each criterion is discussed, evaluated and rated 
one by one. As illustrated in figure 2.1, five different decisions can be made at a gate 
meeting. It is not possible to defer decisions (Cooper 2001: 233):  
 
Go means just that; the project is approved, and the resources, both people 
and money, are committed by the gatekeepers. Kill means 'terminate the 
project': stop all work on it, and spend no more time or money here. And 
don't resurrect the project under a new name in a few months!  
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Hold means that the project passes the gate criteria – it is a good project - but better pro-
jects are available, and at present there are no resources for the project (Cooper 2001). 
A Hold decision is a prioritization issue (Cooper 2001). Recycle is analogous to 'rework' 
on a production line. Recycle signals that the project team has failed to deliver the ex-
pected results (Cooper 2001). The third generation SG will be described in more detail 
in a later section, but Cooper (Cooper 1994c: 10) also introduced a type of output char-
acterized as conditional Go decisions:   
 
This type of conditional decision making is contrary to today's absolute or 
black-and-white schemes. To make a hard-and-fast Go/Kill-decision at to-
day's Gates means that all the needed information must be on the table. By 
contrast a 'conditional Go' means that 'on the basis of the partial information 
available, the project looks good. For now, the project is Go but the incom-
plete information delivered (and positive) by XYZ date. Otherwise the pro-
ject will be halted on XYZ date.  
 
Cooper describes this type of gate as 'fuzzy' (Cooper 1994c) p. 10, which will be am-
plified in the following section. Decisions are reached based on the criteria scores: 
"Progressive companies use scorecards or computer-assisted scoring at the gate meet-
ings, so that scores can be displayed and differences debated" (Cooper 2001:  234). 
Must-meet criteria in Gate 3 are illustrated in table 2.2: 
  
Table 2.2: Must-meet criteria (Cooper 2001; Cooper and others 2001) 
Criteria  Rating 
Business Strategy Fit o Congruence 
o Impact 
0-10 
Product Competitive  
Advantage 
o Customer benefits 
o Meet customer needs 
o Customer value for money 
0-10 
Market Attractiveness o Market Size 
o Market Growth 
o Competitive Situation 
0-10 
Leverages of  
Core Competencies 
o Marketing synergies 
o Technological synergies 
o Production/processing synergies 
0-10 
Technical Feasibility o Size of technical gap 
o Technical complexity 
o Technical uncertainty 
o Demonstrated technical feasibility 
0-10 
Financial Reward o Expected profitability 
o Return (IRR%) 
0-10 
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o Payback method 
o Time to commercial start-up 
 
Gatekeepers are essential as they make the go/kill decisions and decide on resource al-
location. R.G. Cooper (Cooper 2001) has introduced a number of 'rules of thump', 
which include:  
 
o Gatekeepers at any gate must have the authority to approve the resources required 
for the next stage. 
 
o Gatekeepers must represent different functional areas within the firm - including 
R&D, marketing, engineering, operations, sales, purchasing, and quality assurance.  
 
o Usually the gatekeepers change from gate to gate (Cooper 2001). Typically, the 
gatekeeper group at gate 1 is small, perhaps "three or four people who need not to be 
the most senior in the firm. Here the spending level is quite low. By Gate 3, how-
ever, where financial and resource commitments are substantial, the gatekeepers 
typically include more senior managers, such as the leadership team of the business" 
(Cooper 2001) p. 236. 
 
o Cooper recommends some continuity of gatekeepers from gate to gate: "The compo-
sition of the evaluation group should not change totally … for example, some mem-
bers of the leadership team - perhaps the heads of the marketing and R&D depart-
ments - might be at Gate 2, with the full leadership team at Gate 3” (Cooper 2001p. 
236). 
 
2.3 STAGES  
 
Implementation of the required activities is based on three fundamental types of activi-
ties related to market, technical and financial issues, including project management ac-
tivities in some stages. The initial activities of idea generation are not included in table 
(2.1). Cooper (2001: 154) argues that the  
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…trigger for the SG process is a new idea, where technological possibilities 
are matched with market needs and expected market demand. A good new 
product idea can make or break the project.  
 
Cooper (2001) recommends that the following activities are carried out for ideation: 
First, securing idea generation from top-down and bottom-up as both approaches have 
their place in SG. According to Cooper (ibid.), the difference appears in the extent of 
direction, e.g. top-down idea generation is directed more by strategic considerations 
than bottom-up idea generation, which often originates from day-to-day operations. 
Second, continue to look for disruption in the context of the customer's industry. Cooper 
(2001) suggests that large problems stem from major shifts in an industry, and problems 
are followed by big ideas. Third, the development of scenarios is also an important as-
pect of ideation. Scenarios should include the expected future, but also alternate scenar-
ios. Cooper (ibid.) states that alternate scenarios help decision makers to be more "[…] 
sensitive to signals of change" (ibid: 160). Subsequently, it is important to identify the 
primary decisions faced by managers (ibid.). Use of Voice-of-Customer research will 
uncover new opportunities. Cooper (2001) suggests three methods to Voice-of-
Customer research. An anthropological style of research, sometimes labeled "camping 
out" (ibid: 162). Product value analysis is an experiential method where customers in-
teract with facets of the product and express their views, concerns, and difficulties 
(Cooper 2001: 163). The third method is to identify market trends and needs by making 
customer surveys or focus groups. Another point is to work with lead customers.  
 
"[I]f you work with an average customer, you'll get average ideas. But, if 
you identify a selected group of innovative or lead users, and work closely 
with them, then expect much more innovative new products" (Cooper 2001: 
165).  
 
Addressing the technology-push, Cooper (2001) has devised a particular SG model to 
organize ‘science-projects’. According to Cooper (2001), the SG process for technology 
development (SG TD) differs from the standard product-oriented process that allows 
much more experimentation. The output from the modified SG TD process is not a new 
product or a new manufacturing process, but new knowledge or capabilities that may be 
a platform for new products or processes. Another difference is the number of stages 
and gates. The SG TD process consists of three gates and two stages. The criteria are 
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much more strategic than financial in the traditional SG process. Cooper (2001) de-
scribes an example in which a Japanese company, TORAY CHEMICALS, uses the fol-
lowing criteria for evaluating their technology developments projects: degree of strate-
gic fit and strategic importance to the corporation, ability to achieve strategic leverage, 
potential for reward, likelihood of technical feasibility, and likelihood of commercial 
success. Finally, Cooper (2001) stresses that it is important to harness the creative abil-
ity of the organization and suggests a number of ways: 1) establish a proactive idea fo-
cal point - an 'on ramp' - and work with the idea sources, 2) set up an idea bank, 3) try 
immersion - then harvest the ideas, 4) amplify thin ideas, 5) competitors trigger ideas, 6) 
trade shows are excellent sources of ideas, 7) trade publications provide ideas from 
around the world, 8) review patents - the universal clearinghouse, 9) suppliers are an 
untapped source of ideas, 10) universities are a brain trust in your backyard, 11) imple-
ment an in-house suggestion scheme, and 12) provide scouting time to promote creativ-
ity. 
 The first stage of preliminary investigation involves what (Cooper 2001) describes as 
a "quick-and-dirty" market study. The purpose is to determine whether the proposed 
product has any commercial prospects. The task is to find out quickly and at a minimal 
cost as much as possible about market size, growth, segments, customer needs and in-
terest, and competition (ibid). Usually, this stage is completed within less than a month 
(ibid.). The purpose of the Preliminary Technical assessment is to establish preliminary, 
rough, technical and product performance objectives, undertake a very preliminary 
technical feasibility study and pinpoint possible technical risks. The preliminary busi-
ness and financial assessment follows the preliminary, technical and market assess-
ments. The purpose of the business assessment is to map out the strategic and competi-
tive rationale for the project, including what (Cooper 2001) characterizes as a core com-
petence assessment giving a preliminary assessment of whether the project requires 
partnering or outsourcing relationships. The financial assessment estimates expected 
sales, costs, and required investment.  
The second stage is concerned with building the business case. This stage is the most 
difficult and cost generating of the predevelopment stages, and (Cooper 2001: 184) em-
phasizes:  
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Moreover this is the critical homework stage - that makes or breaks the pro-
ject.  
 
This stage includes three main components: (1) Product and project definition, (2) pro-
ject justification, and (3) the project plan. The first component should answer the "for 
whom" and "what" questions. At whom will the product be targeted, and exactly what 
will the product include in terms of benefits, features, and design requirements. The 
second component of the business case answers the ‘why’ question presenting argu-
ments for investing in the project. This component includes a review of business, finan-
cial, profitability, and risk considerations. The third component features the project 
plan, which evaluates resources - money, hours, people, and equipment.  
At the third stage, the project is go for development, and the business case plans are 
translated into concrete deliverables. The first problem is whether the final product will 
receive the same enthusiastic reception from potential customers as the product concept 
did in tests undertaken in stage 2. Technical problems may have emerged during devel-
opment forcing a relaxation of certain performance requirements or an omission of fea-
tures desired by customers (Cooper 2001). Thus, ongoing customer input and feedback 
must be maintained throughout the entire development stage. It is imperative to include 
a number of checks and tests in the game plan to ensure that the project is still on target 
as it moves forward. The key issue is: "no surprises" (ibid: 253). According to Cooper 
(2001), a second problem may occur because "the world does not stand still". The mar-
ket may have changed partway or competitors may have introduced a similar product in 
the meantime. Therefore, rapid development is an imperative.  
The output of stage 4 is a sample or a prototype and the product is partially proved 
due to the continuing customer input in stage 3. The purpose of this stage is to provide a 
final and total validation of the entire project with regard to the commercial product, its 
production and marketing. The marketing plan is an iterative process and was initiated 
in the first stages of SG. Most of the activities in stage 5 have been initiated in previous 
stages and developed further throughout the process. Stage 5 concludes the analyses and 
closes the iterative process. 
 The stage activities to be undertaken is summarized in table 2.3 where all activities 
can be categorized within four main activity areas: market, technical, financial, and pro-
ject planning.  
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Table 2.3: Stage activities overview (developed from Cooper, 2001). 
 
Overview  Stage 1 
 
Preliminary 
investigation 
Stage 2 
 
Detailed  
Investigation 
Stage 3 
 
Development 
 
Stage 4 
 
Test and vali-
dation 
Stage 5 
 
Launch 
Market Quick scop-
ing; desk re-
search only - 
preliminary 
market plan 
and product 
positioning. 
User needs 
and wants 
study, com-
petitive 
analysis 
(product 
strength), 
market and 
product 
analysis, and 
preliminary 
marketing 
plan, concept 
testing 
Customer 
input required 
continues 
throughout 
this stage, 
market devel-
opment; 
Products must 
be “genuine 
breakthrough 
products”. 
Test with cus-
tomers, pref-
erences, and 
trials (test of 
marketing 
mix), pre-test 
of market, 
identify the 
user. 
Marketing 
plan (incl. 
introduction), 
define the 
target market, 
and formulate 
product strat-
egy, market-
ing mix, 
communica-
tion, and sales 
force deci-
sions. 
Technical  Conceptual 
assessment of 
technical fea-
sibility (tech-
nical risks 
included). 
Detailed 
technical as-
sessment, 
technical 
route, virtual 
prototype, 
manufactura-
bility, pro-
duction route, 
and capital 
requirements. 
Intellectual 
property and 
regulatory 
issues (tech-
nology pro-
tection strat-
egy), and 
produc-
tion/operation
s process 
(supply route) 
 
 
 
Financial  “Sanity 
check”, pos-
sible payback 
period (no 
spreadsheets). 
Finan-
cial/business 
analysis, stra-
tegic assess-
ment. NPV, 
IR and sensi-
tivity analy-
sis. 
Update the 
detailed busi-
ness and fi-
nancial analy-
sis. 
Decide the 
data needed 
to estimate 
sales, produc-
tion, stock, 
etc. 
Situation size 
up, the final 
cost and sales 
of the plan 
including 
profit projec-
tions. 
Project plans A Go/Kill 
recommenda-
tion and ac-
tion plan for 
stage 2 (time-
line, re-
sources, next 
gate).  
Recommen-
dation for 
project 
Go/Kill and 
detailed ac-
tion plan for 
stage 3-5. 
Launch date 
is set. 
Develop ac-
tion plan for 
stage 4 (ac-
tions, re-
sources, tim-
ing and mile-
stones).  
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2.4 THIRD GENERATION SG APPROACH 
 
Companies who have successfully installed the generic process - termed the “second 
generation process” (Cooper 2001) - are moving toward what Cooper (2001) describes 
as the “third generation version” of the process (Griffin 1997a). According to Cooper, 
the first-generation process was a phased review process that appeared in the 1960s. It 
was largely engineering driven and featured laborious check-offs at each review point to 
ensure the successful completion of a number of key tasks. Thus, this method was more 
of a measurement and control methodology, designed to ensure that the project was 
proceeding as it should and that every facet of it was completed on time (Cooper 2001: 
145):  
 
Today’s second-generation process, as described so far in the chapter, is a 
step change from the phased review process of the 1960s. SG also consists 
of identifiable and discrete stages preceded by review points or gates. But 
that is where the similarities end. SG overcomes many of the objections 
found in the first-generation processes. SG is cross-functional, with no de-
partment owning any stage – marketing and operations are now integral 
parts of the process. The gates are also cross-functional, so that there is 
alignment of senior people on projects priorities. The process is more holis-
tic. There is greater emphasis on the front end (up-front homework and a 
stronger customer input). It specifies stage activities and best practices. And 
it builds in parallel processing.  
 
SG processes are perceived as “evergreen processes”, i.e. constantly evolving and im-
proving (Cooper 2001). Experienced ‘Stage-Gaters’ have improved their processes to 
emphasize efficiency, speed up an already effective second generation process and allo-
cate development resources more efficiently. According to a PDMA survey (Griffin 
1997a), almost one-half of the companies that adopted SG processes have redesigned 
them to include some of the elements of my third-generation process. The third-
generation process is a natural evolution, once the second-generation SG process has 
been successfully installed in your business. It features six fundamental F’s” (Cooper 
2001: 145) including:  
 
1. Flexibility: “[…] the process is not a straitjacket or a hard-and-fast set of rules. 
Rather, each project can be routed through the process according to its specific 
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level and needs. Stages can be omitted and gates combined, provided the deci-
sions are made consciously and with a full understanding of the risks involved” 
(ibid., p. 145). The gate is ‘fuzzy’ with reference to a “fuzzy logic” where the 
outcome is not binary, but may involve various states in between. As a conse-
quence, a go decision e.g. conditional on some future events may be made. 
 
2. Fuzzy gate concept where the project can act as its own gatekeeper. Cooper 
(2001) makes a reference to NORTEL NETWORKS where the notion of a self-
managed approach has been introduced, but the “[…] the jury is still out on this 
approach”.   
 
3. Fluidity: “The third-generation new product process is fluid and adaptable. Ac-
tivities are not married to specific stages, but rather there are overlapping stages. 
Some activities, normally done in the next stage, will begin before the previous 
stage is completed” (ibid.). 
 
4. Focus: “The third-generation new product process is focused, much like a fun-
nel, where poor projects are weeded out at each gate and resources are reallo-
cated to the best projects” (ibid: 148). 
 
5. Facilitated: Cooper (2001) recommends using a project manager or other organ-
izational facilities. Particularly, in large companies the process manager’s posi-
tion must be full-time.   
 
6. Forever Green: SG processes are constantly renewed, redesigned, and improved 
as user companies gain experience from the approach. Some of the general im-
provements that businesses have made include the five F’s listed above. Other 
companies have adjusted their SG processes to suit their specific needs. Cooper 
(2001) argues that the first step is to strive for a basic and effective new product 
process incorporating only some of the elements (the F’s). Cooper (2001: 150) 
uses the metaphor of an automobile, where it is necessary to learn to drive first 
and follow all the rules and “[…] with experience, the professional driver does 
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some things automatically: and he learns when certain rules can be broken with-
out additional risk in order to speed up the driving”.  
 
7. The seventh F is fallibility and represents a possible negative consequence. The 
third-generation process with flexibility, fluidity “and fuzzy gates introduces 
much more discretion to project leaders, teams, and senior managers”. “The new 
process is more delicate, sophisticated, and sensitive, and thus it requires a more 
experienced, professional management approach. Using the automobile drive 
analogy, with more discretion over the rules and with increased speed, comes an 
increased risk of disaster” (ibid.).  
 
The significant difference between the second and third generation is the gates that can 
be described as12: 
 
Figure 2.2: Third generation gates (developed from Rosenau 1996 p. 8) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 illustrates two types of the “conditional go” decision type introduced with the 
third generation SG approach.  
 
                                                 
12 See also Krishnan and others (1997) where the limitations of concurrent engineering were examined 
with respect to overlapping stages. 
Work underway 
Work may commence and proceed 
for a defined, limited time awaiting 
remaining deliverables. 
Some tasks (e.g. long lead items) 
may be authorized; next stage is not 
yet - and may never be -authorized. 
Some deliverables not yet 
completed e.g. a test report 
Permissive 
Permeable 
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2.5 CONCLUSION 
 
SG is a conceptual model for managing the NPD process. According to the normative 
literature, it is a facilitating management tool to keep the risk associated with new prod-
uct development to a minimum by enforcing decisions through predefined criteria at 
review gates and breaking the whole product process from idea to launch into five small 
stages to guide the concurrent information-generating activities in the cross-functional 
project team. However, the model is much more elaborate in the description of how to 
undertake the decision-setting (Gate reviews) than in the description of the activities 
required in the stages, where Cooper and Kleinschmidt emphasize the control of the 
output and at the gates focus on the process of input, computing and a predefined output 
type.  
The early work is focused on the stages and their performance, but later in the research 
the focus changes to include the gate reviews. However, the coordination between the 
stages and the gates is of paramount importance to performance, and despite the relaxa-
tion reflected in the so-called ‘F’s in his latter work, Cooper et al (2002a; 2000b) has 
recently insisted that the stage must not overlap the decision-setting thus abandoning a 
critical property included in the third generation. The risk is that cost generating activi-
ties that should have been stopped are continued. However, some of the requirements 
have been relaxed, but the third generation SG approach has by no means been concep-
tualized to the same extent as the second generation even though 12 percent of all US 
companies apply a third generation process (Griffin 1997). 
The activities required at each stage are described and to some extent normatively 
elaborated in terms of how to conduct the activities. But Cooper’s concern is that the 
activities are actually carried out without omitting any; the success of the project is 
linked to whether all activities have been performed. Thus, the SG approach described 
here can be characterized a management technique, which is to be studied by analyzing 
how the SG approach becomes a management technology through the perspective of 
appropriateness (to be presented in chapter four). The solution to bring improved per-
formance (efficiency, effectiveness and reduced time-to-market) might not be as direct 
as assumed by Cooper (et al.). 
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But before continuing this line of enquiry, the next chapter will address the issues 
raised by the criticizing literature, which is categorized into four main issue followed by 
sources investigation into decision-making and PD. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Issues raised by the previous literature on the Stage-
Gate approach 
 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a number of critical voices in recent research, 
who have addressed potential limitations and problems in the SG approach, which 
roughly can be divided into the following areas: idea generation, intensity, and stages. 
Other sources have also been identified (De Brentani 2001; Walwyn and others 2002; 
Davis 2002; Barrow 2001; Radnor and Noke 2002), but they do not focus directly on 
the SG approach. The aim of this chapter is to describe the literature13 in the three areas 
explicitly concerned with the SG approach, including literature on decision-making and 
management control literature, in order to present how other research has treated the SG 
approach. 
 
 
3.1 IDEA GENERATION 
 
Since the appearance of the SG approach in Cooper and Kleinschmidt’s version (see 
chapter two), Cooper (2001) has added a ‘discovery’ phase (stage zero) to secure ap-
pearance of ideas to be fed into the SG approach. Smith and others (1999), Shaw and 
                                                 
13 The literature has been identified by searching the ABI Inform, Elsevier, and Business Source Primer 
databases with “stage-gate” as the search string. There was no difference when searching in two separate 
words or with a hyphen. 
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others (2000), Hughes and Chafin 1996, Stevens and others (1999) and Perel (2002) 
have all  criticized the SG approach with respect to creativity.  
Smith et al (1999) argue that the “fuzzy front end” (p. 15) is defined poorly and con-
stitutes an area where companies that have successfully implemented a SG approach 
might optimize due to an increase in the quality of new ideas. Smith and others (ibid.) 
refer to a benchmarking study claiming that out of 3,000 unwritten ideas, only 125 writ-
ten ideas emerge for stage gate development. Out of these, only one will become a 
commercial success, which brings an emphasis on the front end and the design of “an 
organizational process” to manage the inventiveness in the first stages of the SG ap-
proach by decoupling the first stage from the rest of the approach. Research by Shaw et 
al (2000) indicates that out of 100 ideas entering the first stage, only 13 will be com-
mercialized successfully. Hughes and Chafin (1996) suggest that an increased emphasis 
on product development as an iterative process with a focus on customer value, con-
tinuous learning and building consensus among the project team members is a better 
alternative than the SG approach since these issues have not been raised as a particular 
concern (see chapter two). Rather than building a decision-model with a weighted sum 
score for predicting the success of a new idea as suggested by Cooper (2001), the au-
thors suggest a model that will work as a consensus facilitator allowing team members 
to see how closely they agree (Hughes and Chafin 1996). The ‘linearity’ of the SG ap-
proach must be reduced by allowing what Stevens et al (1999: 458) describe as “leaps 
of creativity & branching”. Therefore, they suggest incorporating some of the same non-
linear thoughts on the PD process and select innovation people for the early stages of 
the SG approach teaching the project team business discipline. In this way, the ideas 
will have a breakthrough character reducing the problem that only one out of 3,000 
ideas will prevail before the first gate review. In addition: 
 
Innovation is an iterative process and forcing it into a linear mold offers sen-
ior management too many tempting opportunities to demonstrate the lack of 
courage by killing ideas (Perel 2002). 
 
Contrary to these scholars, Buggie (2002) supports the SG approach by claiming that 
fuzziness is at the front end and not that the front end of the SG approach is fuzzy. Fur-
thermore, Buggie (ibid: 11) argues that the SG approach is a conventional project-
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management process incorporating milestones as it proceeds, which might indicate that 
the criticism raised by Smith and others (1999), Shaw and others (2000), Hughes and 
Chafin (1996), Stevens and others (1999) and Perel (2002) to some extent is out of con-
text compared with the motives behind the design of the SG approach. The SG approach 
is an administrative system for innovation rather than a system designed for creativity 
and idea production.   
 
 
3.2 RIGIDITY 
 
The second area of rigidity addresses compliance with procedure and is a central issue 
in the SG approach. The ‘inventors’, Cooper and Kleinschmidt (see chapter two for the 
origin of the SG approach), emphasized that companies had to conduct their “home-
work” assuring that activities had not been skipped and objective decision-making 
would be carried out. Interestingly, Shaw et al. (2000), who developed a revised model 
based of the SG approach motivated by a desire to reduce development time and re-
sources, also argue that if the SG approach is employed rigidly and more for “its own 
sake”, the result may be an actual increase in the development lead-time. Ottosson 
(1996) addresses coordination (whether to allow overlapping stages) and argues that if 
projects have to wait at each gate until all tasks or activities have been carried out, it is 
difficult to start working on another stage before the previous one has been completed. 
Such a procedure will result in time delays and inefficient use of the company’s human 
resources. This concern has been addressed by the third generation SG (Cooper 2001), 
which relaxes the need for complying with the procedure before moving into the next 
phase. Rosenau (1996) has presented two types of these gates (see figure 2.2). Curtis 
and Ellis (1998) argue that the key benefit of the SG approach is its ability to involve 
general (top) management in the decision-making - especially at the early stages. Jen-
kins et al. (1997a; 1997b) address the concern about rigidity by stating that:  
 
These methodologies do have some potential weaknesses that management 
must address. As has been stated earlier these procedures should be seen as 
guidelines and if an overly rigid set of rules is applied to product develop-
ment, responsibility may actually be taken away from the core team. If this 
is allowed to happen the desired effects of empowering the team, and allow-
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ing them to develop the process will not be achieved. It is thus important to 
remember that phases can, and should be overlapped in places. If tasks are 
allowed to queue at phase review points, time to market may actually be in-
creased (Jenkins et al 1997a:  391). 
 
Jenkins et al (1997) argue that if the formal and structured approach is not applied as a 
‘guideline’ but an imperative, the project team might be demotivated and the projects 
might be queuing before the gate reviews. Perel (2002: 16) uses the terminology from a 
“straight-jacket” to describe the SG approach arguing that it will impede promising pro-
jects and “[…] prolong the agony of losers”. Finally, O'Connor (1994) argues that many 
companies have been asking for a PD process with overlapping phases.  
Cooper (1994) has presented a “conditional go” decision output type that to some ex-
tent permits overlapping stages (third generation SG approach). Flexibility in applica-
tion of the SG approach has been introduced by applying various number of gates based 
on an evaluation of the risk-level associated with each project: a full scale model for 
large, high risk projects (five gates), a fast track process for lower risk projects (three 
gates) and finally a significant customer request process with two gates. However, in the 
most recent work by (Cooper et al. 2002b: 45), the third generation SG model is not 
mentioned and the authors maintain the earlier requirement for: 
 
“[…] tough Go/Kill decisions are built into your new-product process, 
where all products are carefully scrutinized, and weak ones really killed”.  
 
In sum, the application of formal and structured approaches affects the innovation proc-
ess and appears to be an unsettled issue in the literature on the SG approach. In their 
most recent work, Cooper et al. (2002a; 200b) maintain that projects should not be al-
lowed to proceed before a formal approval, and therefore overlapping stages must not 
occur. Thus, application of the SG approach is a central theme when the approach is 
employed in an organizational praxis as a management technology. Since the applica-
tion affects the innovation process in several ways, further research is needed.  
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3.3 STAGES 
 
Stages and decision-making are closely related to rigidity (Anderson 1996; Phillips and 
others 1999; Rochford and Rudelius 1997; Stevens et al. 1999). Anderson (1996) men-
tions particularly the SG approach in the second approach as a Phased Product Devel-
opment (PPD)-approach to PD characterized by segmenting the PD-process into a con-
tinuum of phases or stages. To complete a development phase, a checklist of “exit crite-
ria” must be met and approved by a Phase Review Board. In PPD, risk is managed by 
allocating development funds based on completing each phase of development success-
fully. In view of what Anderson (1996) characterizes as Integrated Product Develop-
ment (IPD), PPD is activity oriented (phase structured) whereas IPD is information and 
decision oriented. IPD focuses on intense communication and information gathering 
among team members, which allows development to move swiftly using partial infor-
mation. This information use is blurring structured-phased development (Anderson 
1996). In IPD (ibid: 33), project teams are empowered to be responsible for project con-
cepts, resources and delivery making it possible to overlap and integrate development 
activities. Thus, 
  
“[…] the focal point of IPD perceives development as an invisible informa-
tion and decision-making process rather than a tangible compartmentaliza-
tion of building block activities along a product maturity curve”. 
 
According to Anderson (1996), the third-generation SG approach is in line with IPD 
and the second-generation SG approach is in line with PPD. Anderson (1996) suggests 
that PPD provides a disciplined system for managing product development by ensuring 
that steps are not skipped, “quality stays high” and technical and marketing risks are 
controlled by senior management. The risks are managed by allocating development 
funds based on the successful completion of each phase. Projects do not take on a life of 
their own and must prove again and again that they are winners. PPD focuses on gain-
ing early market information and underwrites the screening of winners from losers in 
the product pipeline. This ensures a market-driven process rather than a technically 
driven one (ibid.). Through the control procedures of the review board, PPD also pro-
vides opportunities for senior functional managers on all products in the pipeline. Ac-
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cording to Anderson (1996: 31), IPD is founded in the history of developing military 
aircrafts at the LOCKHEED Corporation:  
 
Lockheed's Skunk Works started in a large rented, and remotely located cir-
cus tent. But rather than accenting separate autonomous units today's modi-
fied team model knits development projects into a company's existing struc-
ture. Although a team assumes responsibility for new product delivery, it 
remains a part of the texture of the company even if it locates in a remote 
area. The modified architecture is usually called Concurrent Engineering, 
Simultaneous Engineering, or IPD. 
 
Senior Management outlines a broad concept challenge that becomes the basis for a spe-
cific product development agreement or what Anderson (1996) describes as a contract 
between the project team and senior management. The contract specifies cost, quality, 
schedule and other "negotiated goals to be met by the team” (p. 31). The IPD team is 
multifunctional and led by a respected project manager with responsibility for project 
resources and development decisions. The team consists of a small number of core 
members collocated in one area with additional time-shared experts (Anderson 1996). 
The team establishes the development path using what Anderson (1996) describes as:  
 
"Concurrent and overlapping development practices that accent early plan-
ning and decision making. The focus is on intense communication and in-
formation gathering among team members. This allows development to 
move swiftly using partial information, thus blurring structured phases of 
development. To keep the team honest, metrics are identified to track results 
in aiding the team and senior management" (Anderson 1996: 31-32).  
 
Anderson (1996) supports the notion of an IPD process where the project team is em-
powered. The project is not managed through a SG approach, but the team has a desig-
nated budget and is decoupled from departmental relationships to ensure the informa-
tion flow. Information intensity and empowerment enable a dismissal of the SG func-
tionality to the effect that stages as a notion are dismissed. 
The study by Phillips and others (1999: 290) examined the SG approaches of six 
large firms based on a definition of stage gate as:  
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[…] a framework, which is applied to the company’s product development 
process. The framework aids the process and enables the efficient and effec-
tive movement of a new product from idea to launch”.  
 
The authors regard the SG approach as a high-level representation for product develop-
ment. The method applied by Phillips et al. (1999) was to develop a basic SG approach 
as a control measure to contrast and compare each firm’s specific stage gate approach 
individually. The control approach included four stages: preliminary concept develop-
ment (stage one), design and development (stage two), validation (stage three) and in-
service product support (stage four)14. Phillips et al (1999) conclude that the SG ap-
proaches share the same objective of executing projects efficiently and effectively, but 
the number of phases employed by the six firms range from four to ten. However, each 
organization appears to follow the “[…] typical stages of development” (p. 291). The 
difference appears in the number and title of phases into which organizations divide 
their individual processes suggesting a classification of SG between low and high 
phased processes.  
The underlying organization of the firm has a significant influence on the choice of 
SG configuration. Organizations where each phase in the SG approach only includes a 
few stages have cross-functional teams involved throughout the life of the project. In 
comparison, organizations with high-phased processes need to enforce reviews into the 
overall Stage-Gate process to cope with a functional orientation to development. KO-
DAK, e.g., has a broad scope of businesses, is functionally organized and only applies 
cross-functional advisory groups on special issues (Phillips et al. 1999). A key competi-
tive dimension for KODAK is time to market with a very close customer-orientation. 
Therefore, the company emphasizes the initial stage of development where all customer 
needs are identified (Phillips et al 1999). Thus, the initial concept development stage is 
divided into two phases: customer mission and technical demonstration subdivided by 
an additional review. The same behavior is observed with the validation phase, which is 
divided into three phases or ‘sub-stages’ with additional ‘sub-reviews’ “[…] to obtain 
tighter control” (Phillips et al 1999).  
                                                 
14 The authors use Cooper (1990) as a source to establish a four-stage approach. However, Cooper ad-
dresses a five-stage approach in line with the description in the previous chapter. The contradiction has no 
significant influence on the discussion and the validity of the findings by Phillips et al. (1999). 
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 Rochford and Rudelius (1997) have investigated completed new product projects 
processed by an SG approach in the medical products industry with a particular empha-
sis on the comparison between new-to-the-world products and product modifications in 
terms of perceived importance of twelve PD stages by R&D, manufacturing, and mar-
keting departments. Apparently, there are variations in the use of specific PD stages:  
 
[…] the firms use the PD stages more often for new-to-the-world products 
than for product modifications, and “high-success products” utilize the PD 
stages more often than “low-success products. 
 
Based on the early work of Cooper (1990) and the study made by Booz, Allan and 
Hamilton, Rochford and Rudelius (1997) have used a theoretical derived thirteen stage 
model of the PD process focusing on the twelve stages preceding the last stage: com-
mercialization. Compared to the generic SG approach (described in chapter two), the 
parallel activities made in each stage have been turned into a stage of its own by the au-
thors. However, they are not distinct on the implications of this particular stage gate in 
terms of e.g. costs and what appears to be an extended lead-time. Based on the approach 
to PD, the study investigates four kinds of variables. The method is a questionnaire 
mailed to 215 firms with a response rate of 36%. The survey presents a number of 
managerial implications based on the findings.  
First, the relation of product innovativeness to stage importance is disclosed includ-
ing a distinction between product modifications and new-to-the-world innovativeness 
suggesting that the stages of the PD-process are more important for new-to-the-world 
products than for product modifications. The danger of skipping some of the stages may 
be critical – especially in the medical devices industry where even product modifica-
tions may require significant R&D and product testing (Rochford and Rudelius 1997). 
Cooper (2001) suggests that a fast-track version of the SG approach can be applied to 
smaller projects with  low risk, e.g. line extensions, product improvements, and modifi-
cations, which appear to be supported by Rochford and Rudelius’ (1997) research. For 
new-to-the world and product modification projects, the stages of idea generation, prod-
uct development, and in-house testing are crucial and equally important. The respon-
dents had to weight the perceived importance on a scale ranging from one (not impor-
tant) to five (critically important), and the above mentioned stages were the only ones to 
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score more than four (very important). Rochford and Rudelius (ibid.) also investigated 
what different departments perceive as important and disclose that idea generation, 
product development, and in-house testing once again are perceived as the most impor-
tant stages regardless of the department in question. The greatest difference between the 
four departments R&D, marketing/sales, manufacturing and top-management is how 
they perceive the importance of the preliminary technical analysis and market testing 
stages. In general, marketing/sales considers preliminary technical analysis, product de-
velopment, and in-house product testing to be almost as important as R&D. However, 
the reverse only applies to preliminary market analysis. The conclusion indicates that 
R&D need to value marketing-related stages in the PD-process. Third, the link between 
perceived importance and whether a specific stage actually has been performed were 
also investigated. The study discloses a number of findings (Rochford and Rudelius 
1997: 77):  
 
[…] 100% of the respondents reported their firms used the idea generation 
and product development stages for their new-to-the-world products. In con-
trast, marketing-oriented stages (preliminary market analysis, market study, 
and market testing) were used far less often for product modifications: 60% 
of the preliminary market analysis stage, 51% for the market study stages, 
and only 39% for the market testing stage.  
 
O'Connor (1994) has analyzed how to accelerate implementation by exploring the issues 
and challenges of implementing a SG approach. O'Connor (ibid.) made a simple regres-
sion of the percentage implemented and time-dedicated data, which suggested that com-
plete implementation may take over six years. Also, for companies with similar prac-
tices as those observed in the benchmarking forum, five years may be the norm for 
achieving full (70%-80% complete and benefits accrued) implementation of an PD 
process.  
 
"Another insight that the regression analysis suggests is that negative results 
may accrue during the first six months or so of implementation" (p. 184). 
Through an analysis of the dialogue and bundling the common concerns and 
actions, three key components of implementation emerge:  
 
1. Managing the organization's perceptions/expectations of and commit-
ment to the process 
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2. Developing flexibility and adaptability as a balance to the discipline and 
thoroughness of the process 
3. Causing frequent and productive dialogue between cross-functional 
teams and cross-functional top management" (O'Connor, 1994: 184). 
 
The research by Rochford and Rudelius (1997) also disclose that no two processes are 
identical; each firm creates its own customized version by emphasizing different ele-
ments and activities, but there are also remarkable similarities. Specific activities, tim-
ing of gate reviews, assignment of team members, who participate in gate reviews, who 
lead development teams, the specific role of sponsors’ differ among the processes. The 
number of gates in the six processes ranges from four to seven and gate activities differ 
somewhat for each of the processes. For instance, screening of projects, normally an 
initial gate activity, differs in each participating company. One firm maintained a data-
base of previously reviewed new product ideas. The new-ideas database included prod-
uct descriptions, analyses of the ideas, and the ultimate outcome of each idea. It enabled 
quick references to previous activities on specific ideas with the result that individual 
senior managers and teams did not have to 'recreate the wheel' in screening decisions. 
Screening at an initial gate in other firms includes variations on top management's intui-
tive assessment; weighed evaluation of fit, market attractiveness, product advantage, 
priority ranking of concepts, and identification of killer variables. Activities within 
stages also differ. For example, one firm did not create or involve multifunctional teams 
in gate activities until the third stage of development. It is extremely expensive to get 
teams together, because products are developed and launched globally. This means that 
the activities in stages one and two and the business case analysis are done in functional 
departments. The global multifunctional team comes together electronically when the 
business case has been reviewed and accepted by senior management sitting in review 
at gate three (Anderson, 1996). Finally, Anderson (1996) suggests: 
 
Another discussion theme was that of assuring potential contributors that the 
process is flexible and adaptable. This could be seen in how the processes 
were promoted to their organizations. For example, each firm gave names to 
their processes, which included phrases such as 'development process', 
'management system', 'innovation process', 'concept development', and 'de-
velopment model'. None included the phrase "Stage-Gate". This purposeful 
omission underscores a common desire to position each process as flexible 
and situational, not rigid and bureaucratic.  
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Anderson (1996) abandoned the PPD (or stage functionality) because the approach 
tends to impede the information flow within the team. Therefore, he suggests empower-
ing the team with decision-making authority and a budget based on a contract. How-
ever, the stage gate functionality is maintained by 1) Rochford and Rudelius (1997) who 
have identified the relationship between skipping stages and performance, but also sug-
gest applying a reduced model when the business risk is perceived to be low, 2) Phillips 
et al (1999) who found that the key to the number of stages is cross-organizational in-
formation flows. Consequently, companies with several departments should apply more 
stages to secure information, and 3) O'Connor (1994) who has focused on the complex-
ity of implementation claiming that flexibility must be built into the design of the ap-
proach. Stages are closely related to rigidity. The three authors above maintain the need 
for stage functionality, but one scholar (Anderson, 1996) suggests abandoning the no-
tion of stages due to a fundamental difference in the level of empowerment. Anderson 
(1996) suggests that his perception of an IPD approach is based on leadership whereas 
the others basically regard stage functionality as management control.   
 
 
3.5 MANAGEMENT CONTROL AND STRATEGY 
 
Simons (1987) has investigated the relationship between business strategy and account-
ing based control systems. The latter is defined as  
 
[…] formalized procedures and systems that use information to maintain or 
alter patterns in organizational activity.  
 
Anderson (1996) suggests that the SG approach is a control system that also can be 
identified in Simons’ (1987) definition since the SG approach is a formalized and struc-
tured approach based on information that must be documented before each gate review 
meeting. The purpose of the SG approach is normatively to govern activities into stan-
dardized activities with respect to gates and stages. As such, the SG approach can be 
regarded as a control system.    
Simons (1987) has drawn on a large number of previous studies, which have at-
tempted to test the Burn & Stalker's (ibid.) conclusion that unstructured, organic organi-
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zations with minimal formal controls are best suited to a strategy of innovation. In 
Simons’ (1987) perspective, the results of these studies are inconclusive. In an attempt 
to reconcile these differences, Miller & Friesen's (Simons 1987) research reveals that 
control in relation to the strategy of the firm is critical to understand the relationship be-
tween control and innovation. The key dimension of the Miles & Snow typology is the 
rate at which the organization changes its products or markets. On this basis, they iden-
tify three successful, generic strategies, which they label prospector, defender, and ana-
lyzer. Simon developed a H0 hypothesis claiming that control systems attributes do not 
differ between prospector and defender firms because each strategy requires a particular 
management control system. The hypothesis was rejected partly due to the following 
data (the table below) describing the correlation between ROI and attributes of the con-
trol system. The numbers suggest that prospectors pursing a value adding strategy 
through innovation are using control systems more successfully than defenders. The dif-
ference is even more pronounced when the results are decomposed into company size.  
Davila (2000) has elaborated on these studies based on a research design including 
case studies and surveys by drawing on Galbraith’s uncertainty concept (Galbraith 
1977) and examining the drives of management control systems in PD. Information 
variables on customers, product designs, time, costs, resources and profitability in a 
management control systems were examined. The findings show that there is a positive 
and significant coefficient for the design of the management control system and cost 
information, but the correlation is -0.225 for time. This might indicate that a decrease in 
development time is not always valid with respect to the company’s competitive advan-
tage. This aspect is also underlined by Cooper (2001) who focuses on quality, which 
might decrease development time for the projects’ portfolios due to early canceling of 
unprofitable projects producing free resources for other profitable projects.  
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Table 3.1: Correlation between ROI and attributes of the control system (Simons 
1987) 
 
Attributes control system Prospectors* Defenders* 
Tight budget goals 0.47 0.25 
External scanning -0.08 0.10 
Results monitoring 0.23 0.06 
Cost control -0.20 0.02 
Forecast data 0.27 0.02 
Goals related to output 0.32 0.06 
Reporting frequency 0.14 0.15 
Formula-based bonus remuneration 0.03 0.24 
Tailored control systems -0.36 -0.04 
Control system changeability 0.02 -0.16 
Industry dynamism 0.37 -0.42 
 
* the numbers refer to the correlation coefficient between attributes of a control 
system and ROI, for instance the number 0.47 indicates a strong correlation be-
tween return on investment and to the extent the company investigated secured 
and evaluated the goals set with the budget. 
 
Bonner and others (2002) have made a survey to examine the design of management 
control systems in PD such as stage-gate and QFD. The survey identifies statistical sup-
port claiming that formal process control can become too detailed, which stifles the 
creativity and hinders the project teams’ ability to make the adjustments needed early in 
the process. But the survey could not identify any support for the hypothesis that the 
degree of output control is positively related to performance in contrast to the Simons’ 
findings (1987).  
The SG approach can be aligned with a management control system, and its rele-
vance for firms pursuing the most innovative strategies can be established although the 
literature differs on some issues. Initially, the purpose of the SG approach has been to 
accelerate time-to-market and increase efficiency in the development work by securing 
quality. This notion seems to be supported by literature, but the design and use of these 
systems are highly relevant to the performance of the development project.  
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3.5 DECISION-MAKING ON PD 
 
Literature has raised the issue of overlapping stages as a crucial concern in management 
of the PD process since rational decision-making is an imperative and projects that 
prove unprofitable should be stopped. Therefore, it seems expedient to include some of 
the studies focusing on the SG approach as well as decision-making in PD in general. 
The literature identified15 includes the following sources: 
Olson and Bakke (2001) followed the implementation process of a Lead User 
method in an IT firm. The method was abandoned for a number of reasons although the 
lead-user derived product concepts had been successfully implemented. Management 
explained that it was personnel turnover and lack of time that made them return to the 
original product development process, which was more technological driven. Also, the 
firm was performing well, which added to the conception that a lead-user method was 
“nice to have” rather than “necessary”. The authors indicate that the ambiguity may be 
related to customers’ lack of precision in expressing their desires and preferences for 
current and new product concepts. However, the ambiguity was reduced in the case of 
the lead-user approach resulting in a number of very specific product suggestions from 
customers specifically selected due to their advanced product knowledge. The custom-
ers’ competence level reduced the “translation” problems from customer inputs to the 
language used by the technical development people. According to the authors, a new 
reward system should have been implemented as well as the lead-user method.  
Calantone and others (1999) addressed decision support models for screening prod-
uct ideas in the ‘fuzzy front end’ (see above). Calantone et al. (1999) illustrated a par-
ticular model (AHP: Analytic Hierarchy Process) by applying a new product screening 
decision. The AHP aids the decision-situation by means of a support model and will 
ideally “automate” the decision-process replacing Cooper’s (2001) requirements to dis-
close subjective evaluation through the Likert-scale and the zero to ten points (see chap-
ter two).  
                                                 
15 The inquiry was based on a search in a number of selected journals including Accounting, Organization 
and Society (0 results), European Accounting Review (0 results), Administrative Science Quarterly (0 
results), Management Science (4 results), and Journal of Product Innovation Management (3 results). The 
search string framed was ‘Decision and Product Development’ within a time frame ranging from January 
1999 to April 2003. 
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Mullins and others (1999) examined risk and decision-making disclosing a number 
of findings on the selection of people for the project. They showed that the role of the 
individuals’ previous experiences and whether survival or outperforming competitors 
motivated their goals had an influence on the decisions made. Thus, decisions are not 
only analytical or rational, they also exert an influence on learning.  
Loch and Kavadias (2002) focused on dynamic portfolio selection of PD programs 
based on a programming model. The unit of analysis was not the single project, but a 
strategic program associated with an entire product line. According to the authors, re-
source allocation can be varied continuously at that level because individual projects are 
small relative to the program, which allows a marginal benefit analysis instead of com-
binatorial optimization. The aim of this decision model is to provide decision-makers 
with a “rule of thumb” indicating that the managerial decision-making perspective is a 
rule-based model. The construction of the model is an attempt to gather information 
based on an incomplete view of the world and in a sense an attempt to rationalize on the 
basis of limited information and rules (uncertainty).  
Krishnan and Bhattacharya (2002) addressed the selection of the right technologies 
for new products with an element of uncertainty. The authors formulated a mathemati-
cal model of a firm facing two options: 1) a proven technology that is known to be vi-
able and 2) a prospective technology that offers superior price to performance results, 
but whose viability is not a fully certain outcome. To reduce the impact of technology 
uncertainty, the authors proposed two approaches to design flexibility, termed parallel 
path and sufficient design, allowing concurrent development of the firm’s products 
while validating the technology. The managerial implication is to formulate a number of 
conditions for when to freeze the product design depending on the technological uncer-
tainty. The authors assumed that information is limited and departed from the same 
point of view as (Loch and Kavadias 2002) by formulating a decision-set that managers 
can use to decide on the design of the PD approach.  
Ulrich and Ellison (1999) examined how a firm confronted with developing a new 
product chooses either to design new components or to select components already 
available. They called the situation for the design-select decision and argued that deci-
sions are greatly influenced by customer requirements and core capabilities of the firm. 
Even though the approach is analytical in nature, the authors suggested that a number of 
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elements should be included in the decision on whether to make or buy components, 
and in that sense the decision type can be seen as both analytical and a rule-based.  
Krishnan and Ulrich (2001) reviewed more than 200 papers focused on decision-
making in product development. The papers were categorized according to decisions 
made within the context of a single project or decisions made by a firm to establish an 
organizational context and plan development projects. They explicitly departed from the 
bounded rationality perspective subscribing to the point of view that an organization 
manages uncertainty through information processing (Krishnan and Ulrich 2001).  
However, this small literature review does not make the distinction suggested by 
Krishnan and Ulrich (2001) nor does it subscribe to only one particular perspective on 
decision-making. The literature review does not identify papers according to decisions 
in PD concerned with the anarchical, political or analytical decision types. The number 
of reviewed journals is much larger than the number of journals included in this small 
literature review, but the papers included here are more recent. Krishnan and Ulrich 
(2001: 3) argue that:  
 
The decision perspective helps us get a glimpse inside the ‘black box’ of 
product development without being concerned about how these decisions 
happens. 
 
The literature is concerned with developing systems to support substitute decision-
making that appears to be influenced by uncertainty. Information gathering may reduce 
uncertainty, which makes rational decision-making feasible in PD. However, Olson and 
Bakke’s (2001) study disclosed a situation, in which a firm abandoned an approach to 
manage the PD process where the preferences of customers were made visible, but 
characterized as ambiguous. However, the ambiguity could be handled, but the firm re-
sumed the previous inside-out strategy based on technology. 
 Generally, the literature suggests further research by opening the ‘black box”. In par-
ticular, attention should be focused on the decision-making functionality, which also 
was seen as a significant feature in the SG approach by the literature in the previous sec-
tions. In addition, there is a need for analyzing the relationship between formal and 
structured approaches and ambiguity, which has been identified as ubiquitous in PD 
(Martin and Meyerson 1988; McCaskey 1982). 
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3.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to present a number of critical voices in recent research, 
who have addressed potential limitations and problems in the SG approach. These can 
roughly be divided into the following areas: idea generation, intensity, and stages, man-
agement control and strategy and decision-making on PD. These voices are summarized 
in the table below: 
 
Table 3.2: Limitations and problems in the SG approach 
Issues Discussion in the literature 
The SG approach as a tool for idea 
generation 
The SG approach impedes idea generation in the front 
end by being fuzzy whereas other sources claim that 
fuzziness is at the front end. The benefit of the SG is 
the actual killing of ideas as a procedure for innova-
tion. 
Compliance with the SG approach 
(the issue of rigidity) 
The literature is undecided whether to allow for pro-
ject work to continue without formal approval (the 
coupling between gates and stages).  
The division of the PD process into 
stages 
Closely related to rigidity (see above) is whether pro-
ject teams should be empowered to make their own 
decisions and avoid the requirement for formal ap-
proval (and decisions in general). The discussion on 
whether to have a procedure in place with stage and 
gate functionality remains an open issue. 
The SG approach as management 
control 
Main body of the literature points to a positive rela-
tionship between performance and formal and struc-
tured approaches as the SG approach, but does not 
explain why that is. 
Decision-making on PD Only limited literature on how decision happens and 
assuming ambiguity. Main part of literature is con-
cerned with decision-making support systems. 
 
A study with an organizational focus on how the SG approach is applied within the or-
ganization (as a management technology) appears to be a valid attempt to add more in-
sights into the workings of the SG approach as a formal and structured approach al-
though several performance issue remain open as well. The ‘black box’ should be 
opened, particularly in decision-making where some authors suggest more enquiries 
into how decisions are made in a practice surrounding innovation and PD.    
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Stage-Gate approach as rules: instrumentality and 
appropriateness 
 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish a meta-theoretical framework for the empiri-
cal analysis that is set out in the following chapters. The critical voices that we met in 
the literature review of the previous chapter took ‘rigidity’ as an issue of contention 
(Shaw et al 2000; Ottosson 1996; Jenkins et al 1997a; 1997b), suggesting that formal 
and structured methods of innovation may become too ‘bureaucratic’ when employed in 
an organizational context (Clark and Wheelwright 1992; Hamel 2002). This criticism of 
the Stage-Gate approach indicates that investigating rules might offer one way of ex-
plaining how formal and structured approaches interrelate with the organization, helping 
to develop a better understanding of the problem originally identified in the introduction 
to this study, i.e. how the rules in Stage-Gate becomes a management technology. Thus, 
the chapter will discuss views on organizational workings with respect to rules, taking 
the discussion of Stage-Gate one step further than the issues presented previously.  
According to Giddens (1984), we may, for example, look at rules as formalized pre-
scriptions. In this way, four dualities are relevant to any social analysis: 1) intensive and 
shallow, 2) tacit and discursive, 3) informal and formalized, 4) weakly sanctioned and 
strongly sanctioned. As social structures consist of rules and resources, they constitute 
the means by which the medium acts. As a consequence, structure is both enabling and 
constraining, but not deterministic. Structure is also constructed within the actor and not 
outside the actor.  
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March (1994) has elaborated a notion of appropriateness, which he had already 
sketched in 1963 (Cyert and March 1992), where appropriateness is taken as being con-
structed by rules. Although March (1992) and Giddens (1984) share similar views on 
behavior as a social construction, March (1994) differentiates his analysis by looking at 
structure external to the individual or the organization. As this study will focus on the 
interaction between the system (the structure) and behavior as a way of investigating the 
effects of the system on the organization, this perspective seems the more suitable ap-
proach to adopt here. Moreover, as the study also sets out to analyze rules defined as 
formal rules (i.e. those documented on paper or electronic rules) rather than norms or 
cultural roles, it does not take recourse to Giddens (1994) who would have been a more 
obvious candidate in this instance. The exclusion of informal rules does not, however, 
undervalue the importance of such rules. Instead, formal and written rules have been 
selected because they can be distinctly identified, and consequently the behavior sur-
rounding the formal rules can be profitably investigated.    
Any notion of rules invariably begins with Max Weber (March et al. 2001), who re-
garded rules as the defining characteristic of a bureaucracy (Weber 1968). Within this 
perspective, behavior is intimately linked to rules to the extent that behavior can be pre-
dicted or that an organization in general adopts a systematic approach to its activities. 
This logic can also be identified in the writings of Cooper (e.g. 2001, see chapter two), 
who advocates an organizational standardization of activities. However, more recent 
organizational theories have indicated an additional perspective to rules where behavior 
is influenced by rules, but does not necessarily conform to them (Cyert and March 1992; 
March 1994; March et al. 2001). Here, the individual or organization is assumed to ask 
‘who am I, and what would a person (or organization) do in a situation like this?’ In 
other words ‘What is appropriate?’ According to the perspective of appropriateness, the 
normative Stage-Gate approach described in chapter two is subject to a ‘filter’ and, in 
general, becomes a behavioral issue when we attempt to understand the approach as a 
form of management technology in an organizational practice. 
The framework of analysis adopted here is based on these two perspectives, and will 
be described and discussed in the following sections. The first section examines the per-
spective of instrumental (rule-following), based on the writings of Weber (1968) and 
Cyert and March (1992), and includes a discussion of its relationship with the Stage-
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Gate approach which was set out in chapter two. The second section then examines 
what has been labeled appropriateness, drawing on the writings of March (1994) and 
his collaborators (March et al 2001). Each section (and indeed perspective) also serves 
as a platform for formulating a number of research questions that will be explored in 
more detail in the empirical analyses of the next chapter. 
 
 
4.1 INSTRUMENTALITY 
 
Instrumentality is the first of the two perspectives to be discussed and refers to the no-
tion of human actions as they conform to rules. Our discussion of the Stage-Gate ap-
proach and rules starts by outlining the characteristics of the Weberian-bureaucracy. A 
comparison between the Stage-Gate approach and this kind of bureaucracy is then made 
and is followed by a section addressing administrative rules. On the back of this, a 
number of research questions will be formulated. 
 
4.1.1 The Weberian-bureaucracy 
Weber (1968, 1972) originally made the link between rules, bureaucratization and what 
he perceived as ‘modernity’, tracing: “The modern bureaucracy to a rationalization 
process accompanying the development of capitalist economies” (March et al. 2001: 9). 
The prevalence of rules distinguished formal organizations from intimate interactions, 
and Weber (1968, 1972) saw rules as the defining characteristic of an ideal bureaucracy. 
As will be seen below, at least six of the nine characteristics he delineated as character-
istics of a bureaucracy relate directly to rules and rule-following behavior, these include 
the following features:  
 
(1) “The principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are generally or-
dered by rules, that is, by laws and administrative regulations” (Weber 1968: 
196).  
(2) “The regular activities required for the purposes of the bureaucratically governed 
structure are distributed in a fixed way as official duties” (ibid.).  
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(3) “The authority to give the commands required for the discharge of these duties is 
distributed in a stable way and is strictly delimited by rules concerning the coer-
cive means, physical, sacerdotal, or otherwise, which may be placed at the dis-
posal of officials” (ibid.).  
(4) “Methodical provision is made for the regular and continuous fulfillment of these 
duties and for the execution of the corresponding rights; only persons who have 
the generally regulated qualifications to serve are employed. In public and lawful 
government these three elements constitute ‘bureaucratic authority’. In private 
economic domination, they constitute bureaucratic ‘management’” (ibid.).  
(5) “The principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority mean a 
firmly ordered system of super- and subordination in which there is a supervision 
of the lower offices by the higher one” (ibid.: 197).  
(6) “The management of the modern office is based upon written documents (‘the 
files’), which are preserved in their original or draught form.”  
(7) “Office management, at least all specialized office management – and such man-
agement is distinctly modern – usually presupposes thorough and expert training” 
(ibid.: 198).  
(8) “When the office is fully developed, official activity demands the full working 
capacity of the official, irrespective of the fact that his obligatory time in the bu-
reau may be firmly delimited” (ibid.).  
(9) “The management of the office follows general rules, which are more or less sta-
ble, more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned. Knowledge of these rules 
represents a technical learning, which the officials possess. It involves jurispru-
dence, or administrative or business management. The reduction of modern office 
management to rules is deeply embedded in its very nature” (Weber 1968: 198).  
 
Thus, the ideal form of bureaucracy focuses on structure and activities, functional areas, 
management (employee sanctions), knowledge and learning, line of command, regula-
tion of decision-making and rules used to make objective decisions. Rules are therefore 
the primary characteristic of bureaucracy, as March et al (2001) have also suggested.  
MANAGING PRODUCT INNOVATION THROUGH RULES 58 
 
4.1.2 The SG approach and bureaucracy 
There appears to be a number of similarities between the theories relating to the opera-
tion of a bureaucracy and the theories presented in the SG approach (see chapter two). 
While bureaucracy was originally designed to help regulate office-work and not directly 
for the purposes of PD,16 it may nevertheless be argued that phased-based approaches to 
innovation are in fact an attempt to make PD manageable precisely by applying struc-
tures and rules to the process. In addition, the SG system represents a set of prescrip-
tions, guidelines and procedures, i.e. a whole set of rules on how to conduct PD proc-
esses and activities. In this way, the SG approach represents one of the main characteris-
tics of bureaucracy, namely that it is based on the design, application and modification 
of rules.  
The ideals of Cooper (2001) and Weber (1968) are summarized and compared in ta-
ble 4.1 below with respect to their objectives, interaction and outcome. Both ideals 
strive for the objective discharge of business. When interacting with the organization, 
activities are standardized and behavior is determined by rules, which makes it possible, 
for instance, to comply with time constraints and achieve precision in decision-making. 
 
Table 4.1: The bureaucracy vs. the Stage-Gate approach 
 
 Bureaucracy Stage-Gate 
 
Objectives o bureaucratic authority 
o objective discharge of busi-
ness according to calculable 
rules and ‘without regard to 
persons’ 
o administrative structure for 
both superior and staff, stabil-
ity and predictability 
o specify role obligations, clar-
ity and hierarchical concerns 
o disciplining system for inno-
vation through standardization
o establish a high level of qual-
ity in product development 
processes 
 
Interaction o fixed and official jurisdic- o orchestrate information (also 
                                                 
16 Weber (1968) assumes that ‘regular activities’ are a precondition for bureaucracy, which might merely 
be a methodological side-comment if the SG approach was completely aligned with bureaucracy and not 
merely a matter of sharing similarities. However, Jaworski and others (1993) indicate that low task com-
plexity is not necessarily associated with – what they describe as – the bureaucratic system. Moreover, the 
low control system is associated with routines.  
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 tional areas ordered by rules 
(administrative regulation) 
o stable distribution of authority 
to give commands (delimited 
by rules) 
o a firmly ordered system of 
super- and subordination (hi-
erarchical) 
o thorough and expert training 
(knowledge of rules repre-
sents a special technical learn-
ing) 
o management of the office fol-
lows general rules, which are 
more or less stable, more or 
less exhaustive 
cross-functional) and secure 
documentation 
o standardized activities includ-
ing a standardized common 
format for decision setting 
o standardized format for 
evaluation including prede-
fined criteria and outputs 
 
 
Outcome o speed of operations 
o precision 
o unambiguity 
o knowledge of files 
o continuity 
o discretion 
o unity 
o strict subordination 
o reduction of friction 
o reduction of material and per-
sonal costs 
o effectiveness 
o efficiency 
o time-to-market 
o commercial success with new 
products 
o decisions more ‘objective’ 
 
4.1.3 The SG approach as administrative rules 
Arguably, the Stage-Gate approach (SG approach) shares certain similarities with a bu-
reaucracy, and as a consequence enables its translation into a set of rules that can in turn 
be aligned with the categorization of administrative rules. In this way, Cyert and March 
(1992) investigate the role of management control and rules, and apply four types of 
administrative rules to their analysis of the role of explicit standard operating proce-
dures (SOP). These are: information handling rules; records and reports; planning; and 
task performance rules; and are set out below in more detail.    
 
(1) Information handling rules: These rules define the firm as a communication system, 
emphasizing the distribution and condensation of external or internal information, and 
paying attention to the characteristics of information leaving the organization. Rules on 
information handling can also be identified in the SG approach where the emphasis is 
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placed on cross-functional information generation, assimilation of information as a pro-
ject progresses, as well as documentation based on the criteria used for deciding 
whether a project should continue or not. Cyert and March (1992) focus in particular on 
two aspects of information flows: routing rules and filtering rules. According to them, 
routing addresses “[…] who will communicate to whom about what” (Cyert and March 
1992: 129), which is regulated in the SG approach, for instance through the rule which 
governs that a project manger must not communicate with the decision-makers at the 
gate meeting in order to reduce any ‘political’ influence. Cyert and March (1992) are 
also concerned with filtering rules and argue that bias is omnipresent in organizations, 
and, as a consequence, that some information is unreliable. More particularly, “one of 
the ways in which the organization adapts to the unreliability of information is by devis-
ing procedures for making decisions without attending to apparently relevant informa-
tion” (Cyert and March 1992: 130). 
 
(2) Records and reporting rules: Reporting and records are explicit in the SG approach, 
where information on the criteria on which to decide a project is reported as an input to 
decision-making. It is therefore also implicitly part of the SG approach because of the 
requirement to report the decision as an output. On a more detailed level, these rules are 
present in financial activities (see table 2.1, chapter two) where a number of reports on 
financial considerations must be made prior to each gate review. The details ensure that 
information is available for more detailed reporting on the project.  
 
(3) Plans and planning rules: This rule type is also a component in standard operation 
procedures (Cyert and March 1992) and has been identified by Cooper (2001) as the 
business case that must be formulated in the second stage and updated in subsequent 
stages together with the successive project plans, presumably formulated for each (fol-
lowing) stage. The business case formulation is part of the ‘must’ and ‘should meet’ cri-
teria in the gate meeting, which in Cyert and March’s (1992) terminology are termed 
‘planning rules’. 
 
(4) Task performance rule: This specific type of rule is concerned with the activities 
that have to be undertaken. Cyert and March (1992) suggest that even as complex an 
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activity as decision-making can be reduced to a ‘simple’ problem with a minimum of 
uncertainty, which is also the purpose of the SG approach (chapter two). The SG ap-
proach is designed to reduce uncertainty through the standardization of tasks (see table 
4.1, above) that have to be performed both at the gates and in the stages and by the divi-
sion of decision-making into a number of distinct decision occasions. The task perform-
ance rules include both gate and stage activities. 
The task performance rules for the stages have already been described in table 2.3 
above, where the detailed tasks or activities to be performed are described for each 
stage. However, the rules are not set out on a detailed and operational level for individ-
ual tasks. Rather, they are general task performance rules indicating, for instance, that 
the market activities need to be carried out in stage 4: “Test with customers, prefer-
ences, and trials, pretest of market and identify the user” (Cooper 2001). The task per-
formance rules are of paramount importance to Cooper (ibid.) since management con-
trol through standardization is the primary mechanism used to control instances of poor 
quality. Cooper (2001) identified the omission of task performance as a reason why 
many companies in the 1980s and early 1990s failed to achieve product success.  
The gates can also be seen as a set of activities that need to be performed in order to 
disclose consensus on the evaluation of the project, by matching the evaluation criteria 
of the project with the criteria types ‘must’ and ‘should meet’. According to March 
(1994), two theories of choice are evident in rational decision-making: the standard the-
ory of choice (STC) and the theory of limited rationality. STC embraces a vision of ra-
tionality in which actions are seen to be derived from expected consequences and the 
preferencing of these consequences. STC assumes an actor is in possession of full in-
formation. The theory of limited rationality, on the other hand, questions this assump-
tion of a ‘perfect world’ but rather starts from the perception that the world is imperfect 
and further information may thus be needed to increase the precision of decision-
making. In contrast to the notion of ‘ambiguity’ (March, 1994), these two approaches 
assume an order to the world where preferences are stable, which in turn enables ration-
ality, albeit of a limited scope. Within the vision of a limited rationality, choices arise as 
a result of a deliberate, consequential and management-based decision process, and, ac-
cording to March (1999), they must answer four basic analytical questions:  
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(1) What actions are possible?  
(2) What will the future consequences of each alternative be? (In the most elaborate 
model of rationality, the probability distribution of consequences of each alter-
native is known.) 
(3) How valuable are the consequences associated with each alternative to the deci-
sion-maker? 
(4) How to choose between the alternatives, considering the value of their conse-
quences (decision rule)? 
 
The fundamental idea of limited rationality is that it is impossible to know everything at 
any given time, owing to an element of uncertainty. As a consequence, decision-making 
will be based on incomplete information about alternatives (1) and their consequences 
(2). The real world is only understood imperfectly and not all the information about 
consequences and alternatives is known in the decision-situation. Information is con-
strained and must be discovered through a process of discovery (March 1999), which is 
translated by Cooper (2001) into sequential decision-making functionality. Each project 
is therefore expected to invest in information up to the point at which the marginally 
expected cost of retrieving information equals the marginally expected return. In other 
words, if a piece of information will not affect the choice, it is not worth acquiring 
(March 1994). Some of the reasons for this approach are discussed by March and 
Feldman (1981), who address the assumptions of information underlying limited ration-
ality. As a consequence of rationality, they suggest that information in this paradigm 
should be gathered prior to decision-making and in line with the specific needs of a pro-
ject, provided the marginal return in improving decisions exceeds the marginal cost. 
Thus, only relevant information will be gathered.  
The idea of limited rationality is built into the SG approach as a standard operating 
procedure. Cyert and March (1992) argue that the standard operating procedures pro-
vide the organization with a level of stability, which will consequently influence the or-
ganization, including its decision-making process. The Stage-Gate approach breaks 
down the problem of uncertainty in consequentiality of PD into a number of sequential 
steps. Thus, the gates have to apply the documented information prior to the meeting, 
undertake a consensus disclosure through a 10-point Likert scale (chapter two) and 
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make a decision of a particular decision-type. Even though Cooper was initially con-
cerned with the stages, as was shown in chapter two, he quickly began to address deci-
sion-making as a central issue of creating product success. Cooper (2001) focused on 
the making of rational decisions which, like Weber (1968), was concerned with objec-
tive decision-making as way of avoiding arbitrariness. He suggested that task perform-
ance rules encompass decision-making at the gates, through what Weber (1968) de-
scribed as ‘calculable rules’. In this way, it is assumed that the two normative sets of 
rules in a bureaucracy, and the Stage-Gate approach, are attempts to establish rules that 
also regulate consequentiality in decision-making activities, in terms of programming 
decision-making based on the distinction between programmed and non-programmed 
decisions (Simon et al 1954). A traditional technique of programming decision-making 
is standard operating procedures (ibid.).  
Another central type of performance rules regulates what Cyert and March describe 
as “coordinative mechanisms” (1992: 123). A specific variety of planning rules regu-
lates the relationship between stages and gates and can be seen as task performance 
rules on a more generic level than the specified task performance rules set out earlier in 
table 2.3. Although the coordination rules are by definition not a distinct type of rule, 
they are nevertheless singled out to emphasize one of the central mechanisms of the SG 
approach. Coordination in the second generation of the SG approach regulates the level 
of separation in the sense that gate-activities should not be continued, but rather await 
the decision to be made in the subsequent decision setting. However, in the third gen-
eration, new rules have emerged and have relaxed this distinct segregation (coordination 
rules) to the extent that stage activities are allowed to continue even though a decision 
has not been reached.  
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Table 4.2: The SG approach aligned with the rules of the standard operating procedure 
 
Standard operating 
procedure 
The SG approach 
Task performance rules (4)17 o Stage activities according to a standardized for-
mat 
o Gate activities according to a standardized for-
mat 
o Gate keeper activities required to be undertaken 
o Coordinative mechanism (whether stages must 
overlap) 
 
Information and reporting rules 
(1 and 2)  
 
 
 
o Project managers produce information to be 
used in gates 
o The information production is determined by the 
activities taking place in stages 
o The information must be reported (documented) 
to the decision makers 
o The reporting format follows the stages that 
must include marketing, production (technical 
issues) and finance 
 
Plans and planning rules (3) o Business case formulation 
o Performance criteria (should and must meet) 
o Project plans (including dates) 
 
 
To summarize, the SG approach can be aligned as an explicit standard operating proce-
dure (SOP) containing three types of administrative rules, which reduce decision-
making to a matter of rule-following. This is in line with Cyert and March (1992) and 
their attempt to develop a set of decision rules for regulating decision-making on price 
and output determination in a retail department store (see table 4.2 above). The ideal 
stage-gate approach is translated into a set of rules where deliberate and consequential 
decision-making and other activities, such as reporting and information, are ideally re-
duced to following a set of rules. Behavior must be subdued and aligned with the rules 
and is therefore the first of the two perspectives denoted as instrumentality. 
 
4.1.4 Instrumentality and research questions 
As outlined above, bureaucracies are described by Weber as being defined by nine char-
acteristics, six of which are related to rules on consequential behavior (1968). Rules are 
                                                 
17 The numbers refers to the sections above on the types of rules defined by Cyert and March (1992).  
THE STAGE-GATE APPROACH AS RULES: INSTRUMENTALITY AND APPROPRIATENESS 65
such a primary characteristic that Weber (1968) regards them as so embedded in a bu-
reaucracy that office management can in fact be reduced to rules. A number of similari-
ties between the ideal bureaucracy and the Stage-Gate approach can thus be identified 
precisely because of their mutual emphasis on rule-following. It has been argued that 
rule-following is necessary to avoid inefficiency in the PD process (Cooper 2001). This 
then raises the question: what are the rules in PD within the instrumental rule-following 
perspective? 
 Chapter two indicated that the normative system could be adapted to the individual 
company in terms of number of stages, criteria to be used at the gates, and flexible rules 
(third generation SG). More recently, Cooper et al. (2002a; 2002b) have abandoned the 
flexibility in the SG approach by claiming that the PD process cannot be decoupled 
from the administrative system with flexible gates where activities are not allowed to 
continue until a decision has been reached at the gates. This in turn raises the questions: 
how do the rules in PD compare to the normative system with respect to gates, stages, 
and information/document-tation? 
 
4.2 APPROPRIATENESS18 
 
Cyert and March indicate in the epilogue to a Behavioral Theory of the Firm that the 
theories of consequentiality “underestimate” (1992: 230) an alternative theory to ra-
tional choice, i.e. the logic of appropriateness. They suggest that rules have an effect on 
the four questions of rational choice outlined above. It is therefore possible to devise a 
rule-model for a certain price/output decision-making situation that affects the four 
questions of rational choice in such a manner that can consequentiality be programmed 
into a set of ideal rules which also organize behavior with respect to the gates (decision-
making). In the ideal Weberian-bureaucracy (Weber 1968), the organization is ‘de-
humanized’. Here, Weber’s notion of ‘calculable rules’ is seen as condensing 
                                                 
18 March claims that both the perspectives of rule-following (consequentiality and appropriateness) are 
required: “Empirical observations of decisions provide ample examples of behaviors that are hard to un-
derstand without attention to both perspectives, and neither (at least in its present incarnation) explains 
enough of the phenomena to claim exclusive rights to truth” (1999: 102).  
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consequentiality into a set of rules that is followed by the organizational members.19 It 
is an issue that is not open for debate. Behavior should be subdued. This perspective 
was labeled rule-following.  
March argues that: “[...] rule-following is portrayed as unthinking and automatic” 
and deviations will be treated as deviations from reason. However, he also uses the 
word “rule-following” to describe “[…] rule following in the name of appropriateness” 
(1994: 100). March thus advances appropriateness as a perspective in which identity is 
not taken to be inferior to rule-following and is, consequently, not as ‘straight-forward’ 
as it is assumed to be in the perspective set out above. Instead, he argues that it is rather 
based on rules (March et al. 2001). Within this perspective, individuals or organizations 
are assumed to ask the following three questions: 
 
(1) The question of recognition: What kind of situation is this? 
(2) The question of identity: What kind of person am I, or what kind or organization 
is this? 
(3) The mobilized rule depends on the match between 1) and 2): What does a person 
like me or an organization like this do in a situation like this? 
 
March argues that the process is not “random, arbitrary, or trivial” but a “systematic, 
reasoning, and often quite complicated” (1994: 58) process that makes the behavior of 
individuals and organizations more arbitrary and difficult to predict. “Rules involve … 
three constructions” (1994: 6). Rules are negotiated and interpreted and consequently 
subject to change as indicated by the description of rules in the previous chapter. March 
has thus introduced two levels of analysis: the individual and organizational. The Stage-
Gate approach, however, also focuses on group-activities, particularly at the gate-
meetings. March suggests that a study of decision-making within the perspective of ap-
propriateness leads to a number of questions, including “How are situations interpreted 
                                                 
19 “[C]alculable rules are connected to given ends” (Glegg 1995: 16) which suggests that Weber’s percep-
tion of rationality has certain aspects in common with the consequentiality and logic of means-ends rela-
tionships. However, the instrumental perception of bureaucracy might be supplemented: “Instead of the 
spread of the bureaucracy being due solely to its instrumental efficiency, according to Weber, it could be 
correct to point to the cultural conditions of “rationalization” as the appropriate explanation. Such “cul-
tural” explanation points to the institutionalization of value as the overarching factor in interpreting the 
rise of particular types of organization. The iron cage is a cultural construct not a rational construct” 
(1995: 27).  
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and recognized?”, “How are organizational identities defined?”, and “How is the match 
between situations and identities made?” (1994: 59). Although he applies the word 
‘rule-following’ to both ‘automatic’ rule-following and rule-following from the perspec-
tive of appropriateness, the term ‘rule-based’ is used to describe the theory of appropri-
ateness because actions do not automatically follow rules. This is in line with the most 
recent terminology adopted by March et al. (2001).  
 On the organizational level, organizational rules define what it means to an appropri-
ate decision-maker.  
 
Formal and information organizational rules are woven into, utilize, and 
help define organizational identities and roles. Tasks are organized around 
sets of skills, responsibilities, and rules that define a role. Roles and their as-
sociated rules coordinate and control organizational activities (March 1994: 
60-61).  
 
However, March also emphasizes that rule-based behavior is influenced by uncertainty 
and that “Situations, identities, and rules can all be ambiguous” (1994: 61). In addition, 
“They are processes of reasoned action, but they are quite different from the processes 
of rational analysis” (ibid.). On the level of the individual action:  
 
An identity is a conception of self-organized into rules for matching action 
to situations. When Don Quixote says ‘I know who I am’ …, he claims a 
self-organized around the identity of ‘knight-errant’ (March 1994: 61).  
 
Socially-defined identities are templates for individual identities in three senses. First, 
they define the essential nature of being a project manager or perhaps even a dentist:  
 
Recognizing a dentist involves knowing how dentists behave and associat-
ing observed behavior with that role. Being a dentist involves knowing how 
dentists behave and acting accordingly (ibid.: 64).  
 
Second, social identities are templates in the sense of contracts, where  
 
… an individual agrees to behave in a way consistent with socially defined 
identity in order to gain certain compensation (ibid.).  
 
The third sense is concerned with the assertion of morality,  
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… accepted by individuals and society as what is good, moral, and true. An 
individual “internalizes” an identity, accepting and pursuing it even without 
the presence of external incentives or sanctions (ibid.: 65).  
 
March goes on to argue that the relationship between providing incentives for following 
rules associated with identities and their internalization is complicated:  
 
On the one hand, there is a strong tendency for individuals (and organiza-
tions) to accept identities that are easy or rewarding to perform – that con-
firm their competences … people are more likely to internalize roles and 
rules that they fulfill effectively more than those that they do not (ibid.: 65-
66).  
 
To substantiate this, he takes the case of top-level executives who have experienced 
their own competence in decision-making and have, consequently, tended to internalize 
the role of decision-maker. Thus:  
 
They are likely to think of themselves as decision-makers. They act appro-
priately as decision-makers because they have come to believe that the 
proper way is not only a way to gain social approval but also a way to con-
form to their own standards (ibid: 66).  
 
However, individuals who have failed in decision-making are less likely to internalize 
the role of decision-maker.  
 
As a result, experienced, successful decision-makers become socially more 
reliable in their decision-making, and inexperienced, unsuccessful decision-
makers become less reliable (ibid.: 66).  
 
Although the reward structure influences the internalization of an identity, it is not a re-
warded identity that will be internalized. Internalized identities are likely to be imagined 
where external incentives are weak, whereas strong external threats or dramatic events 
can be used to explain behavior without the need for internal commitment (March 
1994). However,  
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… even when an interpretation is accepted, its ultimate stability depends on 
experiential confirmation, so interpretations that are totally unrealistic will 
be eroded by subsequent disconfirmation (ibid.: 67).  
 
On the issue of internalization and identities, March (1994) summarizes:  
 
Identities are socially constructed contracts, motives, and cognitions that 
connect to organizational rule structures. And this fine tapestry of obligation 
controls much of what is called decision-making (ibid.: 67-68).  
 
Attention is important in this perspective, because some decisions might yield a number 
of relevant identities and rules (March 1994). March illustrates this aspect with the ex-
ample of a decision-maker who is reminded of his role as a citizen and consequently 
may act differently than if (s)he had been reminded of his/her role as a family-member. 
As a consequence, the potentially relevant rules are not evoked. Four psychological 
mechanisms (March 1994) explain how rules and identities are perceived in various 
situations: 1) Experiential learning: individuals learn to evoke identities in a situation by 
experiencing the rewards and punishments of past experiences; positive experiences are 
more likely to evoke an identity; 2) “… central aspects of the self are more likely to be 
evoked more frequently and maintained more consistently than others” (ibid.: 70), 
which suggests that individuals with single categories, for instance where the central 
categorizing feature is its competitive nature, are less dependent on the process of evok-
ing rules and identities; 3) identities and rules that have recently been evoked are more 
likely to be evoked again; 4) the social context of others is also more likely to influence 
which rules and identities are evoked. To illustrate this, March (1994) provides the ex-
ample of a redhead in a crowd who is more likely to focus on hair-color. As he argues: 
 
formal organizations play important parts in organizing the application of 
identities and rules to situations. Organizations shape individual action both 
by providing the content of identities and rules and by providing cues for 
invoking them (ibid.: 70).  
 
Thus, the term ‘use’ relates to shaping appropriate individual action. ‘Use’ is richer than 
the ‘automatic’ (March 1994) action required by the individual in the rule-following 
perspective. Instead, it becomes a behavioral question rather than the more closed ‘black 
box’-perception of ‘just following’ rules within the previous perspective. Formal rules 
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constitute a model for appropriate behavior, on the basis of which project managers or 
decision-makers can imitate, emulate or learn rules, thus:  
 
Rules of appropriate behavior are supplied with concrete meaning through 
elaboration and clarification within an organization (March 1994: 72).  
 
In addition to using rules through a model of appropriate behavior, organizations can 
also be perceived as “writers of scripts and providers of cues and prompts” (ibid.: 72) 
where identities are highlighted through language and by landscaping where the formal 
locations are constructed as a reminder of the appropriateness of formal behavior 
(March 1994). Experience with rules also has an influence on appropriateness:  
 
Experience with pursuing an identity produces learning, by which the rules 
of identity are changed. The experiences are managed to stabilize a consis-
tent set of identities within any given organization (ibid.: 73).  
 
March discusses violations of formal rules:  
 
Most of the time behavior follows rules. At the same time, it is hard to 
imagine a social system without violations of rules. Rules are overlooked or 
ignored (ibid.: 73) 
 
March focuses on two issues particularly: First, where individuals are simply unaware 
of the rules because of complex situations, and where a new ruler or rules can be made 
ambiguous due to political compromises. Nevertheless, rules may also be inconsistent 
with other rules, thus producing deviations, or inconsistent with other procedures, such 
as deadlines. These situations are often unintentional. However, rule violation may also 
be intentional, as March illustrates:   
 
Many are deliberate, conscious violations of known rules. Rule making and 
rule enforcing sometimes involve different coalitions. They address differ-
ent interests and require different mobilization patterns (1994: 74).  
 
The forces that are asked to implement rules may differ from the ones that have made 
the rule in the first place (March 1994), for instance, top management may have devised 
a set of rules that has to be implemented at the project management level. Second, viola-
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tions are more likely to occur when the rules are rigid and cannot be changed easily, just 
as rules are more likely to be violated when the violation is associated with performance 
measures, in which it makes good sense to ignore the rules. As March says:  
 
rules cannot fit every situation, and there is a need to “fine-tune” them to 
meet the demands of the variable environment. Knowing when to bend a 
rule is one of the hallmarks of an experienced decision-maker. Tolerance for 
rule violation is a form of delegation to individuals who have a more refined 
capability for accomplishing the intent of the rules in a special case. Organi-
zation also allows variation in interpreting rules in order to experiment with 
what they might come to mean (2004: 75).  
 
4.2.1 Appropriateness and research questions 
As mentioned at the outset, appropriateness introduces a ‘filter’ between rules and ac-
tions in the rule-following perspective, thereby challenging the instrumentality of rules. 
This ‘de-humanization’ that occurs in the ideal bureaucracy implies that actions con-
form to rules ‘without any questions being asked’. In comparison, the ‘filter’ makes 
formal rules imply interaction with three questions of identity, identifying the situation 
and defining what proper behavior is in the situation in which the actor finds himself. 
Thus, behavior is not as predictable as Weber (1968) argues; despite the advantages he 
assumes this would bring to the ideal bureaucracy. 
The theory of appropriateness suggests that rules are therefore a question of applica-
tion based on the identity of the actor and recognition of the situation. Application itself 
was addressed in the previous chapter, which showed that part of the criticism leveled at 
the Stage-Gate process of an organization focuses on the issue of ‘rigidity’. Rigidity 
seeks to address problems of compliance with procedure and is identified as a central 
issue of the literature on Stage-Gate which has been outlined previously. In this way, 
Shaw et al (2000) have suggested that a rigid employment of the SG approach might 
influence the development lead-time of a project by actually increasing it. Ottosson 
(1996) is similarly concerned with issues of inefficiency since an innovation project 
might first have to wait for the top management to discuss the project at a gate. Jenkins 
et al (1997a; 1997b) also question rigidity at gates and specifically argue that the Stage-
Gate process should be regarded as a set of guidelines rather than “an overly rigid set of 
rules” (1997b: 391). Given these criticisms, it would be instructive to explore the inter-
action between the formal administrative rules and the organization to identify whether 
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the rule-following perspective produces the effects on the PD-organization that are 
promised by Cooper (see table 4.2), including predictability. Such an exploration would 
also address the questions of ‘rigidity’ and ‘bureaucratic issues’ raised by Clark and 
Wheelwright (1992) and Hamel (2000), respectively. Within this perspective, rules are 
perceived as an instrument to control behavior by ‘programming’, but bearing in mind 
the issue appropriateness and rule-deviation that have been outlined above, it would be 
pertinent to ask the question: how exactly are rules applied appropriately to the PD 
process? 
Weber (1968) asserted that the rationale of a bureaucracy demands that rules must be 
followed with obedience. This point of view applies to the SG system too. In order to 
generate the most efficient process from idea to launch, individual behavior must be 
subdued. The peculiarity of modern culture, more specifically its technical and eco-
nomic basis, demands this calculability of results (Weber 1968). The more perfectly de-
veloped a bureaucracy is, the more it is ‘dehumanized’, thus eliminating all purely per-
sonal, irrational and emotional elements that escape calculation:  
 
“Je mehr sie sich entmenschlich[en], je vollkommener” (Weber 1972: 563).  
 
Ideally, rules and regulations offer a rational decision-making procedure based on ‘pure’ 
calculations through which effects can be achieved. But rule ‘following’ is also a behav-
ioral issue, which raises the further question: if formal procedures affect the innovation 
process, do they lead to the effects predicted by Cooper or Weber – or other effects 
identified on the basis of appropriateness?  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
The instrumental perspective on rule application 
 
 
 
 
 
The objective of this chapter is to investigate the nature of rules in product development 
(PD), looking at what kind of rules can be identified, how they are developed with re-
spect to attributes of elaborateness and exhaustiveness, and what problems they are in-
tended to solve. The previous chapter compared the SG approach to an ideal bureauc-
racy, based on a number of similarities that could be identified and which allowed the 
SG approach to be translated into a system of rules in an organizational context. It was, 
however, seen that two perspectives were in fact prevalent on how rules are linked to 
actions through rule-following: the instrumental perspective, which assumes actions are 
programmed, and the behavioral perspective, which assumes that actions are subject to 
‘a filter’ resulting from a construction of appropriateness. This chapter now takes the 
first of these perspectives as its point of departure, seeking to investigate a number of 
research questions that are based on the instrumental perspective in order to identify the 
exact nature of rules in PD, how they can be best characterized, and comparing them to 
the normative system that was set out in chapter two. 
This chapter has a two-fold structure. First, it takes a multiple-case study of five 
companies, as set out in Yin (2003), analyzes them and subjects them to a cross-case 
analysis based on the three research questions ascertained in the previous chapters. Sec-
ond, a single company is then selected for more detailed analysis with respect to the in-
dividual rule-system design of the SG approach and compared to the normative system 
described previously. By way of conclusion, I then discuss these findings within the 
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broader framework of literature on the SG approach that was identified and analyzed in 
chapter three.   
 
 
5.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS – MULTIPLE-CASE ANALYSIS 
 
The starting point of our multiple-case analysis is a set of three research questions, 
which have been framed on the basis of the study so far. These are: 
 
 
(1) The SG approach has been classified as a model which bears comparison with 
an ideal bureaucracy. One of the most important pillars of any bureaucracy is 
rules, and, as a consequence, the SG approach can be regarded as a system for 
PD. As was seen in the previous chapter, Weber (1968) focused on office work 
and activities that can be standardized. The pertinence of his thinking in this 
context is that he explicitly focuses on rules, rather than on whole bureaucracies. 
For Weber, rules can be characterized in terms of exhaustiveness, which is here 
interpreted as compliance with the normative system. As Cyert and March note 
with regard to standard operating procedures: “Choice and control within an or-
ganization depend on the elaboration of standard operating procedures” (1992: 
133, emphasis added). This therefore raises the question: what actually are the 
rules in PD and how they can be characterized with respect to exhaustiveness 
and elaborateness? 
 
(2) The condition of stability was also a concern for Weber (1968). Griffin et al. 
(1997), however, characterize SG approaches on a ‘sophisticated level’ and ar-
gue for instance that a company requires competence in a second generation SG 
approach before it can “move” in version, i.e. towards the third generation ap-
proach, which they perceive as the most sophisticated version of the SG ap-
proach (see chapter two). It can therefore be asked whether the formal proce-
dures for PD do actually provide the process with stability and predictability. 
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(3) Weber (1968) asserts that the rationale of instrumentality demands that rules 
must be followed obediently. This point of view applies to the SG system too. In 
order to generate the most efficient process from project idea to launch, individ-
ual behavior needs to be submissive. The peculiarities of modern culture, more 
specifically its technical and economic basis, demand this calculability of results 
(Weber 1968). The more perfectly developed a bureaucracy is, the more it is 
‘dehumanized’, all purely personal, irrational and emotional attributes being 
eliminated that are not amenable to calculation. Weber sums this attitude up in 
the aphorism:  “Je mehr sie sich entmenschlich[en], je vollkommener” (Weber 
1972: 563). Rules and regulations thus offer a rational decision-making proce-
dure based on ‘pure’ calculation. This leads us to ask: what effects of rules can 
be identified on the PD process? 
 
 
5.2 CASE-COMPANIES  
 
PAINT specializes in producing paint for protective purposes, particularly for windmills 
and shipping companies. The company headquarters is located in Denmark, with a cen-
tralized R&D function, but has four laboratories in various other countries to establish 
proximity to achieve local market adaptation (product modification). The company em-
ploys 3,000 people worldwide and has sales offices in 40 countries, with production fa-
cilities in 20 of these. PAINT is one of the top five companies in the industry and is in 
the process of changing from a follower innovation strategy to a more proactive strat-
egy. In 1999, it initiated the implementation of a SG process and the dissolution of 
R&D. R&D was to be henceforth divided into a long-range technology department, 
with responsibility for feeding SG with product ideas to take the company toward to the 
position of market leader, and a short-range R&D department, which was placed under 
sales and marketing. The SG approach was made noticeable through the introduction of 
handbooks, mouse pads, posters, etc. Those interviewed for the purposes of the present 
study include the R&D Manager and a Product Manager from the primary division (ma-
rine). 
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MEDICO produces devices for a range of medical treatment. The company is organ-
ized into six divisions according to the type of medical ailment to be treated, with de-
velopment departments in each division. The company operates globally with a work-
force of 5,000 employees. There is no product development in subsidiary companies 
and all four divisional development departments are located in Corporate Headquarters, 
Denmark. MEDICO is a market leader in its industry and applies a prospector strategy 
for innovation with extensive user-involvement in R&D, which is why each employee 
in R&D works closely with two selected users. Each year there is a seminar with 200 
selected users and customers which aims to generate ideas for new products and to test 
products in the PD process. MEDICO is currently experiencing high organic growth but 
also through a self-imposed acquisition-strategy. In 2002, it won an award for being the 
most innovative company in Denmark. Moreover, it implemented a SG process in 
1996/97 which was subsequently modified in 1999 and 2002. The implementation of 
the latest changes in the SG approach was made visible through the introduction of a 
company intranet but also through initiating an extensive training program. The respon-
dents to our data gathering include a Project Manager from one of the divisions as well 
as a Group- and Project Manager from the primary division.  
MACHINERY is a global production company with its headquarters and a central-
ized R&D department located in Denmark. The company employees more than 10,000 
people and is organized into three business areas. MACHINERY is a market-leading 
company focusing on value-adding through paying due account to long durability and 
environmental concern. The company had already employed a SG approach in 
1992/1993 which has been subject to changes in 1995 and 1999 in combination with 
major strategic reorientation of the company. As with MEDICO, the SG approach was 
made visible through the introduction of an intranet and training courses. Furthermore, a 
small department was established with specific responsibility for updating the process, 
and in general ensures learning and assimilation of new procedural inputs. The company 
has won many awards, including the European Quality Prize for ‘Leadership and Con-
stancy of Purpose’ from the European Foundation for Quality Management.20 In this 
company, the interview respondents crossed three functions of R&D: a Development 
                                                 
20 Additional reading: http://www.efqm.org/ 
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Process Manager of the SG approach, a Senior Project Manager, and a Product Engi-
neering Manager.  
INGREDIENTS employs 2,000 people worldwide and was recently bought by its 
most dominant competitor, a large American producer of ingredients for the food indus-
try. The product range includes pectin and gum. Thus, the new company has two PD 
centers: one in the US and one in Denmark. Unfortunately, it was only possible to inter-
view the R&D Manager in this company, who was naturally influenced by the change in 
the situation. Experiences with the SG approach were nevertheless perceived to be valid 
for the investigation as most of the changes took place before the takeover. The SG ap-
proach was originally initiated in 1995/1996 and changed in 2000. It manages PD-
projects as well as projects for production process improvements which lead to opera-
tional improvement rather than new products within the SG approach.  
PLASTIC was established in 1992/1993 through a merger of competing companies 
and is now a subsidiary of three large companies in the oil industry. PLASTIC is a mar-
ket leader and employees a competitive strategy focusing on value-adding through in-
novation in plastic properties and customer services. The company employees 5,000 
people and approximately 500 in R&D, which is formally organized into a central R&D 
function owning its own long-range projects but also supports product development in 
seven business units that focus on production plants and markets served respectively. 
The R&D organization is geographically located in five countries. All types of innova-
tion projects, including technology development, product development projects and 
production process improvement, are managed within the SG approach, which was ini-
tiated in 1995/1996. Recently, a new version of the SG approach was implemented 
(January 1st, 2003) with emphasis on portfolio management functionality and the re-
sponsibility of the SG approach being placed under a new function of the portfolio man-
ager.  
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5.3 CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 
 
The section is organized in accordance with the research questions set out in the first 
section (5.1). 
 
1) What are the rules in PD and how can they be characterized? 
An SG-influenced approach has been introduced in all of the five companies under in-
vestigation here. In three of the five companies with an SG-influenced PD process, a 
distinction between technology planning and PD processes is discernible, as is sug-
gested by Smith et al. (1999) and Cooper (2001). This is particularly the case with re-
spect to the specific version of SG, SG TD employed (see chapter two), although on oc-
casion new PD projects are actually influenced by decisions made within the technology 
planning processes. PLASTIC runs technology planning and management of technology 
projects via the SG, but has a particular decision-making forum for what they character-
ize as ‘long range projects’. With all the companies investigated, decision-making with 
PD consequence is also carried out outside the SG model. An electronic template is 
available for each stage and gate in MACHINERY, contrary to PAINT, which has only 
provided the employees with a written manual and has no processes to secure rules for 
best practice.  
 
Table 5.1: Describing rules in PD 
 
 PAINT 
 
MEDICO MACHIN-
ERY 
INGREI-
DENTS 
PLASTIC 
What are the 
formal rules 
for PD? 
SG-influenced 
model 
SG-influenced 
model + tech-
nology plan-
ning + other 
plans 
SG-influenced 
model + tech-
nology scan-
ning process 
SG-influenced SG-influenced 
for all types of 
innovation 
projects 
How are rules 
made notice-
able in the 
organization? 
Handbooks, 
mouse pads, 
posters, etc. 
 
Intranet and 
extensive 
training pro-
gram 
Intranet + 
courses and 
via gate-
driven process 
By a manager 
for project-
processes + 
information 
Intranet, ‘road 
shows’, and 
‘super-users’  
 
In order to better understand the rules in PD, the notions of elaboration and exhaustive-
ness are introduced. Here, exhaustiveness is understood to constitute completeness with 
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respect to the system described in the normative SG approach (see chapter two). In 
other words, it seeks to answer the question: do the rules cover all prescribed areas or is 
their scope wider? For instance, the normative system covers stages, information (and 
documentation), and gates, as well as the rules identified in organizational practice. 
These all need to cover these basic functionalities on the general level of exhaustive-
ness. Three levels of exhaustiveness are defined: 1) Very exhaustive: In this case, the 
scope is broader than the SG approach originally prescribes, for example, through addi-
tional rules on new areas or topics. In other words, the business case should always be 
confirmed and supplemented with data from both the marketing and the accounting de-
partments before it is presented; 2) Normal: This covers the areas prescribed by the SG 
approach and which fulfill the requirements formulated by SG; 3) Less than normal: 
This has a narrower scope than the SG approach prescribes, but does not require that the 
business case should be developed and presented as a requirement for proceeding to the 
next stage. In all of this, the rules can be more or less elaborate, which is merely the ex-
pression of the level of detail contained in the rules. To illustrate this, one rule of the 
Stage-Gate approach involves the need to produce a financial calculation, but a number 
of elaborated ‘sub rules’ can frame the calculation by requiring figures for, amongst 
other things, expected market share and development costs. In some examples this can 
be achieved via an electronic template made available through a company’s intranet. 
Three levels of elaborateness are defined here: 1) Extra elaborate: This case has more 
details than the SG approach prescribes, for example, through the addition of further 
rules to the requirements set for developing the business case; 2) Normal: This situation 
entails the level of detail that the SG prescribes, fulfilling the requirements formulated 
by SG; and 3) Less than normal: This case has a lower level of detail than the SG ap-
proach prescribes, for instance, through requiring that only rudimentary information on 
the business case is presented at the gate meeting. 
Both the degree of exhaustiveness and elaboration vary among the case companies. 
MACHINERY has a department for securing best practice rules in innovation and each 
functional area continually contributes to the process. An example of this is the finan-
cial department’s design of a spreadsheet for carrying out product calculations. IN-
GREDIENTS has replaced a very elaborate model with a much simpler checklist. 
PLASTIC has moved from a less elaborate model to a normal elaborate model and then 
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more exhaustive, for example, by instigating the inclusion of the portfolio-management 
functionality of the SG model, which constitutes an advance on the earlier version. One 
cross-case observation that can be drawn at this stage is that companies with elaborate 
rules also tend to develop more exhaustive rules. As one senior project manager from 
the MACHINERY firm states: “Rules seem to be added, not removed”.  
Companies with more exhaustive rules seem to utilize the intranet frequently as a 
means of communicating the rules throughout the organizations, providing templates 
and examples. On the other hand, companies with extensive rules tend to spend large 
amounts of their resources on training project- and product-managers, also in the SG 
approach.  
 
Table 5.2: Rules in case companies on two dimensions 
 
Exhaus-
tive/Elaborate 
 
Very elaborate Normal Less than normal 
Very Exhaustive MEDICO 
MACHINERY 
 
PLASTIC 
 
Normal   
 
 
Less than normal  PAINT 
INGREDIENTS 
 
 
2) Do formal and structured procedures for PD actually provide the process with 
stability and predictability? 
The SG approach was originally introduced into the companies some 5-10 years ago, 
and has typically undergone one or two major revisions or changes since its introduc-
tion. Rules can therefore be said to be not stable if studied over a longer period (say 10 
years), although periods between revisions obviously represent a level of stability. The 
question of stability is nevertheless also related to the question of how rules are applied. 
This is indicated by the data, which suggests that there is a difference between formal 
rules and the usage of rules in all the cases, as will be analyzed in more detail in the fol-
lowing chapter. 
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Table 5.3: Stability and change in case companies 
 
 PAINT 
 
MEDICO MACHINERY INGREI-
DENTS 
PLASTIC 
When origi-
nally initi-
ated? 
1999 1996/97 1992/93 1995/96 1995/1996 
Significant 
changes 
N/A 1999 and 2002 1995 and 1999 2000 2003 
Version of 
the SG ap-
proach 
adopted? 
Facilitated 
Stage Gate 
Third genera-
tion Stage 
Gate 
Third generation 
Stage Gate 
Facilitated Stage 
Gate 
Facilitated 
Stage Gate 
Rules stable 
– medium 
time perspec-
tive 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rules stable 
– long time 
perspective 
N/A No No No No 
Does the PD 
process pro-
vide stability 
and predict-
ability 
through ru-
les? 
PD is struc-
tured and still 
market driven 
and “we can 
show that we 
are doing the 
right things 
now” 
Rules estab-
lish common 
ground for 
internal situa-
tions and par-
ticularly the 
relationship 
between team 
and manage-
ment 
The PD-process 
is making the 
organization 
more ‘sure’ of 
what it does and 
why 
The PD process 
ensures that cen-
tral issues are 
processed 
PD process 
is providing 
decision-
makers with 
an ‘over-
view’ and in 
general port-
folio func-
tionality. 
Now the 
projects can 
be perceived 
an entity 
with a total 
NPV. 
 
Griffin (1997) has examined the types of processes in PD and identified that ap-
proximately 12 percent of production companies apply no process type at all, 22 percent 
apply an informal process type, and 6 percent apply a functional sequential process 
type. The remaining 60 percent apply a version of the Stage-Gate approach, which was 
further separated into three process types: ‘Stage Gate’ (24 percent), ‘facilitated Stage 
Gate’ (19 percent), and ‘third generation Stage Gate’ (17 percent).21 The distinction be-
tween functional, sequential and Stage Gate versions is that the latter are cross-
                                                 
21 All numbers in percentage terms refer to production companies and have been read of figure 1 (Griffin 
1997: particularly 440). 
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functional. The distinctions between the versions of the SG approach are not defined 
other than: 
 
Over half the firms which adopted stage gate […] processes have moved 
from a basic process to more sophisticated versions with formal process 
ownership and facilitation (18.5 percent of the total) or third generation 
process with more flexible gates and stage structured (15 percent). Third 
generation processes match the complexity and difficulty of the project […]. 
The PD process owners who ‘own’ facilitated process are instrumental in 
aiding teams in effectively following and completing the requirements for 
each stage of the process and prove a means to retain and diffuse corporate 
learning across projects and over time (Griffin et al. 1997). 
 
PAINT is in its first version of SG, but has sought to establish a clear ownership of the 
process from the outset (R&D manager). It has also been instrumental in providing the 
project team with handbooks and even mouse pads. PLASTIC on the other hand is in 
the process of evolving from the second version to the third generation of the SG ap-
proach and has added more exhaustiveness through with the introduction of portfolio 
management rules. On the downside, however, it has for instance not provided its staff 
with any training in the latest approaches. Teams have therefore attempted to work 
cross-functionally but have found it difficult to get the latest information through formal 
channels of cross-functionality. In addition, this approach has only been facilitated to a 
limited degree. MEDICO and MACHINERY are both in the process of introducing 
greater flexibility, training and putting greater emphasis on organizational learning in 
the SG approach.  Both fit into the third generation approach although the MACHIN-
ERY is further down the road to third generation than MEDICO. Finally, INGREDI-
ENTS attempted to adopt the third generation approach as its first version with a proc-
ess owner, contractual agreement.22 However, it did not provide sufficient training for 
its staff as this version was eventually abandoned in favour of a facilitated version of the 
SG approach. Griffin et al (1997) have identified that companies tend to ‘move up’ in 
version in direction of the third generation approach, but as argued has been argued by 
Cooper (2001), rules first require competence before the shift to a more sophisticated 
level.  
                                                 
22 Similar to Integrated Product Development (IPD) described in chapter thee, Anderson (1996). 
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The companies under investigation therefore appear to have very different sets of 
rules in PD. As has been seen, not all companies are ‘ready’ for the adoption of a whole 
set of rules and all companies with a formalized PD approach tend to apply the rules 
differently. Two of the five companies appear to relax the demand for rule-following as 
the company gains competence in the rules. Cooper (2001) argues that as a company 
gains competence it tends to move towards a higher level of generation, which has also 
been observed by Griffin who states that “PD processes continue to evolve and become 
more sophisticated” (1997a: 429). 
However, sophistication or flexibility is not achieved through flexible gates with de-
pendent decisions sanctioning the launch of a project where stage activities are not com-
pleted, as has been suggested by Cooper et al. (2002b). This rather occurs through the 
introduction of loosely-structured stages and the application of a number of gates ac-
cording to the perceived risk of the project. The existence of flexible gates, which allow 
a project to continue regardless of whether all activities are carried out or not, are not 
part of the findings of this study. This suggests that the characteristics of the third gen-
eration SG approach must be found at the level of model applied according to project 
size and the degree of relaxed rule-following within the stages. As the company gains 
competence with the rules and chooses to relax the demand for rule-following in the 
stages, and as the company seeks to maintain this demand through gates, the role of 
gates comes more and more into focus. Moreover, with increasing rule-relaxation com-
panies tend to simultaneously increase the number of rules both in terms of exhaustive-
ness and degree of elaboration, which in some cases is the result of a deliberate process. 
This can be seen with MACHINERY where a whole department was designated the re-
sponsibility of process facilitation and improving the SG approach.  
It would appear that two out of the five companies with the SG-influenced model for 
conducting PD processes have gained sufficient experience to change the rule-system 
significantly within a time-frame of 2-3 years; the rules being subject to changes result-
ing from both internal and external factors. Unsurprisingly, however, a relationship be-
tween the rules and the organizational context can also be identified. Strategic (market 
perception) or managerial driven rule development seems to take place frequently, as 
was found by Zhou (1993) in quite another context. The companies all seem to have ad-
dressed a number of widely diverging and broader organizational issues regarding the 
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design and application of rules in PD. Companies that are moving into new markets, 
orienting themselves globally or placing greater focusing on customer and sales-
integration into PD-processes all seem to develop extensive rules with respect to these 
developments, and are often eager to use the rules for creating a common language of 
communication on such issues within the organization. They may also focus on the ap-
plication of special subsets of rules that are deemed helpful in addressing wider organ-
izational issues (which are, of course, related to the PD activities). This is also often ex-
pressed when companies relate their experiences with regard to the advantages that can 
be had by adopting the SG model.  
As is the case with all companies, rules have been introduced within the last ten 
years and have typically been modified twice since their introduction. Modifications 
can, however, be more or less extensive, but at least three companies have invested sub-
stantial resources in updating, amending or extending the rules on a regular basis and in 
a structured way. The rules tend to be stable if looked at within a period of a few years, 
but are invariably modified over the long term. Therefore, in answer to Weber’s propo-
sition that rules are required to be stable (1968), it may be said that the answer is ‘yes’ 
and ‘no’, depending on the timeframe in question. To be fair, however, it should be 
noted that Weber was not unaware of instability and states, as can be seen from the fol-
lowing: 
 
Business management throughout rests on increasing precision, steadiness, 
and, above all the speed of operations … The extraordinary increase in the 
speed by which public announcements, as well as economic and political 
facts, are transmitted exerts a steady and sharp pressure in the direction of 
speeding up the tempo of administrative reaction towards various situations. 
The optimum of such reaction time is normally attained only by a strictly 
bureaucratic organization (Weber 1968: 215). 
 
In the case of INGREDIENTS, the modifications have been significant since the re-
quirements for use of the rules has been relaxed extensively. The question then arises 
whether this change was the result of a managerial decision, which had already been 
implemented by the PD projects in the company or whether as result of the daily work-
ing practices of the team members? No evidence supports either of these propositions.   
Finally, with the exception of PLASTIC, all companies have made a distinction be-
tween a reduced- or full-scale application of the rules, depending on the level of ex-
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pected investment and the business risk involved. For example, MACHINERY estab-
lished a new rule to apply a full-scale PD process only when the project requires an in-
vestment of more than €700,000. It could therefore be argued that this new rule was a 
response to what must have appeared a problem to many of the companies in the case 
study, namely whether they should apply a full-scale model to each project under devel-
opment. Here, Rochford and Rudelius (1997) have identified a useful distinction be-
tween what they label ‘new-to-the-world’ and ‘product modifications’. Their research 
has indicated that ‘high-success’ products tend to utilize the PD stages more often than 
‘low success’ products, independent of whether they address new-to-the-world products 
or product modifications. From the companies under investigation here, however, no 
evidence disclosed whether the states or gates were skipped, apart from those of low-
risk projects which were often cases of product modification rather than new products. 
 
3) What effects can be identified with regard to rule application in the PD process? 
In all of the companies under investigation, the status of PD and the attention paid to it 
by top-management is high. (In the case of PLASTIC, however, only divisional manag-
ers participate in the gate review meetings, not members of the executive committee, 
which is nevertheless not perceived as a problem by any of the participants.) Each of the 
companies under review has experienced a range of benefits from the introduction of 
the SG model, which are primarily associated with the effects brought about by the re-
quirements of rules on documentation and explicit decision-making on PD.  
In all of the five companies, various organizational issues seem to have been ‘solved’ 
through the introduction of rules in PD, which was suggested to be a function of rules 
by March (1994) and March et al. (2001). PAINT, for instance, needed to generate 
greater focus on calculations regarding the business potential of its many product devel-
opment and product modification projects. MEDICO needed to place more focus on en-
suring commitment within the organization and across countries and units. As MA-
CHINERY had a number of projects and ideas working simultaneously, the introduction 
of the SG approach helped provide it with rules for documentation and decision-
making. INGREDIENTS needed to improve cooperation and develop a common lan-
guage, whereas PLASTIC needed to establish an ‘overview’ of the range of projects it 
was undertaking, and subsequently a reduction, which was eventually solved by rules of 
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decision authority diminishing the project managers’ responsibilities. Nevertheless, this 
is not to claim that all these complex problems disappeared as a result of implementing 
the latest version of rules in these organizations, merely that the use of rules is thought 
of, and often discussed in terms of having a positive effect on the problems at hand.  
The reduction of friction and political processes that is brought about by the intro-
duction of rules is one of the central advantages to have been identified by Weber 
(1968). All five cases of SG rules indicate that there has been a reduction in these fac-
tors, even though political issues, described as ‘lobbying’, seem to be prevalent in 
PLASTIC. Here, ‘lobbying’ was associated with a lack of objective decision-making 
and instances of pre-approval with the portfolio manager which the formal rules permit-
ted. As one respondent discloses: 
 
… a year or two ago one person started to promote the idea [that in] the new 
plants we were using a catalyst without any evidence that it worked, for ex-
ample, not even at the pilot stage … and especially not in our demonstration 
production unit.… Now they are building a €200 million plant or they are 
proposing that it is okay that we will use this catalyst – without any evi-
dence [that it works]. 
 
These issues are summarized in the table below. 
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Table 5.4: The instrumental effects of rules on the PD process 
 
 PAINT MEDICO MACHINERY INGREDI-
ENTS 
PLASTIC 
What is the 
status of PD 
activities? 
There is 
much more 
focus on PD 
recently. 
Top man-
agement at-
tention. Pro-
gress is 
monitored 
and “we 
serve the 
sales compa-
nies” 
High  High High – ‘R’ feels 
that more atten-
tion is devoted 
to ‘D’, which 
contrasts with 
‘R’, which is not 
(just) a ‘cost-
spender’. 
Are organ-
izational is-
sues and 
problems 
solved by the 
rules? 
Focus on the 
business po-
tential. 
Commitment 
across the 
organization. 
Several.  Cross func-
tional and 
cross organ-
izational co-
operation - 
and creating 
a common 
language. 
Too many pro-
jects are reduced 
through modi-
fied rules and 
the portfolio and 
total value has 
become a mana-
gerial concern. 
Has there 
been a reduc-
tion in fric-
tion and po-
litical proc-
esses through 
rules? 
‘Random’ 
decisions on 
which pro-
jects to ap-
prove is re-
duced. 
The PD-
process func-
tions as a 
sorting proc-
ess 
Problems with 
new markets are 
resolved through 
modified rules. 
Before: Pro-
jects initi-
ated by indi-
vidual man-
agers pro-
ducing prob-
lems. Now: 
Mandatory 
cooperation. 
Formally the 
problems with 
friction are 
solved, but ‘lob-
bying’ prevails 
and is in general 
perceived as a 
problem. 
 
 
5.4 RULES IN PLASTIC 
 
The PLASTIC firm has been selected for further investigation for several reasons. First, 
the company had previously applied a version of the SG approach in which the project 
managers were empowered to make decisions on the project, but has since reverted to a 
facilitated SG approach rather than the third generation Stage-Gate approach. Second, it 
is the only company under investigation in which where the rules have been analyzed as 
very exhaustive and subject to normal elaborateness (see table 5.2). 
The second part of this chapter is therefore a single-case analysis of PLASTIC, 
which is structured as follows: In the first section, the rules of PLASTIC are presented, 
followed by a comparison of these rules with the normative rules in the generic SG ap-
MANAGING PRODUCT INNOVATION THROUGH RULES 
 
88 
proach (as described in chapter two). Finally, the literature on the SG approach (pre-
sented in chapter three) is discussed in relation to the rule-system of PLASTIC, and the 
findings of the analysis are compared. 
PLASTIC’s main products are polyolefin – plastic raw materials consisting of poly-
ethylene (PE) and polypropylene (PP). The turnover in 2002 was €3,514 million, which 
generated an operating profit of €85 million. The firm employs 5,000 people and pro-
duces approximately 3.5 million tons of PE and PP each year. Polyolefin is a plastic 
which increasingly can be substituted for many conventional materials due to innova-
tion in its properties and performance. The primary customers of its products are plastic 
manufactures which convert the company’s products into everyday products – from 
food packaging and construction material through household goods to car and aircraft 
components. 
The production of plastics is a process industry and the manufacturing process of PE 
and PP starts with the distillation of crude oil. Most of the substances in crude oil con-
tain hydrocarbons. The molecular weights of the substances in crude oil vary, which 
enables a distillation of different fractions (or monomers) through heating and subse-
quent cooling in a refinery. Each fraction is a mixture of hydrocarbon chains, which dif-
fer in terms of the size and structure of their molecules. One particular fraction is Naph-
tha, which in its gaseous form is the feedstock in the production process of the plastic 
firm. No chemical transformation has taken place after distillation in the refinery, 
which, nevertheless, is required in order to make more practicable products with differ-
ent melting and boiling points and chemical properties.  
Chemical transformation is initiated in a reactor where the fractions are transformed 
into products through a cracking process which breaks the naphtha down into smaller 
hydrocarbon molecules such as the gases ethylene and propylene (olefins). The plastic 
firm has five crackers (some in joint venture) geographically placed throughout Europe 
and the Middle East. The transformation continues in a chemical reaction called polym-
erization, where a large number of individual molecules are linked together to form 
polymer chains, such as PE and PP. In this reaction, the double binding of the carbon 
molecules in, for example, ethylene are broken and the electron released from this goes 
on to form two single-bindings in which the open binding becomes coupled with an-
other ethylene-molecule with an open binding, and where ethylene goes on to form a 
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chain of polymer: polypropylene. The output of the plastic firm, namely polymers PE 
and PP, takes the form of granulates, which are transported as bulk or by truck to the 
customers. PLASTIC has seven polymerization plants. The design of the assets in the 
plants has an influence on the properties of olefins and each particular plant is designed 
to operate under certain conditions with special catalyst systems to make its own prod-
uct mix. The polymerization production process is complex when a new product is re-
quired, because a new additive that has thus far not been tested – or even in some cases 
has been tested – can contaminate the production process and subsequently the next 
product.   
The company is structured in five areas including a polyolefin business group, tech-
nology and projects (including R&D), operations and procurement, hydrocarbons group 
and business support. The largest area is the polyolefin business group, consisting of 
primarily eight business units of which five are organized according to markets served, 
two according to assets (PE) and (PP) and one as a support function. Each business unit 
is a profit center. Approximately 500 people work within R&D. The company has 57 
projects in the portfolio and seven long range projects (Quarter 3, 2003). Innovation 
projects can be owned by R&D and are primarily concerned with catalyst research in 
the cracking process, which often has a ten-year development time. In Quarter 3, 2003, 
seven long range projects were owned by the R&D department. The five business units 
managed 47 projects in Quarter 3, 2003 concerned with product development. This is 
normally a development issue which centers on additives to the polymer in the polym-
erization process with the aim to control product properties. The procedure can be illus-
trated by, for example, a common experience in the household, when cling-film some-
times becomes difficult to separate when applying it in the kitchen – this is often a 
cause of the quality or the level of ‘slipperiness’ which depends on the types of addi-
tives mixed in the polymer, which in turn depends on the price. Asset (PE and PP) also 
owns 10 innovation projects (Quarter 10, 2003) that often address issues of production 
process investment and innovation in the fundamental production technologies of the 
company. This influences both the cracking and polymerization process. The building 
of a new test plant is also one of these projects. 
All innovation projects are organized in line with the SG approach, which has been 
in existence in the company since 1995/1996. In 2003, the process was changed from 
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the first version, PD & I, to what the company describes as the ‘new innovation process’ 
(IP). The value of the portfolio is €241 million (Quarter 3, 2003) measured as the sum 
of a net present value (NPV) multiplied by the likelihood of success for each innovation 
project; a project team normally include 6 or 7 people. The SG approach of PLASTIC 
includes six stages and five gates and shares a high number of similarities with the 
stages of the normative SG approach (see chapter two). It is, however, influenced by the 
peculiarities of the process industry. Issues of comparison will be investigated later 
when attempting to answer the two analytical questions at the outset of this chapter. For 
the present, this approach is illustrated in the figure below: 
 
Figure 5.1: PLASTIC Stage-gate approach (source PLASTIC; redrawn from evidence material 
due to technical difficulties with scanning). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The decision-making authority of a project largely depends on the project type. Long-
range projects (which are normally concerned with catalyst development) must be de-
cided by a technology council, as opposed to a portfolio management meeting (PFMM) 
where decisions on the portfolio are taken. The R&D department, asset PE and PP, and 
business units, can all recommend projects to the technology council. Business units, 
asset PE and PP, and manufacturing can propose projects to the portfolio. The decision-
makers of the PFMM are the General Manager of the two asset clusters (who are the 
Chairmen of the meetings, and as a consequence revolve), PE and PP. However, ques-
tions concerning resources must be agreed together with the portfolio manager. Con-
flicts that cannot be resolved by the General Managers are put before an Executive Vice 
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President of Research and Technology who does not participate in PFMM, unlike the 
technology council the executive vice president of technology and projects do however 
participate. 
 The PFMM-forum also includes (besides the General Managers PE and PP) one pro-
duction team leader, the portfolio manager, the VPs of each business unit, the VP of 
R&D, and one senior scientist (appointed by the General Manager). The progress of the 
project is monitored according to a checklist in which eight deliverables must be met, 
including strategic fit, market plan, business case, killer variables, milestone solution, 
project plan, HSE/FTO (production possibility, environmental – and safety issues) and 
resources (source: formal IP material). All projects in concept development, detailed 
development and launch are part of the portfolio, see figure 5.1 above.  
Innovation activities (allowing for 20 percent of the time) can also take place outside 
the portfolio as a separate ‘activity’, but must be made part of the portfolio when pilot 
plant runs and/or upscale runs in ‘commercial plant outside the current operating win-
dow’ is required, or when catalyst or process research is required outside the opportu-
nity assessment work. This type of activity has been observed when entering the portfo-
lio with a project status of concept development, which is formally the skipping busi-
ness assessment stage. 
The PFMM-meetings are dislocated in time from the innovation projects. This is be-
cause the PFMM takes place on a quarterly basis but then covers all innovation projects 
in the portfolio at one go. According to the formal rules, a PFMM is also possible each 
month but this has so far not been carried. It is also possible to approve provisional en-
tries into the portfolio by the portfolio manager, if resources are available and the crite-
ria set out above are met. The PFMM-meetings are required to make decisions on single 
projects and on the portfolio-level of decision-making, including setting priorities be-
tween the individual projects; the former includes decisions as to whether a project 
should be kept in the portfolio at all or discontinued “as a result of a stage review” 
(source: PLASTIC). Portfolio decisions include prioritization of projects to maximize 
cash-flow over time, and to decide on  
 
… an optimal mix of projects with respect to strategy (risk, business mix) 
… balance resources and define cut-off points between projects for which 
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resources are available and projects for which resources are no longer avail-
able (source: PLASTIC).  
 
The gate activities (PFMM) that are required to be carried out are illustrated in table 5.4 
below and described in more detail in chapter six, where the extent of rule application is 
analyzed: 
 
Table 5.5: Formal gate rules (source: PLASTIC) 
 
Rule area Formal gate rules 
Agenda o Status of current portfolio and its implications 
o Existing projects at major stage gates 
o New projects at major stage gates 
o Implication of long-range projects 
o Recommended portfolio implications and alternatives 
Decision o New portfolio 
o Project managers 
o Resolve all outstanding legal/HSE/IPR issues 
Portfolio o Prioritize projects to maximize cash flow over time 
o Decide on optimal mix 
o Balance resources and define cut-off point between projects for which re-
sources are available and projects for which no longer any resources are vi-
able 
o Quarterly 
o Monthly 
 
The company employs a database particularly for its innovation purposes, where the 
project data is stored in the form of a project description, and where resources allocated 
and cost follow-ups are registered. This particular innovation enables links to another 
archival database where documents in the form of reports are stored, for example in the 
form of a business case and market plan. Consequently, the databases should ideally be 
able to provide a formal a ‘snapshot’ of the progress of an innovation project at any 
point in time.  
The responsibility for updating information has been designated to the assessment 
leader (vice presidents) in the first two stages (idea generation and business assessment) 
and the project manager in the subsequent stages. The assessment leader is therefore 
responsible for documenting project ideas, using an ‘idea communicator’ which is sim-
ply a Word document, and, in the second stage, for securing information in the form of 
a project description, including a business case, and HSE-check registered in the inno-
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vation database, as well as links in the archive-database. In the subsequent phases 
(stages), the project manager assumes responsibility for documenting a market- and 
launch-plan as well as a project plan. The documentation must be updated “continually” 
and “checked at least in milestone review” (formal IP material). One example of in-
creasing elaboration in the PLASTIC firm is the introduction of the innovation database 
and the formal templates to be filled out.  
The detailed requirements to be registered generally fall into four categories of rules. 
First, information on the project including objectives, target objectives and the selected 
technology platform (pop-down menu) is to be registered. Second, ‘Project Assessment 
Metrics’ are required to be filled out, including the probability of success (which is cal-
culated as an average between market and technical probability of success), the esti-
mated NPV of the project (business case), and finally the estimated cost. Third, the pro-
ject is to be documented with the business case, market plan, killer variables, and pro-
ject plan (including end date). Finally, the innovation tasks are to be described in opera-
tional terms and the formal stage and status of the project on a continual basis.  
The production of information to be registered and documented takes place in the 
stage activities of the PLASTIC firm, where each stage formally has a number of objec-
tives and required actions that are to be undertaken. As suggested above, the rules have 
not only been made more elaborate as part of this latest Stage-Gate version, but also 
more exhaustive by the portfolio management functionality. Portfolio management has 
introduced a division of activities in the stage-activities in terms of pre-portfolio activi-
ties that are the responsibility of a business unit or R&D, and, when the idea is devel-
oped to the extent that the use of the test-plant is required, the project must be made part 
of the portfolio. The pre-portfolio activities are illustrated in table 5.6 below. 
 
Table 5.6: Formal rules of pre-portfolio (source: PLASTIC) 
 
Stage Objectives Actions 
 
Idea generation 
and screening 
o Acquire broadest set of ideas – 
connect to customer needs 
o Take action on all ideas 
aligned with innovation objec-
tives within a robust process 
o Measure and reward good 
o Broadly communicate innovation 
objectives, aligned with business 
strategy 
o Assign ideas to innovation objec-
tives – enhance, enrich and struc-
ture ideas 
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ideas o Separate potential activities vs. 
potential projects 
o Communicate outcome of idea 
evaluation to all involved 
Opportunity 
assessment 
o Assess commercial and tech-
nical feasibility of ideas 
o Identify ideas with largest 
business potential 
o Prepare necessary information 
for first portfolio decision incl. 
business case and project plan 
through launch 
 
o Conduct an initial proof of concept 
and get sign-off from a senior sci-
entist 
o Prepare business case, assess stra-
tegic fit, competitive advantage 
and risks 
o Develop project plan, identity criti-
cal path and killer variables 
o Decide which opportunities to for-
ward to portfolio decision or to 
discontinue 
o Identify critical resources and 
check availability 
 
The first stages in the pre-portfolio phase are idea generation and screening and oppor-
tunity assessment, whereas the portfolio stages are subsequently concerned with devel-
opment and post-development, including concept development, detailed development, 
launch and review (see figure 5.1). The formal system of the PLASTIC firm shares 
similarities with the normative system, which will be discussed in greater detail below, 
but for the time being it is interesting to note that the focus on customer and economic 
rationality is one similarity between the two normative rule systems.  
The portfolio responsibility includes transfer to line-management but also that of 
capturing lessons from the specific development project. The stages include concept de-
velopment, detailed development, launch and review. The objectives to be fulfilled and 
the activities required to be carried out are thus listed in the table below: 
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Table 5.7: Formal rules of portfolio (source: PLASTIC) 
Stage Objectives Actions 
Concept  
development23 
o Demonstrate value creation po-
tential for customer and Bore-
alis 
o Proof of concept on bench and 
pilot scale prepare for detailed 
development 
o Test and prove technical feasibil-
ity on bench and pilot scale 
o Identify upscale plant, determine 
recipe and process conditions 
o Adapt market and competitive 
assessment – use pilot material 
for tests with customers as appro-
priate 
o Obtain sign-off from manufactur-
ing for upscale 
Detailed  
development24 
o Demonstrate value creation for 
customer and Borealis 
o Proof of concept at commercial 
scale 
o Prepare for launch 
o Scale up to commercial plant 
o Test and approve and mate-
rial/process with key customer; 
start pre-marketing activities 
o Resolve all understanding le-
gal/HSE/IPR issues 
o Prepare all necessary material for 
launch 
o Obtain sign off from commercial 
and plan manager for launch 
Launch o Fast and successful penetration 
of the market 
o Successfully manage transition 
of product/process from project 
team to line organization 
o Provide technical support with 
new grade to customers 
o Execute launch according to plan 
(timing, sales volume and mar-
gins by customer) 
o Hand over to line organization 
Review o Enable knowledge building and 
learning from completed and 
terminated projects 
o Support learning for decision 
makers, project managers and 
team members 
o Conduct review session within 
portfolio decision meeting 
o Project managers write final re-
port and present project outcomes 
and key learning’s to decision fo-
rum 
o Decision makers review decision 
made over course of the project 
o Root cause analysis for project 
success/failure 
 
The rules employed by PLASTIC have been described to the extent that they have been 
made available to the investigator. It must, however, be recognized that acquiring 
knowledge in this area has generally proved difficult due to the fact that competence in 
                                                 
23 This stage has formally been subdivided into two stages: bench scale and pilot scale which refer to the 
physical development of the plastic. The stages are divided by an ‘interim milestone review’ to be run by 
the steering committee of the project.   
24 This stage has formally been subdivided in plant scale and market test requiring that a market test can-
not be undertaken before the product has run through the plant. Again, the ‘interim milestone review’ 
must be run by the steering committee.  
MANAGING PRODUCT INNOVATION THROUGH RULES 
 
96 
the rules is not sufficiently developed amongst many of the respondents and that formal 
training has so far not been undertaken. This applies at both vice president and project 
management level. Thus, the description of rules provided above draws heavily on the 
formal literature and print-outs that were made available to the investigator during a 
start-up meeting at corporate headquarters. No access was possible to the databases. 
 
 
5.5 COMPARISON OF NORMATIVE SYSTEMS  
 
Similarities as well as differences can be identified between the normative system as 
described in chapter two and the normative system that was designed by PLASTIC and 
presented in the section above, particularly with respect to gates, stages, and informa-
tion/documentation. The latter forms the link between gates and stages.  
Gates: The system described in chapter two prescribes a standard of evaluation for an 
individual project that is undertaken according to the criteria with which the project has 
to comply. The criteria are similar even though the distinction between – what was de-
scribed in chapter two as – should-meet and must meet criteria could not be identified in 
PLASTIC. As was outlined in chapter two, the two timelines of gate review meetings 
each quarter and the progress of an individual project were not identified as possibilities 
by the normative system set out by Cooper and Kleinschmidt (see chapter two). The 
normative gates that are defined by these authors are two-fold: first, the project must 
comply with the must-meet criterion and, second, the should-meet criterion should also 
be fulfilled where comparison between the projects is undertaken according to a 10-
point Likert-scale (Cooper, 2001) to be evaluated by each participant in the meeting. 
The requirement for making portfolio-based decisions is therefore not developed to the 
same extent in PLASTIC as was the case with the normative system set out in chapter 
two. The purpose of the should-meet criterion is to establish a standard of comparison 
between the different projects in the portfolio and the purpose of the Likert-scale is to 
disclose the level of agreement that is reached among the gate review participants, and 
which was a central issue to Cooper and Kleinschmidt (see chapter two). Project man-
agers are excluded from the gate review meetings to secure ‘objectivity’, which was 
identified as a requirement by Cooper (2001), and top-management, at least at the level 
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of the executive committee, do not participate in the gate review meetings (PFMM) ei-
ther. This, however, is required by the normative system described in chapter two. 
Stages: In stage one, the activities of PLASTIC are more focused on the communica-
tion of ideas and not so much on idea generation itself, as was suggested by the initial 
stage of this investigation and proposed by Cooper (2001). Idea production, however, 
needed to be more market focused, which is why BUs needed to formulate innovation 
objectives as part of the new innovation process for PLASTIC. Stage two follows a 
similar pattern, but here the project management of the rule system requires that the pro-
ject manager must submit an end date when entering the portfolio that is, ideally, not 
subject to change as the project develops. Stage two in the normative system set out by 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt (cf. the detailed investigation) has been integrated into stage 
two of PLASTIC. Stage three also pursues a similar development, particularly with the 
requirement of greater contact to the customers early in the process. PLASTIC proves 
the exception here as it has divided this stage into two sub-stages. Stage four in the 
normative system requires product testing with customers, including trials and pre-tests 
in the marketplace, whereas PLASTIC rather sets its requirements on up-scaling to 
commercial plant testing and approval of material with the customer. This stage has also 
been divided into two sub-stages. The sub-stages are further divided by a sub-gate to be 
managed by the steering committee. Moreover, PLASTIC has added an extra stage after 
launch, namely the ‘review phase’, which has been added to emphasize learning and 
secure the delivery of the project to the line organization. 
 PLASTIC manages technology development projects, process improvement projects, 
and product development projects within the SG approach, whereas projects with an 
expected NPV of less than €2 million (often product modifications) are governed by the 
respective departments of the project owners without the involvement of portfolio man-
agement. This might introduce a resource problem since product development projects 
will naturally also compete for resources. Cooper (2001) recommends a lighter version 
of the SG approach to manage low-risk projects, like product modifications, for compa-
nies where competence has been developed, but does nevertheless recommends a ver-
sion of SG which is focused on technology development (SG TD). 
 Information and documentation is facilitated through a number of databases, which 
ideally enable constant control of the content and development of projects together with 
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monthly reporting of costs to SAP and hours to the hour-reporting system (SSP). The 
database is also designed to facilitate communication between project team members 
who can often be geographically dispersed, such as when a project in Finland can be 
managed by a project manager in another European country. Cooper (2001) does not 
elaborate too much on the topics of information and documentation, but merely assumes 
that all information is documented and made available to the members of the gate re-
view. This is done in order to secure ‘objective’ decision-making and also so that in-
formation is shared cross-functionally as well as among the project team members.  
 In conclusion, it can be seen that the nature of the two normative systems is indeed 
similar in terms of their attempts to install economic rationality (consequentiality) by 
separating the innovation process into a number of gate reviews and stages. Interest-
ingly, no formal rules at PLASTIC require project managers to stop working while 
awaiting the decision of the PFMM. This is an additional difference between the two 
systems.  
 
 
5.6 ANALYZING RULES IN PLASTIC 
 
The change in the SG approach at PLASTIC resulted from problems that occurred as 
the number of projects continually increased and the sense that the executive committee 
had thus lost the overview. In the previous rule-system, PD&I, project managers were 
authorized to make decisions on their own projects and business units decided the total 
number of new projects that were to be undertaken. Nevertheless, the project managers 
have been deprived of this authority. As one respondent states: 
 
… in a way the power of the project manager is not as big any more; earlier 
we basically had the right to make many decisions on the project concept, 
and now, in the innovation process, the decision level has moved up. We are 
basically more coordinators than decision-makers (project manager). 
 
Anderson (1996) suggested that within what he described as IPD, project managers 
should be empowered to make decisions on a project based on a contractual agreement. 
This was attempted at INGREDIENTS, but the number of projects increased, which 
was in itself ascribed to the authority of project managers to make decisions. Keeping to 
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the terminology of Anderson (1996) the second generation SG approach can be said to 
be more a management control system than an innovation system. 
 On the project level, exhaustiveness was increased through the introduction of in-
formation and documentation rules which project managers required were continually 
updated. The portfolio management functionality, on the other hand, was subsumed un-
der the responsibility of a designated portfolio manager who reported to two Asset Gen-
eral Managers. The main responsibility of these General Managers is the operation of 
the plants at PLASTIC. The functionality of the SG approach is to make ‘objective’ de-
cisions based on sufficient project information and documentation. The elaborateness of 
documentation and information rules corresponds to the requirements for making port-
folio decisions even though PLASTIC does not have any rules for reaching should meet 
criteria which support portfolio decision-making by comparing the relative attractive-
ness of projects against other projects. 
 Phillips et al. (1999) argue that the number of stages depends on the strategy of the 
company and the peculiarities of organization which prevail at any given company. 
PLASTIC has set itself the goal of becoming more of a prospector with a focus on cus-
tomers and value adding. According to Phillips et al. (1999), this strategy requires the 
subdivision of the first stages in the SG approach at PLASTIC as customer needs are 
identified particularly in these stages. KODAK is mentioned as an example of a com-
pany which has adopted this process design as a result of greater customer-orientation. 
This design can, however, not be applied to PLASTIC, which is more focused on secur-
ing quality in the concept and detailed development of the product. Sub-stages are asso-
ciated by Phillips et al. (1999) with tighter control, which in the case of PLASTIC is 
placed on concept and detailed development. Phillips et al. (1999) further suggest that 
high-phased companies like PLASTIC (eight stages) need to enforce reviews as part of 
the overall process in order to cope with the broad scope of business strategy. The busi-
ness scope of PLASTIC, however, is not broad, at least not to the same extent as KO-
DAK. However, the geographical locations of its units are widely dispersed, particularly 
between sales- and marketing and R&D, which appear to the rationale for devising sub-
stages in the first place rather than as a result of overall corporate strategy issues. 
 Rochford and Rudelius (1997) suggest that the number of stages can vary in accor-
dance with the risk of the project. In addition, Cooper (2001) suggests a fast track ver-
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sion for smaller projects as advisable. In PLASTIC, a rule has been added only to ad-
dress projects with an expected NPV over €2 million in the SG approach. This is the 
only example of a rule which has been made in order to create flexibility whereas all 
other types of projects, including product modification, are managed by the business 
units and thus outside portfolio management. 
 
 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
 
Taking PLASTIC as a case study, rules influenced by the SG approach have been iden-
tified in an organizational practice. Not only can the rule systems be characterized in 
terms of elaborateness, as suggested by Cyert and March (1992), but also with respect 
to exhaustiveness (Weber 1968). The degree of exhaustiveness and elaborateness varies 
among the companies. Rules are stable in the short run, but generally change between 2 
and 3 times over a 10-year time-frame. Competence in rules seems to be an imperative 
when companies are in the process of moving to a higher generation SG, but a retroac-
tive movement has also been identified among the case studies. The issue of compe-
tence indicates that the organizational response to rules requires a perspective of appro-
priateness to understand the use of rules in an organizational practice. The companies 
with the ‘highest’ attitude towards PD appear to be companies with the greatest reduc-
tion in friction and political processes, which further emphasizes the perspective of ap-
propriateness when understanding the manageability of PD, since organizational iden-
tity seems to be central to understanding the link between rules and actions. Moreover, 
SG rules in PD are interconnected with other rules and problems outside PD. 
 The comparison between the normative systems described in chapter two and the 
system of PLASTIC revealed a degree of similarity between the two systems, even 
though some differences could also be identified. As was seen, the goal of the PLAS-
TIC rule-system was to produce objective decision-making in the gates ‘fueled’ by in-
formation produced in the stages and documented prior to the gate meeting. In this 
sense, the rule-system of PLASTIC is an attempt to install rational behavior (conse-
quentality) in PD. However, the findings in the cross-case analysis further substantiate 
the need for understanding how rules are actually used. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The appropriateness perspective: using rules in five 
case companies 
 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze rule-application in relation to the five compa-
nies under examination. As we saw in the previous chapter, the perspective of rule-
following assumes that actions conform to a rule (instrumentality) and, as a conse-
quence, tend to neglect accounts of identity or any situational interpretation of the cir-
cumstances in which actors find themselves.  
The perspective of appropriateness challenges the instrumental perspective of rules – 
how rules are applied therefore becomes a central issue since they cannot be pro-
grammed (or even automatically predicted). Building on the previous chapter, this sec-
tion seeks to analyze the multiple-case studies as a whole before turning to the single-
case analyses in the following chapters. In the following case study, observation is then 
included as a relevant data-gathering technique.  
The starting point of this chapter, however, is the framing of two research questions, 
which provide an organizing device for the subsequent analysis in the following two 
sections. In doing so, the chapter refers particularly to rule-application with respect to 
the five companies before offering a preliminary conclusion of the argument so far.  
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6.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The analysis outlined above leads directly to the approach adopted here. In exploring 
this approach, we are guided by two research questions which implicitly determine the 
structure of this chapter. These questions are formulated as follows: 
 
(1) The concept of appropriateness challenges actions which are said to conform to 
rules by claming that actions are a result not only of rules themselves, but also 
issues of identity and interpretation of the situation in which the respective actor 
or organization finds itself. As March (1994:61) notes: 
 
To say that individuals and organizations follow rules and identities, 
however, is not to say that their behavior is always easily predicted. 
Rule-based behavior is freighted with uncertainty. Situations, identi-
ties, and rules can all be ambiguous. 
 
As a consequence, actions cannot be assumed to conform solely to rules. This 
raises the question: how are rules actually applied to PD – in strict accordance 
with bureaucratic mechanisms or rather in a relaxed way through the construc-
tion of appropriateness? 
 
(2) Moreover, the interaction of rules with the organization itself first needs to be 
understood in order to evaluate whether the application of the rules is actually 
different from that which is assumed by the instrumental perspective. Arguing 
from the perspective of appropriateness, it may thus be questioned whether rules 
influence organizational identity, require competence, and, additionally, 
whether the rules are a response to problems other than those assumed by the 
normative rule-system as outlined in chapter two? 
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6.2 RULE APPLICATION IN PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT 
 
Rules are not applied to all PD activities. All five companies under consideration here 
make a distinction between a reduced or full-scale application of rules depending on the 
expected investment and the risk to business involved. MACHINERY, for example, 
only applies a full-scale PD process when the PD project requires an investment of 
more than €700,000, whereas the PLASTIC firm does so only when the expected NPV 
is above €2 million.  
From four out of the five firms under examination, it is not mandatory to use all the 
rules. In this way, PLASTIC formally demands that all rules are followed, but rule-
deviations are not sanctioned. The PAINT company, on the other hand, rather places its 
focus on stages, the preparation of documents and the preparation of the business case – 
as is the case with the INGREDIENT company. Generally, there seems to be a discerni-
ble focus on preparing documentation for the gate meetings, as required by the formal 
(and normative) rules. The INGREDIENT company seems to apply the SG approach 
when organizational cooperation between the different PD centers is essential and/or 
needed. The general attitude towards the rule systems for PD in the five companies is 
summarized in the table below.  
 
Table 6.1: General attitudes of SG rule-based systems in the five case studies 
General Atti-
tude 
“They are of 
great help – 
they provide 
structure to the 
process and 
secure good 
decisions.” 
“Rules exist – 
but we use them 
as needed.” 
“They play an 
insignificant 
role; important 
decision-
makers and 
other decision 
forums deter-
mine what 
happens in the 
PD process.” 
 
“We consid-
ered introduc-
ing rules – but 
do not consider 
them to be im-
portant.” 
Firm PAINT 
PLASTIC 
INGREDIENTS 
MACHINERY  
MEDICO 
  
 
From the empirical analysis, PAINT seems to prefer sticking to the rules. One explana-
tion for this may lie in the fact that the company is new to the world of SG rules and is 
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therefore still in the process of learning. Similarly, PLASTIC sticks to the rules as a 
consequence of its experience in the delegation of decision-making authority, which has 
led to the generation of too many projects (more than 200) and the feeling that the top 
management has lost the ‘overview’ of these projects. A new version of the SG ap-
proach, however, was implemented at the beginning of 2003, when formal decision-
making was re-introduced. In the other three companies, respondents generally found 
rules helpful to the extent that they provided structure and tended to secure good deci-
sions, providing that their application was a discretionary matter and not mandatory. 
Moreover, the general picture of rules in the PD process was that they work as a ‘guide’ 
or ‘framework’, which suggests that rules are applied according to the specifics of a 
situation. As two respondents had it: “You can choose independently what to include in 
the stages” (senior project manager) and “rules can be challenged” (project manager).  
Furthermore, three out of the five companies had already attempted to establish man-
datory rule-following, but the experience had merely resulted in the companies reducing 
their requirements (with the exception of PLASTIC), particularly for rule-following in 
the instrumental understanding, and instead the form of a ‘checklist’. As one respondent 
explained his experience with regard to the use of detailed documentation: “the exten-
sive use of manuals is too tight and bureaucratic” (Development Manager). 
 Discretionary application also appears to apply especially to activities between deci-
sions (gates). Again, the PLASTIC firm is an exception here, as it outwardly maintains 
the formality of rules while not sanctioning their breakage. In this case, for example, 
while the performance of the project managers is officially monitored via the company 
intranet, a project may still be formally approved even though a business plan for the 
project had not even been uploaded. 
Gates seem to have an important role in the structuring of the PD processes, with 
gate three (before development) and gate five (before launch) particularly being kept 
completely formal through the participation of executive management or divisional 
management. In this way, MEDICO has replaced gate one with decisions related to the 
budgeting process, where divisional managers allocate resources to the PD project only 
if the project complies with the required criteria.  
PLASTIC is a market leader and employs a competitive strategy which focuses on 
value added and at the same time on production costs because of heavy production fa-
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cilities. Consequently, it applies an expected NPV as the economic criteria for taking 
account of sales and costs. INGREDIENT is also a process industry. Both types of 
company therefore include process improvements which are to be managed through the 
PD process and are influenced by the SG approach. PAINT, on the other hand, is also a 
process industry but is currently in a process of transition from a follower to a proactive 
prospector strategy. In the past, it produced products which were based on by-passing 
patents, but is now attempting to focus its attention on more proactive projects with a 
‘new-to-the world’ element. As a consequence, R&D has been relocated under sales and 
marketing, which thereby re-focuses interest on the business potential. Finally, MED-
ICO and MACHINERY are also both market leaders in their respective industries, but 
have placed their focus on costs because their price-strategy had already been deter-
mined prior to the respective project work on product development and the fact that 
costs were set from the outset of the project development.  
All the companies under investigation are in the process of trying to establish an eco-
nomically viable rationality, in the instrumental sense, even though they are aware that 
the initial calculation (in gate one) is rough and uncertain. Nevertheless, all of the com-
panies are developing these calculations further as the product development projects 
progress. The requirements for financial calculation appear to be mandatory with no 
possibility for choosing freely, except when management chooses to support ‘a high-
risk project’, a ‘strategic’ project or a ‘symbolic project’ to legitimize other decisions. 
The latter case can be evidenced by PLASTIC where a particular project was approved 
despite the fact that it was below the €2 million-rule. In this case, the decision was justi-
fied by the need to support an earlier decision to build a new plant which was to pro-
duce the product resulting from the development project.  
Rule-following is rather relaxed when it accords with the complete set of SG rules. 
None of the companies investigated here are particularly strict when it comes to de-
manding that the whole set of rules must be applied (although PLASTIC appears to be 
the exception) even if they have invested large amounts of resources in developing and 
updating, including training on, the rules. This does not mean that PLASTIC has sof-
tened its requirements for following formal rules, rather that all the rules are not fol-
lowed in an organizational practice. There is ample room for context specific interpreta-
tions and modifications to the rules; thus, the SG approaches, when implemented, do 
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not amount to a whole bureaucracy in the strictest Weberian-sense. For Weber (1968, 
1972), rule-following was not an open question or a discretionary matter even though he 
recognized that rules could be learned. Nevertheless, the bureaucratic mechanism could 
be identified to a certain extent. In fact, the PD processes are influenced by the particu-
lar SG approach that has been selected, especially with regard to documentation and the 
kind of argumentation adopted at the gate meetings (Gate reviews). The gate meetings 
thus come into focus if the development, design and application of rules in PR, is to be 
further investigated. Consequently, if the company relaxes rule-following at the stages, 
the question arises as to the quality of decision-making that is taking place at the gate 
meeting, owing to the lack of information. No evidence supports this, which raises a 
further dilemma as to how some of the bureaucratic advantages that are claimed to be 
experienced by the organization can in fact be accomplished if the rules are violated, 
even to a limited degree? 
The empirical data supports the notion that PD is made manageable through an ap-
plication of rules to the process at hand, e.g. to rules for calculating the justification of 
projects or rules regarding user involvement and decision-making. Even if the rules are 
applied in different ways, and to different degrees, companies with SG approaches find 
that the PD process is heavily influenced by some form of requirement for preparing a 
business case or business model for new products, or also for presenting calculations on 
expected costs or expected future profits. The introduction of various models and tem-
plates that arises through introducing and utilizing the SG approach for preparing these 
calculations and documents for the SG meetings seems, in fact, to be one of the major 
impacts that this approach has had on the cases under study, and as was predicted by 
Weber (1968).  
The introduction of rules seems to influence the PD process by placing greater focus 
on calculation, thus moving the PD decisions into the ‘open’ decision arena, and – ac-
cording to a number of interviewed actors – reducing the influence of ‘people’ and poli-
tics on the  
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Table 6.2: Summary of rule-application at the organizational level 
 
 PAINT 
 
MEDICO MACHIN-
ERY 
INGREDI-
ENT 
PLASTIC 
Rules ap-
plied on all 
PD activi-
ties? 
No.  No. No. No. SG used 
when organ-
izational coop-
eration is 
needed. 
 
No. 
Is it manda-
tory to use 
all the 
rules? 
No. Focus 
stages on pre-
paring docu-
mentation and 
business case. 
No. Focus on 
stages and 
documenta-
tion, but linked 
with many 
planning ac-
tivities. 
No. Applied 
differently 
across the or-
ganization. 
Decision 
points impor-
tant. 
No. Focus on 
preparing case 
and to justify 
the project. 
Gate-contracts 
for each stage. 
Formally yes, 
but rule-
deviation is 
not sanctioned. 
Are the PD 
processes 
structured 
according 
to formal 
rules? 
PD is becom-
ing more 
structured. 
To a high de-
gree – PD ac-
tivities are re-
lated to vari-
ous plans and 
planning ac-
tivities. 
Formalized 
and structured 
– but there is 
room for high-
risk projects. 
Success rate of 
70% is the tar-
get. 
To some ex-
tent – and in-
creasingly 
more. 
PD and tech-
nology plan-
ning is becom-
ing more 
structured. 
Are 'writ-
ten’ rules 
and rule 
following  
important in 
PD? 
Rules serve as 
a ‘guide’ to 
activities be-
tween gates. 
Rules for ac-
tivities act as a 
‘compass’ or 
‘time-table’. 
Rules for PD 
are a ‘frame-
work’.  
Experienced 
that extensive 
use of manuals 
etc. is too 
‘confining’ 
and ‘bureau-
cratic’. 
Rule-
following by 
project man-
agers is moni-
tored but not 
sanctioned. 
Are there 
formal gate-
meetings? 
Yes. Yes. Gates can 
be replaced by 
other meet-
ings. 
Yes. Yes – difficult 
to get the proc-
ess working. 
Yes – but gate 
meetings for 
technology 
planning is 
separate. 
Is PD influ-
enced by 
calcula-
tions? 
Yes – business 
potential. 
Yes – focus on 
costs. 
Yes – costs 
and market 
potential. 
Yes – profit 
from projects. 
Yes – focus 
expected NPV. 
Are PD pro-
jects budg-
eted? 
No project 
budgets. 
Project man-
agers becom-
ing more fo-
cused on plan-
ning, budgets, 
and coordina-
tion (vis-à-vis 
departments). 
Yes, negotiate 
about re-
sources, PD 
costs, business 
evaluation, and 
payback pe-
riod. 
Budget issues 
are the line 
manager’s re-
sponsibility. 
Yes monthly 
updated in 
terms of costs 
and time con-
sumption. 
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PD processes themselves. In this way, rules do actually fulfill another major objective 
identified by Weber (1968), namely that of removing the ‘personal’ from the decision 
arena and introducing ‘objective criteria’ to decision-making. The data gathered here 
indicate that at least two of the companies under investigation think that the SG model 
is helpful, provide structure to the process and facilitate decision-making. At the same 
time, the data indicate that while rules do exist, they are often applied as needed. The 
five companies that adopted the SG approach with regard to the PD process are more or 
less structured according to the SG rules and their application. That being said, the de-
gree of structure varies greatly among the respective cases. This is summarized below. 
Returning to the first research question, which asked how rules are applied to PD, it 
can therefore be concluded that rules are not followed mandatorily nor do actions di-
rectly conform to the rules. Moreover, although the analysis suggests that the gates are 
kept formal, rule-following in stages is rather more relaxed and tends to be couched 
rather in terms of appropriateness. 
 
 
6.3 INTERACTION BETWEEN RULES AND THE ORGANIZATION  
 
No respondents expressed any particular problems with implementation, as is addressed 
in the work of O’Connor (1994). In particular, his observation that it can take up to six 
years for an SG approach to work cannot be supported by the analysis here. That being 
said, INGREDIENTS actually experienced the need to relax the demand for rule-
following, as O’Connor (1994) predicted when he argued that a key component in im-
plementation was the need to develop flexibility as a counterbalance to the discipline 
and thoroughness of the SG model. As the cases show, there are situations where rule-
following is more or less mandatory but the activities and processes between gate meet-
ings are more loosely structured and only narrowly related to rule-following. 
In fact, the five companies under investigation here have all undergone some major 
shift in their organizational focus or in the priorities set by the management. PAINT, for 
instance, has moved into new markets in an effort to become truly global. As a conse-
quence, it still needs to integrate more production facilities and geographical markets. 
Top management has become more involved in the innovation process, and there is 
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more focus on customer and sales company involvement, as is the case in MEDICO and 
MACHINERY. The identity of the organization therefore seems to be influenced by the 
formal rules, and the rules in turn are influenced by company strategy in terms of its re-
lationship with the environment. 
The relationship between the organizational identity and the formal rules for working 
in the companies can, however, represent a challenge, as is the case of PAINT where, to 
quote one actor:  
 
[S]ome technicians regard the rules as purely bureaucratic. Others want 
boxes and rules for everything, for example, on responsibility, and that is 
not possible – unfortunately (R&D manager).  
 
In MEDICO a distinction between senior project managers and new managers is estab-
lished by their access to extensive training activities within the company. In the MA-
CHINERY firm, on the other hand, there is a classical clash between the identity of 
production and the PD teams. Here there is 
 
…an old culture in the company. There has never been a great distance be-
tween idea and action in the company. Things had to go fast, and there has 
not always been any discipline (in PD) processes. … [for instance, when] 
electronics wants more formal rules than machine people.  
 
In sum, identity can be influenced by formal rules, but it can still be ambiguous and 
sometimes even contradictory. The identity of groups within the organization seems, 
nevertheless, to be further influenced by the general level of education of such groups, 
which suggests that rule-following is in fact a construction reflective of education. 
Some groups want more rules whereas others want fewer, which means that homogene-
ity is not an effect of rules, although the organization’s identity is influenced as a con-
sequence.  
 Rules are established in response to a variety of problems. For instance, PAINT 
wanted more integration of the project teams and clearer project definitions, whereas 
MACHINERY wanted better coordination between the market segments, the latter nev-
ertheless being accomplished through a separating R&D into two new different depart-
  MANAGING PRODUCT INNOVATION THROUGH RULES 110
ments.25 With INGREIDENTS one important comment that was made was that the for-
mal rules influenced the identity of the company to the extent that a common language 
was established. PLASTIC experienced problems as a consequence of developing too 
many projects and thus decided to modify the rules, depriving project managers of their 
decision-making authority, generating more market-related ideas and ideally to better 
integrate R&D. 
 Some organizational identities seem to be more susceptible to formal rules than oth-
ers. This was the case with INGREDIENTS which had to adapt from a more elaborate 
(‘bureaucratic’) model to a simple form of checklist. Rule implementation was softened 
because of its incompatibility with the organizational identity, which could in turn ex-
plain such policies as the lack of training programs within the company and the top-
down decision to implement the SG approach.  
Rules can also be learned – which is evidenced by the findings in all companies – but 
organizations need to build competences in using them. Where a training program was 
not offered to do this, it was usually grounded in the perception that the rules were too 
‘bureaucratic’. Moreover, the learning process has to be conscientious since at least 
three of the companies have more extensive rules than are actually required in the PD 
processes. For example, MEDICO has an extensive formal training program. In the 
training program, the SG approach is presented and actually gives newcomers the im-
pression that they have to apply all the rules in their projects. In turn, this introduces 
large amounts of documentation into the PD process. Trainees have to learn the differ-
ence between formal rules and the ‘necessary’ formal rules needed to comply with the 
demands and requirements, or in other words, they have to learn the difference between 
‘nice-to-have’ and ‘need-to-have’ rules. March et al. (2001) argue that competences can 
be built into the process of using rules (as is in fact illustrated by the data here), but that 
rules do not necessarily solve all problems.  
 
                                                 
25  For further reading on this specific company, see Christiansen et al. (2003). The break-up of research 
(R) and development (D) was a managerial intervention aimed at increasing manageability by reducing 
technological ambiguity in product development. This was in order to resolve some of the problems ear-
lier identified in R.  
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Table 6.3: The interaction between rules and the organization 
 
 Major changes in organ-
izational focus? 
Rules and organizational 
working? 
 
Rules and organizational 
culture 
PAINT More market-oriented 
and more collaboration, 
top management in-
volvement 
Too many projects started 
with the same people. 
Challenge “to get the pro-
ject, the project team and 
the project definition”. 
Some technicians regard 
the rules as purely bu-
reaucratic. But “some 
engineers love boxes. 
They want clear defini-
tions of relationships. 
That’s not possible – 
unfortunately”  
 
MEDICO More market-oriented – 
involving customers ear-
lier. 
The six divisions and the 
sales companies are not 
always involved in Gate 3 
decisions. Top manage-
ment is involved in PD. 
 
Divisional focus versus 
central planning – but 
several planning proc-
esses criss-cross the or-
ganization 
MACHINERY Three market segments 
defined – early customer 
and market involvement 
and analysis. 
The question of coordi-
nating three market seg-
ments is solved through a 
division of PD and sepa-
ration between ‘R’ and 
‘D’. 
Production units versus 
PD. “Old culture – not far 
between idea and actions. 
Things had to go fast, and 
there has not always been 
a discipline (in PD proc-
esses).” “Electronics' 
wants more formal rules 
than machine people”. 
 
INGREDIENTS New owner – important 
to get the process to work 
across the whole organi-
zation and between all 
levels. 
PD needs to be coordi-
nated between two PD 
organizations – SG cre-
ates a common language 
with guidelines. 
 
After change form exten-
sive handbook to a guide-
line and checklist – much 
more positive comments. 
PLASTIC More focus on environ-
mental issues and more 
market-driven idea gen-
eration (and innovation). 
Portfolio-perspective is 
important and will solve 
the uncontrollable num-
ber of new projects 
The merger of the four 
companies is not physical 
and organizational. The 
magnitude of the produc-
tion plant impedes the 
integration of the com-
pany in many ways, but 
the local culture seems to 
have been diminished 
through frequent job rota-
tion. 
 
PLASTIC, for instance, is struggling to influence behavior and make action conform to 
the formal rules, but does not, nevertheless, seem to have provided any training pro-
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grams to achieve this. Before implementing the new version of the stage-gate approach, 
down-sizing (Hamel 2000) through the so-called MATT-program (outlined in chapter 
five) had already been undertaken. The consequent reduction in the number of people 
employed in R&D, somewhere in the order of approximately 30 percent, naturally gen-
erated a negative attitude towards the new rule-system amongst some of the respon-
dents. This is summarized in table 6.3. 
The second research question set out at the beginning of this chapter sought to frame 
an analysis of the interaction between rules and an organization. It was argued that iden-
tity is influenced by rules but that identity is nevertheless not homogenous. Instead, the 
interaction between rules and organization is subject to a filter, which is determined by 
identity. This suggests that actions cannot automatically be linked to the formal rules 
provided by the design of the SG approach within each company. Rules can, however, 
be learned which suggests that the attitude towards the rules is an important factor when 
attempting to manage the PD process through the adoption of formal rules. Strategic 
problems also need to be solved. Here, the approach has been motivated by the theories 
of Cooper (as analyzed in chapter two), who emphasizes the need for companies to be 
more market focused.  
 
 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
 
Summarizing the above, when rules are applied to PD activities, it becomes clear from 
an analysis of the organizational level that their application varies among rules govern-
ing gates, information and documentation, and stages. In the five case studies, emphasis 
seems to be placed on preparing and documenting the Gate Reviews, which are kept 
formal, whereas rule-following in stages tends to be a discretionary matter with respect 
to the project managers. Amongst some project managers, it is even a hallmark of the 
more experienced to break the rules, which suggests that their identification with the 
company is not homogenous. Moreover, the rules in some situations do not cover all 
eventualities since projects are by their nature unique and therefore do not lend them-
selves to the generalized character of the SG rules. In other words, rules are generic and 
situations specific (March, 1994). 
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Rules are generated not only in response to problems of innovation but also issues of 
strategy, particularly in concerns with respect to the relation of the organization to its 
environment. As suggested by March et al (2001), rules are interconnected and new 
rules that respond to problems created by the environment affect the formal rule-system 
of innovation. ‘Rule-following’ is further interrelated with the organizational identity, 
which along with other factors (including training), leads to the construction of an atti-
tude as to whether it is appropriate to ‘follow’ the rules or not. March (1994) empha-
sizes that appropriateness is a rational process, but another form of rationality than the 
analytical (see chapter four). Thus, rule-breaking can in some situations make more 
sense to the organization, as part of its formation of a sense of appropriateness than 
‘just’ following the rules. March (1994) also suggests that formal rules are socialized, 
which in turn raises the question whether new rules can in fact compete with old rules 
(norms). This is one of the limitations consciously placed on the present study, which 
attempts to focus on explicit rules only. 
Thus, rule-following becomes a question of constructing a sense of appropriateness 
rather than merely automated actions which are programmed by rules (Simons, 1954). 
This in turn suggests the need for a more in-depth analysis of how rules are actually 
constructed, situations interpreted and identities associated with rules. Moreover, more 
analysis is needed not only in investigating the variance in the Stage Gate components 
but also as to why some rules are broken and others followed. From the above, the 
companies appear to insist on keeping the gates formal, which further suggests that an 
examination of these gates is required in order to identify whether rule-following in this 
instance is also rather relaxed.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The appropriateness perspective:  
using rules in PLASTIC 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter sets out to investigate how rules are used in PLASTIC from the perspective 
of appropriateness. The previous chapter analyzed appropriateness on an organizational 
level and, through cross case-analysis, identified a number of important findings. 
PLASTIC was then selected for further analysis. How rules are used in this case will be 
is investigated below by applying the theory of appropriateness as outlined in chapter 
four. Here, it will be remembered that appropriateness is constructed according to the 
following schema:    
 
Figure 7.1: Constructing appropriateness.26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26This model is developed on the basis of March et al. (2001: 22) and inspired by March’s earlier work 
(1994). The boxed area is added to the model adopted by March et al. (2001) in order to emphasize the 
theory of appropriateness and the ‘filter’ which is conspicuous in the behavior of actors between the 
sphere of rules and actions. Appropriateness is discussed in more detail in chapter eight where additional 
variables are added. 
 
Rules 
Identity selected 
Situation recognized 
Application  
of rules Actions 
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The formal rules of PLASTIC prescribe what it means to be, say, a proper decision-
maker or a project manager, but whether these rules call forth the actions(s) actually in-
tended by the rule(s) crucially depends on how issues of identity are defined as well as 
the specific situational circumstances in which the rules are used. This can sometimes 
result in rule-deviation or the use of the rule(s) being regarded as a duty, and thus lack-
ing any internal commitment, particularly where external coercion is a motive (March 
1994). As a consequence, rule-competition, rule-ambiguity, multiple identities, ambigu-
ous situations, and ignorance can all result in rule-deviation (ibid.). With this in mind, 
the first part of this chapter analyzes the extent that rule-following and rule-deviation 
occurs in PLASTIC with respect to gates, information (and documentation), and stages. 
A second section then focuses on analyzing a gate meeting in more detail, looking at the 
decision-situation as defined by the formal rules. As with previous chapters, each of the 
following sections is guided by a number of key research questions.  
 
 
7.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
Previous chapters investigated the broad framework of the theory of appropriateness 
and identified a number of conceptual and practical questions. These questions are fur-
ther analyzed in the following chapter as applied to PLASTIC. In exploring these issues, 
two broad questions guide our analysis.  
 
(1) The previous chapter suggested that rule application varied among PD activities, 
with gate reviews in particular being kept formal. Observation, however, was 
not part of the data gathering technique in the previous chapter, which suggests 
that discretion might be exercised with respect to rule-following – also in gates – 
but not detected through, say, interviews. This arises because post-
rationalization can sometimes occur among respondents (March 1994). In this 
chapter, therefore, observation is specifically added as a data-gathering tech-
nique in order to answer the question: to what extent are rules used in the PD 
activities of PLASTIC? 
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(2) According to Weber (1968), rules and regulations offer a rational decision-
making process which is based on ‘pure’ calculation effected through calculable 
rules. The previous chapter, however, indicated that the identity of the project 
manager was crucial in explaining whether a rule was evoked or not. Moreover, 
rule-following between gates was seen to be generally lenient when compared to 
the actions that the formal rules actually prescribed. As a result, the kind of ob-
jective decision-making predicted by the instrumental perspective was seen to be 
an illusion since information is not produced in the stages. The theory of appro-
priateness, on the other hand, represents an alternative rationale to ‘rule-
following’, one where identity and the interpretation of a specific situation are 
regarded as central under ambiguity. Thus, the overarching question may be 
asked: how are rules actually used with respect to decision-making (in the gate 
meeting)? This can in turn be broken down into further relevant sub-questions: 
 
a. Does the color-rule system (monitoring time-delay) compete with other 
rules? Rule competition becomes conspicuous when actors use rules 
(March 1994). This aspect is therefore analyzed in two further sub-
sections. The first investigates projects that are addressed at the gate 
meeting (PFMM-meeting in PLASTIC-terminology) according to the 
rules that prescribe how projects are to be selected when shifting stages. 
It also looks at the color-rule system, which is designed to monitor de-
lays to the end-date which is approved when the project enters the port-
folio. The second section then analyses projects which are addressed ac-
cording to other rules or problems not so far solved by existing rules. 
 
b. How is the criterion of manufacturability27 constructed within the gate 
meeting and can competition among criteria rules be identified? Here, an 
analysis of two projects is undertaken with respect to the interpretation 
and construction of appropriateness of this particular criterion. 
 
                                                 
27 Manufacturability is the most common discussed criterion (appendix J: projects no. 47, 30, 23, 28, 8, 
and 32). 
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c. What is the role of calculations under ambiguity? Calculations constitute 
yet another calculable rule (within the terminology of instrumental rule-
following) and are observed to be raised at gate-meetings. This section 
examines whether calculations are also subject to interpretation and 
whether post-facto information gathering can indeed be identified as a 
form of legitimizing decisions, as was suggested by March and Feldman 
(1981). 
 
These questions are examined in the following and the chapter is organized accordingly. 
Thus, the first section analyzes the extent of rule-following that can be observed in the 
case under review, whereas the second section seeks to examine the gate meeting in 
view of the four supporting questions set out above. Analysis of the first supporting 
question in section (a) is, however, further divided in two separate sections. The chapter 
concludes by providing answers to the two main research questions stated at the outset. 
 
 
7.2 EXTENT OF RULE USAGE 
 
In the following, the analysis of the extent of rule usage is undertaken with respect to 
three factors: 1) gates; 2) information (and documentation); and 3) stages. 
 
7.2.1 Gate rules 
The formal gate-rules of PLASTIC are described in chapter five (see table 5.4 above) 
and fall into three rule-areas: agenda, decision and portfolio decision. Whether these 
rules are followed in all projects is examined by looking at the September PFMM and 
illustrated in table 7.1 below. From this, it can be seen, for instance, that an analysis of 
the rule ‘existing projects at major stage gates’ reveals that three projects are not ad-
dressed in the gate meeting. This rule is therefore marked with a ‘no’ in the table.  
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Table 7.1: Summary of the application of gate rules 
 
Gate Rules 
 
 Applied?*
Agenda Status of current portfolio and its implications Yes 
 Existing projects at major stage gates No 
 New projects at major stage gates Yes 
 Implication of long-range projects No 
 Recommended portfolio implications and alternatives No 
Decision New portfolio Yes 
 Project managers No 
 Resolve all outstanding legal/HSE/IPR issues Yes 
Portfolio  Prioritize projects to maximize cash flow over time No 
Decision Decide on optimal mix No 
 Balance resources and define cut-off point between projects for 
which resources are available and projects for which resources 
are no longer viable 
No 
 Quarterly Yes 
 Monthly No 
 
* Yes or no indicates whether the rule has been applied to all projects 
 
Agenda: In the September PFMM, two out of five normative rules concerning the 
‘agenda’ were used, three rules were not applied. The ‘status of the current portfolio-
rule’ and its implications were discussed in terms of the expected NPV, and the value of 
the portfolio was generally identified as a concern, particularly by the portfolio manager 
and the chairman of the meeting. The state-gating rule of ‘existing projects at major 
stage gates’ was also used to the extent that all projects which were in the process of 
moving into new stages were addressed at the meeting – with the exception of projects 
no. 12, 29, and 67 (see appendix J). As a consequence, the rules were not applied to all 
projects, but did nevertheless have a substantial influence on which projects were ad-
dressed. ‘New projects at major Stage Gate’ were addressed and formalized, for in-
stance, as all new projects were preliminarily approved prior to entering the portfolio so 
as to avoid delays. One peculiarity of PLASTIC is that all projects are addressed at the 
quarterly meetings, thus being detached from progress reporting on individual projects 
which might require intermediate decisions. As will be discussed below, in one instance 
a new project was seen to enter the portfolio although it was already in the detailed de-
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velopment-stage (stage 4).28 The ‘implications of long-range projects’-rule is not ap-
plied, although in some cases the possibility of a spin-off project was discussed. This 
rule is designed, since the set of rules in the SG approach rules also cover decision-
making undertaken by the Technology Council.29‘Portfolio implications’ was addressed 
as part of the discussion on status, in terms of expected NPV-value, which is a main 
concern. Alternatives were, however, not discussed since none was actually presented at 
the meeting. As a consequence, no prioritization was undertaken in this regard during 
the PFMM. All new projects were approved and the pool of active projects in the port-
folio was not questioned, especially regarding their justification or attractiveness com-
pared to other more profitable projects. Decision: The ‘new portfolio’-rule was used as 
it was addressed as a matter of concern and concern by the participants. ‘All outstanding 
legal/HSE/IPR’ issues were not resolved during the meetings. For instance, an analysis 
of the documentation rules indicate that, on average, only 34 percent of the projects 
have been able to resolve this issue (this will be analyzed further in the forthcoming sec-
tion). An analysis of the information and documentation in the gate meeting indicates 
that several projects were formally without a ‘project manager’ (cf. figure 7.2 below). 
Portfolio decision: Here, one rule is followed, namely that of the quarterly meetings, 
whereas none of the other rules –  ‘prioritize projects to maximize cash-flow over time’, 
‘decide an optimal mix’, ‘balance resource and define cut-off points’, ‘monthly meet-
ings’ – was used during the gate review meeting being observed (September PFMM).  
In the previous chapter, the examination of the organizational level suggested that 
gates were kept formal. An analysis of PLASTIC, however, reveals that rules are also 
applied leniently with respect to gates (on the vice president level) with 38 percent of 
the rules being applied and 62 percent not. In particular, rules governing portfolio deci-
sion-making are not used. Sixteen projects (excluding new projects, see appendix J) 
were at a major SG, although three of them were not addressed (projects no. 12, 29, 67, 
see appendix J). 
 
 
                                                 
28 According to the normative system (described in chapter five), the project should in fact have entered 
the portfolio at the concept development stage. 
29 For information on the Technology Council, see chapter five. This decision situation was not observed. 
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7.2.2 Information (and documentation) rules 
In this section, the use of information and documentation rules is investigated. PLAS-
TIC is particularly concerned with the ‘quality’ of rule-following in the area of informa-
tion and documentation rules. While rule deviations are monitored, they are neverthe-
less not sanctioned – as was emphasized by the portfolio managers. Still, what is char-
acterized as Quality Information (QI) is measured for each project and will be made 
available as from the November meeting, albeit in measures. Figures for the September 
PFMM were not made available, and could therefore not be employed in this study. The 
results for rule-deviation that could be obtained are illustrated in figure 7.2 below, 
where 100 percent indicates that all projects have formally applied all the rules. In the 
case of PLASTIC, these rules have been broken down into five rule-areas.  
The first area, basics, is characterized as information on innovation objectives. On 
average, rule-deviation in this area is 59 percent, which indicates that definition and re-
sponsibility for this area seems to be a low priority for the project managers (see figure 
7.2, in particular, no documentation has been made available (URL for further reading).  
The second area, innovation database, is concerned with information on the project 
itself. Here, average rule-deviation is only 11 percent – this is a rule-area that can be 
followed easily by the project managers. No access was permitted to the database for 
the purposes of this study, but respondents ensured the investigator that these types of 
rules took the form of a drop-down menu. Thus ‘Technology Platform’, for instance, 
provides a choice between three technologies which are assumed to be the main tech-
nologies of the company. Figure 7.2, however, indicates that approximately 60 percent 
of projects have not been assigned. Instead, a chairman steering committee takes care of 
day-to-day operations and evaluates the sub-stages (milestones) within the detailed de-
velopment-stage. Moreover, all projects appear to have uploaded an end date, since 
rule-deviation is zero percent in this respect.  
The third area, project assessment metrics, indicates whether the business case has 
been made (including expected NPV), the probability of success calculated (based on 
the business case), and whether cost and environmental issues (FTE) have been consid-
ered. Again, this appears to have been uploaded since the average rule-deviation is one 
percent. Of the five areas, this type of rule is most often applied to the project. 
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The fourth area, project documentation, concerns which project documentation has 
been entered into the various information systems. The average rule-deviation here is 55 
percent, which suggests that the documentation cannot be made available to the vice 
presidents in the portfolio management meetings (e.g. September PFMM) in more than 
half the projects. As a consequence, they are not able to examine the figures adequately 
and validate the expected NPV of each project. Furthermore, portfolio management 
rules were not mobilized in the gates (except for one, see table 7.1), which related to 
rule-deviation of documentation rules. In more than half the projects, it is impossible to 
discuss the project in detail and thus compare them than any other means except met-
rics, which is nevertheless followed by the project managers.  
The fifth area is denoted by PLASTIC as innovation tasks and indicates, amongst 
other things, that the tasks to be undertaken have been defined for approximately 40 
percent of the projects. By contrast, more than 70 percent of the projects have not 
documented the killer variable, which is to be formulated by the project managers, and 
more than 70 percent have not dealt with bottle-neck resources. The latter calls attention 
to the fact that the lack of mobilization in portfolio management rules does not solve 
resource allocation issues between projects.  
Average rule-deviation amounts to 33 percent; consequently, rule-following lies at 
67 percent. These figures correspond to the situation described by gate rule application 
(see section 7.1.1). How easy it is to follow a rule, however, largely depends on when 
rules are actually used. Apparently, it is possible in the case under review for a project 
manager to suggest that the business case has been made without uploading the market 
plan, which is ideally part of the calculation in the business case. Moreover, rule-
deviation varies among the business units, which could suggest that leadership styles 
influence rule-following, as was pointed out by the new portfolio manager when asked 
about this kind of variation.  
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Figure 7.2: Rule-deviation, information and documentation rules. Grey area indicates rule-deviation (source: PLASTIC). 
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The QI-level for projects nos. 22, 23, 24, and 47 (green projects) and nos. 4, 9, 33, 36 (red 
projects) are shown in appendix I (see also appendix J). In project 4, rules are applied 58 
percent of the time, but none of the documentation rules has been followed. The project is 
instead tested with a strategic customer and then taken forward. As can be seen from ap-
pendix J, the duration of discussion on this amounted to a mere 30 seconds. Rules are ap-
plied 63 percent of the time in project 9. Here, discussions centered on the evolution of how 
the project could be applied to a market, yet, as the data in appendix J suggests, the market 
plan has nevertheless not been documented, including killing variables. The same situation 
can be identified with projects 33 and 36, where market plans and killer variables have also 
not been documented. In addition, environmental rules have not been followed in the red 
projects. The average rule-following ration for red projects amounts to approximately 70 
percent and 93 percent for green projects. Projects 22 and 24 were deemed inappropriate 
for discussion at the September PFMM (these will be discussed below). However, while the 
vice president, who ‘owns’ projects no. 22 and 24, attempted to comply with portfolio 
management rules, and despite the fact that there was a high degree of information and 
documentation rule-following in this case, he was not able to initiate a discussion on these 
projects. Project 23 was in stage gate (appendix J), but the issue of manufacturability was 
raised in the discussion which rather instigated an argument on economic viability (more 
specifically, lower production costs). This highlights the point made earlier, that even 
though the project complied with (almost) all information and documentation rules, the 
economic benefits and criteria of manufacturability still proved a point of debate among the 
vice presidents at the gate meeting. The same line of reasoning applies to project 47. On 
average, 33 percent of rules are deviated from, which consequently means that in 67 per-
cent of cases are the information and documentation rules followed. Rules were deviated 
from to the greatest extent in project documentation and innovation tasks, particularly in 
red projects. Here, rule-deviation was most dominant, suggesting that it was inappropriate 
to upload inconclusive documentation for the use of participants at the September PFMM.  
Projects 22 and 24, which displayed almost total rule-following, were nevertheless not 
discussed despite their high level of rule-compliance. This was most likely due to the fact 
that they were concern with deviation than rule-following at the vice president-level. A 
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template has been designed for the vice president to be used when presenting a project, 
which indicates that his participation in decision-making does not, however, rely on the in-
formation and documentation which is made available through the databases. (This tem-
plate is reproduced in appendix E.) 
 Respondents at the vice president-level suggested that they were not using the informa-
tion available to them through the database, as was also substantiated through observation 
of the September PFMM. This has implications for management, particularly the project 
managers, as can be seen from the following dialogue between the investigator and a vice 
president of a business unit:  
 
Vice president: “[…] really going [into] the details? [speals very low] This we 
didn’t do at all” 
 
Investigator: “What do you think about the information available?” 
 
Vice president: “I have the feeling that [the archive database] is very well docu-
mented but, to be honest, I don’t use it frequently. The information is available 
[but] it is not used” 
 
Investigator: "Because?” 
 
Vice president “I don’t know why [not] – maybe it is a question of time, maybe 
it’s a question of going into the system, maybe it’s not such a convenient sys-
tem, and these kind of things – but it’s available. Information on innovation is 
available in PLASTIC; summarized in [the archival database] we can find it, no 
problem. The question is what [21.30] and draw your conclusions out of it, be-
fore you go into the meeting” 
 
Investigator: “If you don’t use [it] that much – maybe the people that you work 
with, will not use it that much [either]?” 
 
Vice president: “Exactly – project managers enter information into [the archival 
database], but more out of duty than as to use it as a tool”. 
 
The impression made by some project mangers is that the information is there to be used to 
discuss a project at the gate review meeting. The two time-lines between the gate review 
meeting and the project progress meeting, however, tended to create problems, as was men-
tioned by several project managers who argued, for instance, that a test-run or pilot cam-
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paign had not, in some cases, been finalized prior to the meeting. The project managers also 
stated this as a reason why these should be involved personally in the gate review meeting, 
where they would prefer to present and be present during discussion of ‘their’ project. 
 Documentation is ideally updated prior to a gate review meeting or a meeting of the 
steering council (at project management level) between sub-stages and, as a consequence, 
the most recent information is invariably not available in the archival database at any point 
in time. Moreover, as costs are reported monthly and a project manager recommends that 
decisions are based on the slide that vice presidents fill out prior to the meeting (appendix 
E), this information is necessarily not gleaned from the available databases. Furthermore, 
while the databases (including the innovation database) were developed to facilitate infor-
mation flow between members of the project team, who are geographically spread across 
Europe and the Persian Gulf, the information is very often based on what is provided by the 
persons who are participating in a meeting. Thus, if marketing is not participating in the 
meetings for any reason, information on a possible change in customer preferences will not 
be communicated in a timely manner. As one participant confirms: “… you normally don’t 
get the information very fast … if the right people are not present, then it’s a problem” 
(project manager).  
In conclusion, one part of a project manager’s identity is established through the realiza-
tion of information and documentation rules, and consequently the actions that are gener-
ated through following these rules. However, with some project managers this was carried 
out as a ‘duty’ rather than through a sense of commitment, particularly since some project 
managers were unaware of decisions that had been made on the basis of the databases in the 
gate meeting. Owing to this lack of decision-making in order to establish priorities between 
projects, the resource problem tended to be pushed downwards to the project management 
level and even other levels. For example, the manager of the test plan had to set prioritiza-
tion without any criteria for doing so, or even in some cases according to the dictates of the 
project manager who ‘shouted the loudest’. New rules have, however, been added to solve 
these problems in the test plant. Nevertheless, no respondent was able to explain these rules 
when prompted, due to their high complexity and a lack of competence in using them. 
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7.2.3 Stage rules 
A similar analysis is undertaken with respect to the usage of stage rules. The design of the 
SG approach of PLASTIC consists of six stages (see figure 5.1, chapter five). Each stage is 
analyzed with respect to the extent of rule-following as with gates and information rules. 
Stage 1 and 2 represent the pre-portfolio activities that are required to be carried out, 
whereas stages 3 to 6 are undertaken within the portfolio itself. 
 
Table 7.2: Summarizing the application of stage rules 
Stage Formal rules 
 
Applied?* 
Stage 1 Communicate innovation objectives No 
 Assign ideas to innovation objectives – enhance, enrich and structure 
ideas 
No 
 Separate potential activities vs. potential projects No 
 Communicate outcome of idea evaluation to all involved No 
Stage 2 Conduct initial proof of concept and get sign-off from a senior scien-
tist 
Yes 
 Prepare business case, assess strategic fit, competitive advantage and 
risks 
No 
 Develop project plan, identify critical path No 
 Identify killer variables No 
 Decide which opportunities to forward to portfolio decision or to 
discontinue 
Yes 
 Identify critical resources and check availability No 
Stage 3 Test and prove technical feasibility on bench and pilot scale Yes 
 Identify upscale-plant, determine recipe and process conditions Yes 
 Adapt market and competitive assessment – use pilot material for 
tests with customers as appropriate 
No 
 Obtain sign-off from manufacturing for upscale No 
Stage 4 Scale up to commercial plant Yes 
 Test and approve material/process with key customer; start pre-
marketing activities 
Yes 
 Resolve all outstanding legal/HSE/IPR issues No 
 Obtain sign off from commercial and plant manager for launch Yes 
Stage 5 Provide technical support with new grades to customers Yes 
 Execute launch according to plan  Yes 
 Hand over to line organization Yes 
Stage 6 Conduct review session with portfolio decision meeting No 
 Project managers write final report and present project key learn-
ing’s to decision forum 
No 
 Decision makers review decisions made over course of the project No 
 Root cause analysis for project success/failure No 
* Yes or no indicates whether the rule has been applied to all projects 
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The first rule to be followed in stage 1 is the communication of innovation objectives. Ap-
proximately one year after the formal start of the new set of rules, the HRM-organization in 
R&D undertook a road-show to market the new IP (new set of rules) and the innovation 
databases and, in particular, the innovation objectives to be described through these data-
bases. Access to the databases has been limited, but observation of one of these road-show 
sessions at the company headquarters suggested that some innovation objectives had been 
made available in the innovation database. That being said, it seems to be that the organiza-
tion has not taken any notice of its own objectives, which were ideally designed to guide 
the generation of new ideas. When quizzed about this, one respondent replied: “No not 
really, because the system [addressing the front end] is not really working as it should” 
(portfolio manager).  
The innovation objectives were criticized by one respondent for being too detailed, and 
also as constituting more a project proposal rather than a vision for creativity. Generally, 
idea evaluation and discussion are an informal process where the idea-owner tests the idea 
through discussion with colleagues and subsequently registers it in an idea bank should it 
not meet approval amongst the pool of colleagues. Presumably, in acknowledgement of the 
general character of deposited ideas, the idea bank does not appear to play a significant role 
in PLASTIC despite the fact that the management put emphasis on the utility of this tool in 
the first stage of the innovation process. It can therefore not be characterized as being prop-
erly communicated and motivated. Examining the information rules suggests that innova-
tion objectives was one of the rules that was not followed by the red projects. One project 
manager, for example, stated that the responsibility for formulating innovation objectives 
for ongoing projects also remained unclear. In this case, he had to approach the portfolio 
manager for help in re-formulating the innovation objective of his project, which was for-
mulated so broadly that it could apply to almost any of the projects in the business unit. 
When combined with the extent of rule usage in information and documentation rules, the 
general impression arises that the project objective is often formulated subsequent to the 
initiation of the project. As one respondent stated:  
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Yes. It has been carried out, but also that is something that is – I mean, it is not 
yet as clear for people as it should be, because many of the projects that we had 
earlier are now being continued in the new [way], so it was not done. Actually 
it should have been done, also to those [projects], but it was done in a very – let 
us say – [cursory] way, because the project was already there (project man-
ager). 
 
The argument that rule deviation is more frequent amongst old30 projects was also put for-
ward by the new portfolio manager and explicitly stated in the formal report of the Septem-
ber PFMM. That being said, while a new project – project 74 – which was discussed in 
September had demonstrated a degree of rule-following that amounted to 59 percent, wide-
spread rule-deviation particularly with regard to documentation rules, including market 
plan, could also be identified amongst new projects as well as those that already existed. 
The separation of ‘potential activities’ and ‘potential projects’ is supposed to be an formal 
activity, and one business unit thus  felt justified in copying the portfolio rules and applying 
them to formal decision-meeting in this respect, as the following exchange demonstrates:  
 
Investigator: “And this also takes place on the business unit level … ” 
 
Vice president: “Yes, yes, yes. The information – no, the innovation process – 
is this general innovation project meeting across [PLASTIC]. But this is only 
what we call in category one. For category two, three and four we have our own 
business unit project meetings”. 
 
Investigator: “And do you also work in these meetings with, say, criteria?” 
 
Vice president: “Yeah, yeah. For idea generation we use the same template as 
for the overall innovation process. And for new product development and for 
activities we have a very simple template, designed by ourselves, of one- and-a-
half pages where we really describe the project and what the NPV or additional 
operating profit is, and so on. So we have simplified this to really one–and-a-
half pages, because there shouldn’t be too much bureaucracy”. 
 
Idea evaluation takes place informally between colleagues and since only one business unit 
has formalized its evaluation of ideas – and copied a simplified version of the innovation 
process to the business unit – it can be assumed that the rule of communicating the outcome 
                                                 
30 In progress prior to January 1, 2003. 
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of idea evaluation to all those involved is not followed in the majority of business units (in-
cluding R&D). Instead, this is done through informal networks. Generally, the business unit 
vice president and project managers are uncertain about the rules of stage 1 and not all for-
mal rules are followed with all projects. The level of elaborateness and exhaustiveness is 
low in terms of how to solve the demand for, say, “assigning ideas to innovation objectives 
– enhance, enrich and structured ideas”. This in turn has consequently produced new rules 
to be marshaled as a simplified copy of the innovation rules on the process-level within one 
business unit. The respondents did not mention ‘the level of ideas’ as a problem, but it is 
rather their administration that appears to be linked to why rules are not followed. Respon-
sibility is placed outside, or even prior, to the portfolio and is not a formal and centralized 
activity, as the portfolio activities themselves. This suggests that the rules do not impede 
the production of new ideas (creativity) but rather the administration of ideas, which in turn 
only serves to push a limited number of new projects into the portfolio. One respondent 
thus requested tools for selecting ideas.  
The analysis of the information and documentation rules in stage 2 demonstrate that the 
rule to ‘prepare the business case, assess strategic fit, competitive advantage and risks’ is 
not followed in all projects. While the project managers reported that they had made a 
business plan (metrics, figure 7.1), only approximately 27 percent of the projects have up-
loaded the required documentation. One project manager reported that it was impossible to 
make a business plan for his project and that he consequently wasted two months. He went 
on to state his regret in not having approached an experienced project manager earlier, so as 
not to waste his time. Had he done so, he would have learned which rules applied to his 
particular project.  
71 percent of the projects do not have a killer variable (see figure 7.2). In the same way, 
45 percent of the projects have not documented the project plan even though all projects 
have registered the end date (see figure 7.2). Business units are responsible for forwarding 
new projects and the data suggests that they, together with the R&D department, are at least 
attempting to fulfill this activity, even though several respondents mentioned the need for 
further tools to select, for example, which ideas they should pursue and which not. In sum, 
the evidence suggests that this rule is followed. The analysis of gate rule application also 
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identified that the availability of resources is a problem (see section 7.2.1), particularly 
since the number of projects has not been reduced and no prioritization has been under-
taken. Nevertheless, the high number of small projects reduced in line with the normative 
system, which is emphasized by figure 7.2. The rule of ”identify critical resources and 
check availability” is not followed since resources are strained beyond what is required to 
undertake the projects (according to project managers). 
The first rule in stage 3 is to ”test and prove technical feasibility on bench and pilot 
scale”. While being used, the evidence on gate rule application with regard to this rule indi-
cates that it requires interpretation. No evidence suggests that the rule to ”identify upscale-
plant, determine recipe and process conditions” is not followed. The ”adapt market and 
competitive assessment – use pilot material for tests with customers as appropriate” rule is 
attempted to be followed by project managers, but the evidence suggest that a market and 
competitive assessment has not been undertaken with all projects. ”Obtain sign-off from 
manufacturing for upscale” seems to be followed.  
The ”up-scaling to commercial plant” is the first rule of stage 4, and is invariably fol-
lowed if the project has not been killed by the responsible vice president. The rule to ”re-
solve all outstanding legal/HSE/IPR issues” is, however, not followed as can be seen in 
figure 7.1, where approximately 65 percent of the projects have not provided an evaluation 
of a HSE-check. That the rule to ”obtain sign-off from commercial and plant manager for 
launch” is not followed in all projects is indicated by the discussion on the gate rule appli-
cation. 
The rules of stage 5 are all followed in the projects, including the rules to ”provide tech-
nical support with new grades to customers”, ”execute launch according to plan”, and 
”hand over to line organization”. The most widespread instance of rule-deviation is found 
in stage 6, where none of the rules is followed in any of the projects (see table 7.2).   
 The analysis of rule-following in stages is summarized in table 7.2 (above). As can be 
seen, in aggregate 53 percent of the rules are followed, while 47 per cent are broken when 
applied to all projects. Rule-deviation is most frequent in stage 6, which suggests that the 
ideal case of learning to be part of the normative system – also amongst decision-makers – 
is not effected in all projects. Some meetings are carried out post-launch, when the project 
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is discussed, but no evidence suggests that any of the meetings focused on decisions that 
were otherwise required by the rule.  
The stages prior to the portfolio (pre-development) are the responsibility of the business 
units and R&D, but the date indicates that there were several deviations from the rules in 
the first two stages. Here, 20 percent of the rules were followed, while 80 percent of the 
rules were deviated from in application. Evidence suggests that there is a link between 
problems and rules (March et al. 2001) and that rule-deviation can consequently be associ-
ated with the problems caused by not formalizing ideas which  already obtain in the organi-
zation, since creativity or the level of new ideas does not appear to be a problem in PLAS-
TIC.  
Of the seven new projects that were formally to be approved in the September PFMM, 
all seven were accepted (also preliminary projects). However, no alternatives were dis-
cussed, which was probably due to the inappropriateness of doing so, but also perhaps be-
cause of resource issues. The business unit and R&D are responsible for resources in prac-
tice. Since no resource-decisions were made at the meeting and since presenting more pro-
jects would have assumed resource-competition with other business units or R&D, rule-
deviation resulting from not mobilizing portfolio decisions in the gate reviews led to the 
problem of having too many projects with too few resources. This in turn impeded the in-
troduction of additional new projects: As one vice president protested: 
 
… project with 0.1 and 0.001 people. It’s a waste of time. Because you can’t do 
a project, you cannot create a step change by adding 0.01 of a person 
 
A possible explanation for this can be identified by reference to not following the rules. 
This suggests that rules which are not used produce problems elsewhere in the rule-system 
through interconnectivity. Other reasons can also be identified. First, the desire to finalize 
projects within the calendar year is a conspicuous trait of human identity, such that the last 
quarters before year end usually see a dearth of new projects as attention is rather devoted 
to finishing existing projects. As one respondent confirms: “[it is] very important that 83 
percent of the project ends before 2004” (vice president). Second, the resource problems 
raised by the large number of project managers allows for no concession for additional ac-
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tivities, which are otherwise normally allocated upto 20 percent of the resources. Again, the 
upshot of this is that problems are not solved by rules at the vice president level within the 
system, which subsequently causes problems elsewhere in the rule-system. Rules can there-
fore be seen to be highly interconnected in PD. Or as one project manager reasons; “be-
cause nowadays it is still very much a point of debate between various parties as to how 
priorities are defined and [debating] what is this and what is that” . 
 
7.2.4 Conclusion 
The extent of rule-following among the three elements of the SG approach is summarized 
in table 7.3 below. The numbers (in percentage form) express the extent to which the for-
mal rules have been applied to all innovation projects of PLASTIC.  
 
Table 7.3: The extent of rules application (source: Tables 7.1-7.2 and figure 7.2) 
 
 Gate rules Information and 
documentation 
rules 
Stage rules1 
 
Extent of application3 
 
 
38 % 
 
67% 
 
40%2 
 
1Stages: pre-portfolio:20% (Y=2, No=8) and portfolio: 53% (Y=8 and No=7) 
2Y=10 and N=15 ⇒ 10/25 x 100 = 40% 
3Measured as percentage of rules followed with all projects 
 
Twenty percent of the rules are followed at the pre-portfolio stage whereas 53 percent of 
the rules are followed within the portfolio. The differences can be explained by the level of 
responsibility (more prevalent in the portfolio), the lack of rewards or threats to using the 
rules prior to the portfolio, lack of clarity in the rules (too complex to use), and the fact that 
the design of the rules is often not elaborate enough for them to be realized. One instance of 
this can be illustrated at idea selection, which was identified by one manager as being too 
complex a task if it lacked any specific criteria or an explicit strategy. 
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  While gate rules are applied to the lowest extent in the table, evidence nevertheless sug-
gests that rules did indeed influence the gate meeting by directing attention to project de-
lays and to shifts in project stages (with the exception of three projects)31. Information and 
documentation rules represent the highest proportion of application, but these rules are usu-
ally only followed as a matter of ‘duty’, at least by some project managers, whereas other 
project managers were keen with ‘boxes’ and therefore motivated to follow these rules. As 
can be seen from the table, the extent of rule-following in stages is 40 percent. However, to 
qualify this, it must be borne in mind that the extent of rule-following was higher in the 
portfolio stage than in the pre-portfolio phase, due to vagueness of responsibilities and lack 
of competence in following the rules. 
 The analysis on the organizational level (as set out in chapter six) also showed that rules 
in stages were normally not followed, which has thus been confirmed through the above 
evaluation of 40 percent. Thus, information and documentation is not available for deci-
sion-making through the databases. The portfolio manager has designed a template (appen-
dix E) to be used by the vice president. Moreover, project managers are uncertain when to 
upload revised information or documentation, which impedes the portfolio perspective and 
the comparison of projects. Thus, the importance of rules in gates comes into sharper focus, 
and particularly with regard to how the vice presidents can make decisions when informa-
tion is not available. 
 
 
7.3 HOW RULES ARE USED IN THE GATE MEETING 
 
The analysis in the previous sections has disclosed that, when subscribing to the theory of 
appropriateness, rules were not followed for a number of reasons. Surprisingly, rule-
deviation was most frequent in the gate meeting, which is normally regarded as an area 
                                                 
31 The vice presidents were aware of the resource problem and a new set of rules governing resource alloca-
tion was launched at the beginning of 2004. However, no respondents were able to explain the content of 
these rules (which were often described as ‘complex’). Neither has any training been provided. These rules 
resulted in a discussion at the March PFMM (not observed) where two new projects which were due to enter 
the portfolio were apparently stopped. 
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where rule-following is highly formal (see chapter six). Moreover, the analyses indicated 
that competence, vagueness of rules, and rules to support, say, idea selection would have 
enabled rule-following among business units and R&D prior to the portfolio. The pre-
portfolio activities (stage 1 and 2) produced seven new projects, which were all pre-
approved and subsequently approved at the gate meeting. No prioritization was undertaken. 
Rule-deviation was also present in the gate meeting, which focused on the projects in the 
portfolio only. More analysis is, however, required on this issue in order to fully understand 
how appropriateness is actually constructed at the gate meeting and, subsequently, how 
rules are actually used.  
 Here, an analysis of appropriateness at the gate meeting is undertaken in four stages by 
1) examining the projects addressed in accordance with the evoked rules (color-rule system 
and stage gating rule); 2) investigating projects not addressed in accordance with these 
rules; 3) analyzing the interpretation of the criterion of manufacturability, which is the most 
common identified criteria or calculable rules; and 4) investigating the role of calculations 
in a decision-making situation. Finally, the use of rules is discussed with respect to seeking 
greater understanding of decision-making under conditions of ambiguity and the role of 
rules in gates.  
 
7.3.1 Projects addressed in accordance with color and SG rule 
In the September 2003-portfolio, there were 62 projects with a total portfolio value of ap-
proximately €¼ billion, but only 33 of these were subject to discussion (see appendix J, 
column B). The projects discussed were addressed according to two rule-systems that were 
in use. First, the color-rule system categorized projects into three colors: red (more than 
two months delay), yellow (less than two months delay) and green (not delayed) in accor-
dance with the expected delay of the project. The evaluation was undertaken by the vice 
president and portfolio manager. An additional color, white, has also been added to address 
new projects that are just coming into the portfolio. Second, projects that are stage gating 
(i.e. moving to the next stage) were to be addressed at the gate review meeting according to 
the formal rule of ”existing projects at major stage gates” (see table 5.4) but were also to be 
evaluated as green if not delayed. March et al. (2001) and March (1994) suggested that am-
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biguity can produce rule-competition, so investigating possible evidence of this will also 
form part of the analysis.  
The stage gating-rule directs attention to projects which are moving into the next stage. 
Stage gating projects have been evaluated in terms of their capacity to fulfill certain criteria 
which thereby deem them ready for the next stage by the portfolio manager and the vice 
president. The projects discussed in stage gate were nos. 2, 3, 47, 31, 30, 27, 23, and 70 
(see appendix J for details and an overview). Three stage gating projects were concerned 
with manufacturability, one project with sales, and four projects (no. 2, 3, 27, and 31) were 
not discussed when compared with the distinct formal criterion for doing so (see appendix 
J, column L). Column L, appendix J, indicates whether a complete criteria-list was tendered 
as a definite argument during the September PFMM, and only in three cases (no. 30, 27, 
and 70) was an argument made for complete compliance. Three stage gating projects were, 
however, not addressed (nos. 12, 29,32 and 67, see appendix J), primarily because these pro-
jects were owned by a business unit that did not have any red projects to be discussed and, 
as a result, did not attract any attention. This suggests that the color-rule system has more 
of an influence on the gate review than the stage gating rules, which consequently compete 
with one another. Subsequent to the formal implementation of the new rules from January 
2003 onwards, the color-rule system was devised in response to problems caused through 
project delays, which the portfolio manager did not perceive to be solved by the introduc-
tion of new rules in PLASTIC. Evidence gathered from the September PFMM suggests that 
the meaning of the rule-color system has achieved an attention-directing functionality 
(Simons 1954) in terms of foregrounding the question: “[w]hat problems should I look 
into?” (1954: 3). Attention direction by rules was identified by March et al. (2001) when 
analyzing Stanford University and its relationship with the political environment. Applying 
this to PLASTIC achieved the functionality of directing attention to projects which were 
labeled both red and yellow: 11 projects were labeled red, nos. 4, 8, 9, 28, 33, 36, 37, 38, 
40, 42, 43, and 46 (see Appendix J) and two projects were labeled yellow, nos. 29 and 32 
(see Appendix J). The formal rule requiring a ”status of the current portfolio” (see table 
                                                 
32 This project is yellow, but was not delayed. The project was, however, to be finalized (out of the portfolio), 
which indicates that the color was assigned by mistake or that, as expressed by the chairman: “a two month 
delay is ‘okay’ and therefore did not initiate a discussion of this project although it was in stage gate. 
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7.2) has been interpreted by the general manager, asset and portfolio manager of PLASTIC 
to start with the deviating projects and subsequently address stage gating projects. 
Project no. 4 was delayed by three months due to delays in customer testing. The ex-
pected NPV was €2.8 million. The formal report stated however that the: “[P]roject will be 
stopped if no results have been forthcoming by the end of March”. The criteria were not 
discussed because the customer is a global and industry leading company (important cus-
tomer), thus making the project ‘strategic’. Project no. 8 was stopped before the meeting by 
the responsible vice president, due to ambiguity. As he stated, the technical solutions were 
not possible and, consequently: “… we have to take back the theory of founding”. Subse-
quently, the chairman stated his interests: “So it is stopped. We take it out – what about the 
NPV?” (emphasis added).  
 It must however be assumed that the chairman as such was aware of the consequences 
of stopping the project for the expected NPV (estimated at €5.3 million), but that the ques-
tion in itself was raised indicates that the NPV is loosely coupled with the project, as is 
also indicated by the formal report where the comment was made: “Reformulate project 
and bring up for approval. Project description and resource input need improvement”.  
This statement and the question regarding the NPV could be interpreted as seeking to 
encourage the vice president to produce a new project and thus ‘secure’ value in the vice 
president’s pool (ratio) of the portfolio, rather than accelerate other projects in the portfolio 
or initiate new ones, from other business units too. (The value was, however, removed from 
the business unit’s active portfolio in the formal report from the September PFMM.) Pro-
ject no. 9 was delayed by 36 months, also due to ambiguity. The discussion concerned 
whether the scope of the project had been changed or whether it needed another application 
in terms of ‘customer market’. The formal report states the need to: “Adapt project plan to 
meet new end date”, and the project was approved for continuation under these conditions. 
Project no. 28 was labeled yellow although the project was not delayed. Another new rule 
of only addressing projects above €2 million is also an example of a rule which was made 
to deal with the issue of time-to-market. The rule of €2 million was only activated during 
the discussion of project no. 28, which was labeled red due to a 12 month delay and was as 
THE APPROPRIATENESS PERSPECTIVE: USING RULES IN PLASTIC 137
such also subject to the criteria of manufacturability (see section 1):  As the following ex-
change shows:     
 
1. Vice president: “If we take the red one, what is happening there is that there is 
a grain, which has been developed for both … so this for both … so this is for 
[…], and there are two constructions of [technical explanation]. And this [… 
44.28] is not working well enough. So, what we have here is, that we a patent 
which we are acquiring from […]; one of our customers who have different 
technologies [44.44] which works and what we have to is, that we have to go 
back to development in using this patent technology. I think one thing here is 
that actually, if you look at expected NPV it does not qualify for the portfolio, 
so the question is should the decision be basically to take it out  formally to 
take it out of the portfolio? I do not know what you are …” 
 
2. Unidentified participant: “That is our recommendation as well”.  
 
3. Vice president: “And it will be managed as a task … because of the resources 
that will be spent on it, because we are basically buying a technology which is 
already available”. 
 
The €2 million was only resorted to as an argument for terminating the project in the port-
folio stage. The project had, however, already been terminated without prior formal ap-
proval, but the comment by the unidentified participant in section 2 indicates that some dis-
cussion must have taken place on this prior to the formal meeting, since the unidentified 
participant would have otherwise not used this formulation. The fact that the project had 
already been terminated when it was and that other activities had already been initiated by 
the acquisition of a patent, indicates that the meaning of the approval rule in some situa-
tions is interpreted only as a means of legitimizing issues which have already been decided. 
This amounts to making formal decisions merely symbolic, creating an arena for demon-
strating the ability to cope with ambiguity as well as the inappropriateness of waiting to 
make such decisions in real terms in a formal decision-making forum. Project 32 was also 
labeled yellow even though no delay was specified. The project was deemed not technically 
feasible and the responsible vice president recommended terminating it. While the chair-
man did not take any formal stance, the meeting report showed that it had been removed 
from the portfolio. Project 33 was delayed but generated some confusion as to whether the 
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formal end-date had already been changed and approved prior to the meeting. This episode 
highlights the significance of the color-rule system for encompassing end-date changes 
(whereby in this case the project was no longer considered red) prior to the meeting, even 
though this will affect the optimum portfolio, according to the formal portfolio decision-
making rules, from being the ideal focus of the PFMM. Project 36 was labeled red due to 
an eight-month delay. The scope of the project was changed by the responsible vice presi-
dent even though the chairman did not agree with this move. In this case, the portfolio 
manager made the criticism that the project had been changed without any formal approval 
by suggesting that the project would remain red until it was finished. In this way, the color 
system was consequently linked what is termed the ‘scope’ of the project and not solely to 
a delay in the progress of the individual project. The chairman underlined the remarks of 
the portfolio manager and his comments immediately after the vice president substantiate 
that the delay of eight months is “okay”, even with “a couple of months or so” in delay. On 
the question of why the project could not be pushed, it was said: “We have to drive those 
guys a bit harder then … [we need more] customer focus. Focus on the speed of this” 
(Chairman).  
Subsequently, the other participants raised a general issue regarding additives in the de-
velopment process. Because the properties of additives are uncertain, it was argued:  
 
…normally you don’t know what concept is the best one. I mean some compa-
nies are claiming that they have additives, but they do not know how they will 
work” (unidentified participant) followed by another unidentified participant: 
“We test the additives to find out [1.12.04] whether this can really give us com-
plete advantage over the competition”.  
 
In this way, the vice president was assisted by the other vice presidents in raising the prob-
lematization of additives to a general level. This in turn generates (unforeseen) complexity 
and was linked to the very competitiveness of the company. In response to this support, the 
vice president admitted that:  
 
It was maybe more because of optimistic planning than a real delay; because of 
a lack of resources or something. 
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An unidentified participant pointed out:  
 
We really do not know what is going on and it seems to be very important for 
us [the participant went on to suggest involving research in the work, in order to 
speed it up].  
 
The chairman was nevertheless focused more on time and thus emphasized: “… good ad-
vice to speed it up”. However, a simultaneous discussion was then initiated which made it 
impossible to identify. The portfolio manager then asked:  
 
What is the decision on this one? Delay as it is [… 1.13.31] or change the scope 
and we accept it?  
 
To which the chairman responded:  
 
We have a delay like this because I do not see anything about scope [1.13.51]  
 
The chairman’s comments were followed by an unusually long break in proceedings (of 
approximately 10 seconds), which suggests disagreement or even surprise at the chairman’s 
conclusions. Project 38 was labeled red because of a nine-month delay. The discussion of 
this project revolved around what stage the project was actually is at. The formal system 
indicated detailed development, as was pointed out by the portfolio manager, but the dis-
cussion showed that the project was close for launch. Initially, the portfolio manager stated:  
 
Stage-gate approval from concept development to detailed development 
 
To which the chairman responded:  
 
I know all this but I am just confused about detailed development; we are stage-
gating here about detailed development which has to be [0.00.53] done before it 
comes to the plant?  
 
The chief scientist concurred by saying: 
 
I am confused about that as well.  
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The following discussion does, however, suggest that the project was already in detailed 
development and thus ready to go into launch. According to one unidentified participant:  
 
In reality, is it close for launch then? 
 
To which the VP BU responded:  
 
… we found out that we made a very good product also for other kinds of struc-
tural [03.29] our proposal is to finalize the project not to continue it.   
 
The project had an expected NPV of €0.6 million, but the rule of an expected NPV above 
€2 million was not brought into effect because the project is connected to the building of a 
new plant. By way of justifying this, the chairman stated: “This is a little bit special […] the 
plant and everything.”  
The project was already in the process of going through the launch phase, and therefore 
formally closed in the portfolio as it had moved to line management:  
 
“And the answer is to close it now?” (Chairman), “Yes” (vice president), “And 
you have received all the documents and things like that?” (Chairman), “To be 
honest, I do not remember. I will check” (the responsible vice president), “It is 
approved but you have to check if there is something missing, we will come 
back [05.08] very good” (Chairman).  
 
As is clear from this exchange, the vice president was not sanctioned but rather encouraged 
to proceed because the project was actually not delayed, despite its formal registration as in 
detailed development. It had rather moved into launch phase (which was, however, not re-
ported). Project 40 was delayed by seven months. When discussing this, the participants 
seem to have had different channels of communication on this issue since the discussion 
revolved around the content of the project and whether the project was successful. One par-
ticipant merely stated “there is a small part left and that could be an important one”. This 
latter was in connection to a discussion on deviation from the project’s original aim and 
whether an expected NPV of €7.5 million could be sustained despite ambiguity influencing 
the project. The project was red before (in the previous meeting) and was not terminated 
due to an expected high NPV-value. Unidentified participants suggested that a separate 
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meeting on this project be held before the next PFMM-meeting (in November), but the vice 
president maintained his position confirming the decision already made by the vice presi-
dent to terminate the project in the portfolio. The vice president was supported by the port-
folio manager, who had apparently already been communicating with the vice president 
about the project before the meeting. The project was therefore approved with the comment 
(from the chairman) that the portfolio manager needed to receive the final report on the pro-
ject despite the fact that the chairman was convinced that the project should be terminated. 
Project 42 is explained by the responsible vice president:  
 
… a few years ago we upgraded our … product lane … but unfortunately then 
we recommended it to commercial production when … there was a major 
amount of fall out … so we had to start anew … we have produced over a pe-
riod of twice a month ….we have already been able to eliminate the fall out. 
Only last week, we had the final test run results from a customer and our final 
report is therefore not ready yet […] we know it is okay now so we can move.  
 
Due to uncertainties in the technical solutions, the project has been delayed, but the project 
will be approved for finalization when the final report is received. Project 43 was termi-
nated prior to the meeting:  
 
Vice President: we do not want to pursue that further. It has been terminated  
 
But formally the chairman stated: But perhaps we sent in to present to stop […] 
decide to [portfolio manager] and he will decide to stop if anybody agree?”  
 
The value was deducted from the business unit’s portfolio in the formal report. Project 46 
was delayed by 12 months. The discussion focused on whether the project should in fact be 
split in two or whether one part of the project should be continued and a new project formu-
lated from a business-oriented perspective rather than the existing technical (in asset) out-
look. It was decided to terminate the project (and thereby both parts) and transfer owner-
ship to another business unit. It was further decided to delegate the work to the business 
unit with the idea of reformulating a new project, which was more business oriented. The 
reason given for not entirely dropping the project was that work so far had demonstrated 
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some possibilities for process improvement, which could be exploited to product develop-
ment. Based on the analyses of the projects above, a number of observations can therefore 
be drawn: 
 
a) All formally delayed projects were designated red according to the color-rule sys-
tem, which suggests that this type of rule tends to solve the problem of detecting de-
layed projects. 
 
b) The decision to halt a project is primarily based on the decisions of the vice presi-
dents themselves and not on any other participants to the meeting. For example, 
projects 8 and 43 were halted prior to the meeting by the respective vice president, 
whereas the discussion of project 46 showed that although the project had been 
halted by the chairman the novelty of this raised an unfamiliar pause in the discus-
sion. The formal rule of securing an ‘optimal portfolio’ requires projects to be killed 
or frozen, as suggested by the normative system (in chapter two) but was never put 
into effect.  
 
c) Ambiguity tends to influence the progress of projects but was detected only because 
it caused delays. Unforeseen technical difficulties were perceived to be a legitimate 
reason for delays, since the projects were not sanctioned when delayed. 
 
d) Project 33 was labeled red, which caused some confusion because the delay had 
been agreed with the portfolio manager prior to the meeting, while other partici-
pants remained unaware of this prior arrangement. This suggests that the scope of 
the color-rule system has been widened not only to encompass delays, but also to 
legitimize prior end-date decisions to the PFMM, albeit with the exception of pro-
jects with a high expected NPV (e.g. projects 40 at €7.5 million), Although the ex-
pected NPV of project 8 was €5.3 million, no rules prohibit a change of end date 
without approval. 
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e) The formal stage of a project is not necessarily the same as the stage shown in the 
databases, as was indicated in the discussion of project 38. In addition, it is not 
sanctioned to skip stages. It is instead encouraged because of the intention to keep 
projects within the end-date. This suggests that in practice, the concern is rather to 
integrate or skip stages than uphold the SG structure of dividing the PD process at 
all costs. 
 
f) There is much concern with the value of the project. Projects that were killed were 
all encouraged to be re-approved after being reformulated, which implies that a pro-
ject can in fact never be killed. A point which is underlined by the fact that project 
40 was designated red over the period of two gate meetings (half a year). 
 
g) It should be noted that it is difficult for the participants of the meeting to identify 
exactly when a decision has been made, particularly when there was some debate 
amongst the participants or even disagreement. Only in cases where the chairman 
explicitly articulated a decision, did it become distinctly identifiable to the partici-
pants. Otherwise, the device by which participants were able to recall and identify 
whether a decision was made, particularly if it did not concern their own projects, 
was through the formal report. This was substantiated in subsequent post-meeting 
interviews. 
 
In conclusion, color- and stage gating rules determine which projects are to be addressed, 
but suffer from being inherently competitive. As a result of this, three projects were not ad-
dressed (nos. 12, 29, and 67, see appendix J). Here, attention was not directed towards the 
business units that were managing these projects as none of their projects had any delays. 
The color-rule system was not part of the initial rule-design of the SG approach, formally 
implemented in January 2003, but has nevertheless gained growing attention as it has be-
come the most appropriate rule to use. In 62 percent of the cases, gate rules were not fol-
lowed in all projects, and rules relating to portfolio management especially tended not to be 
put into action (see table 7.1 and 7.3). 
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7.3.2 Projects not addressed through color and SG rules 
The previous section examined projects which were discussed at the September PFMM ac-
cording to the application of the stage gating-rule and the color-rule system. Another ques-
tion, however, arises as to whether these projects can also be addressed according to some 
other rules or whether problems are not in fact solved by these rules at all. 
Such projects include nos. 62, 50, 22, and 24. Project no. 62 was addressed at the meet-
ing because of a change in ownership of business units. This problem was not covered by 
the formal innovation rules, which may imply that if a problem is not covered, it will con-
sequently be addressed. Project no. 50 was a new project in respect to the existing portfolio, 
but is a spin-off from another long-term project. The project was labeled green even though 
new projects are normally designated white. This was because it was already known to 
some extent by the participants at the September PFMM – for example, the chief scientist 
who also participates in the Technology Council meeting (see chapter five) which makes 
decisions on long-range projects. The discussion centered on project no. 50, which could 
indicate that the project was made part of the portfolio by mistake. The project manager and 
project members had been involved in the original long-range project. As they were uncer-
tain of the rule of preparing the business case, they started to produce a business case for 
some elements of the long-range project prematurely. The formal rule of PLASTIC, how-
ever, requires that:  
 
Spin-off projects with the goals to commercialize parts of the findings are 
treated as regular BU and Asset project portfolio candidates. 
 
But the meaning of the rule has been interpreted to regard a project as ready for the portfo-
lio if a business case can be made that includes market evaluation and calculations. How-
ever, this rule is difficult to carry out in a specific situation since the participants at the 
meeting themselves were uncertain of the rule, which suggests that the work of the project 
manager and project members was too premature to be properly fulfilled (the expected 
NPV of this project is €9.8 million). Projects no. 22 and 24 were addressed simultaneously 
by the responsible vice president as he was the only participant in the meeting who at-
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tempted to follow the rules concerning portfolio management, including the rule to ”priori-
tize projects to maximize cash flow over time” – as will be analyzed in the following dis-
cussion. It was nevertheless inappropriate to instigate these projects despite the fact that it 
was an attempt to follow the rules. The vice president was able to delegate decision-making 
authority in order to change the end-date (i.e. accelerate because of a high expected NPV 
for projects 22 and 24 of €25.3 million), but did not follow through with delegating al-
though it was in total compliance with the formal portfolio rules. Furthermore, the projects 
were addressed at a time when another vice president was already addressing his red pro-
jects, and therefore did not constitute part of the current meeting agenda. There was conse-
quently some uncertainty on when to address this issue because the vice president appar-
ently believed that the agenda had moved on to new projects. As the following exchange 
illustrates: 
 
1. Vice president: “No, no, this is a comment on some [projects] which are 
not new, but that is okay. We would like to have numbers 22 and 24 
speeded up. Because the end-date is 2007, and with such a high NPV we 
should speed up with more resources than that. Is the silicon [? 59.04] I 
guess this is the […] which slightly are the one with [… 59.12]. We would 
like them to go faster”. 
 
2. Chairman: “We cannot change this here … we have to take through the 
project and [… 59.17] because when you decided when you change the 
year again”. 
 
3. Vice president: “It is being requested that you investigate what it takes to 
speed it up, so that is something that we need to report back”.  
 
4. Chairman: “Please do and if you then decide to make it faster, you change 
the resources and you change the end line and feed it, any day, into the sys-
tem. I have to be a little bit strict on the subject [… 59.55] otherwise we 
will be here for a full day”. 
 
5. Portfolio Manager: “But actually you are the one initiating the investiga-
tion on what extra resources are required to speed it up. Let us take the next 
one”. 
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As we can see, one identity of the vice president generates concern about the value of the 
business unit portfolio, and, as a consequence, he wants to activate the formal rule of mak-
ing resource changes. The vice president is thus interpreting the formal rule of ”status of 
current portfolio and its implications” as the need to accelerate the two projects because of 
the high NPV. By appealing to this rule, the vice president is, however, violating the ‘color 
rule-system’ (green, yellow and red), which suggests that the formal rules of making deci-
sions on the portfolio are in competition with the rule color system, as was suggested 
above. In section 2, however, the chairman finds it inappropriate to utilize the formal rule 
of making resource decisions and, instead, opens up the possibility for the vice president to 
investigate the issue himself and, therefore enables him to change the end-date without fur-
ther approval from the PFMM (delegation). In section 3, the vice president apparently ac-
cepts the delegation of decision-making authority (which is in itself a violation of group 
identity), but undertakes to accelerate the projects and deviate the formal rule of only mak-
ing decisions within the formal decision-setting. The identity of the chairman is multiple 
and the identity of the chairman, that of the efficient time-keeper,  consequently ends up 
competing with what is considered proper behavior according to the formal rule of making 
resource decisions. This results in preferencing a time-argument over the formal decision-
rule of making portfolio (or resource) decisions. From the beginning of the meeting, the 
portfolio manager has attempted to promote the endorsement of formal rules on portfolio 
decision-making.  Through his introduction to the meeting, he has sought to highlight the 
need for these types of decisions, and seems to continue this train of persuasion by attempt-
ing to motivate the vice presidents themselves to instigate the utilization of formal rules for 
resource decision-making. Despite the chairman’s decision, this particular delegation of 
decision-making authority did not, however, make it into the formal report and there is no 
evidence to support the fact that the end-date has been changed, as was the intention of the 
vice president (formal report from November PFMM). This suggests that the vice president 
in question adopted the identity (March 1994) of a ‘proper’ vice president, based on the 
conduct of the other vice presidents (the group) in regard to the use of the formal rule, 
which in this case was deviated from. Thus, the vice president did not conform to the dele-
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gated decision authority, which was in any case a deviation brought about by the chairman 
that all decisions must be made at the PFMM.  
 The analysis of these projects suggests that widespread rule-breaking in the gate reviews 
(62 percent) comes about as a result of group identity, and was consistently substantiated 
by the participants in the meeting, even to the extent that individual actions tended to align 
themselves with the group identity through adoption of an ideal picture of a ‘proper’ vice 
president. This seemed to be more important in defining what a proper vice president would 
do as a decision-maker (March 1994), despite the prevalence of multiple identities amongst 
the actors. In this case, it led to the vice president using a formal rule of ”optimal portfolio” 
that was nevertheless inappropriate in terms of the group identity, as an acceleration of pro-
jects 22 and 24 would have triggered an inappropriate discussion on resources despite there 
being a formal rule to secure the optimality of projects in the portfolio. Group identity acti-
vates rules concerned with securing project management and keeping projects within the 
time-line (end-date).  
Projects in stage-gating were also addressed at the meeting, while three were excluded, 
indicating that the identity of the group (of vice presidents) tends not to bring about the 
evocation of portfolio management rules that would have consequently shifted the balance 
of resources – allocated to each business unit (profit center) according to the budget of each 
business unit.  
 
7.3.3 Manufacturability 
An analysis of the manufacturability criterion can best be achieved through taking a closer 
examination of projects 30 and 23.  
In project 30 (expected NPV: €1.6 million) the discussion was initiated by a comment 
from an unidentified participant, who, with respect to the issue of manufacturability, simply 
claimed “we can not really make it” (see section 3). The following exchange illustrates this:  
 
1. Vice president: “So, everything has been fulfilled in the criteria”.  
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The issue of the manufacturability criterion is, however, raised in section 2, where the re-
sponsible vice president argues that if that particular project is not to be approved, a lot of 
other projects should not be approved either (section 3): 
 
2. Unidentified participant [Difficult to hear distinctly 51.41]: “Because this 
is what I am concerned about with that project [… 52.14] means we can 
not really make it. [… 52.23] can you close a project if you have not se-
cured the manufacturing?”  
 
3. Vice president: “I think that then we should stop a lot of products where we 
have problems … so I think it is not as simple as that because we have are 
doing telecommunication rates [? 52.42] in the plant still, where we have 
20 percent off-grade where we have production problems” 
 
The chairman is unaware of the formal rule securing manufacturing through an agency 
check, which is explained to him by the portfolio manager:  
 
4. Chairman: “Let us take it in the following way – you will have to tick off 
where we say … possible to manufacture or something like that?” 
 
5. Portfolio manager: “Basically it is part of that one… it has to be approved 
by the commercial manager and commercial production is approved by 
manufacturing”.  
 
6. [Many participants talk simultaneously] 
 
The chairman approves the project by seeking to interpret the unfamiliar rule (at least to 
him). His interpretation is concerned with not approving the project when it is impossible to 
produce, which suggests that the appropriate definition is negatively rather than positively 
delineated. Thus, one purpose of his participation in the PFMM can be seen to be that of 
partial interpreter of the identity, and thus by implication also as a means of sustaining it. 
Consequently, his function is to interpret which are the appropriate rules to apply rather 
than merely making decisions in the instrumental sense. The meaning of manufacturability 
is discussed in section 7, where the chairman states: 
 
7. Chairman: [… 53.16] “because of course … with the introduction of new 
problems you have the problems that we if you have the objectives to able 
to produce it, of course, if it is impossible to produce, it is not approved 
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here. Because then we would stop the project. It is possible to produce, but 
if it has great difficulties it should of course ideally be in the project, that 
we have solved everything but eh… you are continuing, I think we will ap-
prove the project”. 
 
However, an unidentified participant chose to argue against this interpretation, which was 
initially brought into play because of differences over defining the situation. The identity of 
this participant is partly influenced by the formal rule of ‘pursuing the formal rule’ (i.e. to 
make optimal decisions on the portfolio level), even to the extent that he argues for the ap-
propriateness of the system (see section 8 below). The chairman, however, replied that the 
situation defined by the system should in fact eliminate un-manufacturability as a negative 
delimited criterion ‘no one can produce it’ by contrast with a positive criterion (section 9 
below). Another unidentified participant then raised the issue of competing rules with 
manufacturability, pointing to the end-date of the project plan and the color rule system, as 
well as the ambiguities of positioning a project in the innovation process that would create 
problems of predicting the need for test-runs. It was further argued that if the ideal situation 
should be achieved, all the projects would in fact be designated red because they would all 
be delayed (section 9). These issues seemed to be of general concern (section 11).   
 
8. (Many participants are talking simultaneously: 53.47) Unidentified partici-
pant: “It will require a number of test runs before we accept it as a com-
mercial product, that should be linked to this and this [… 53.56] systems, 
which are combined, so we have a formal system to approve it”. 
 
9. Chairman: “This process should actually take away the classical things: 
‘this is a fantastic product but no one can produce it’ (it should avoid this); 
‘this is a fantastic product but no one will buy it’ – these sorts of hurdles 
should be taken away by the flow [?] Into that [.? 54.18] the point is very 
well taken”. 
 
10. Unidentified participant: “If I may make a comment: I am not against this 
type of project, everybody can agree … that the product is great, but when 
it comes to planning the stages of this process within a certain time … are 
you able to define whether you now in the middle of the process [stains? 
54.45] that the product has been approved. We [usually] have to manufac-
ture three times before it is okay. That might influence the time schedule of 
the product, and then we might end up in the situation that most of the 
products are red because …”. 
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11. [Many participants start talking simultaneously] 
 
The following section (12) indicates that the chairman is actually unaware of the formal 
rule. According to the normative rules (see chapter five), manufacturability already needs to 
be addressed at the beginning of the project, in stages 1 and 2. However, whose ultimate 
responsibility it is for complying with the rules is not clear among the business units. With 
the entry into the portfolio in stage 3, however, the issue of manufacturability should have 
been addressed, yet at this point no test runs have been made.  
 
12. Chairman: “I think there may be a point concerning the beginning of the 
project, that is that you include some feedback from manufacturing and 
from HSE [55.22] and marketing of course [… 55.29] … I think we can 
approve that comment that we would like to look into the manufacturing 
area”. 
 
Time-to-market will increase if the ambiguities of manufacturing are necessarily reduced, 
ideally through three test-runs. This is also identified by March when arguing that demands 
(from rules) can be inconsistent and particularly when “[d]ecision-makers may be faced 
with deadlines that are inconsistent with required procedures (1994: 74). 
The unidentified participant in this exchange suggests that following the criterion of 
manufacturability and complying with the end-date – which is expected to be fixed at the 
beginning of the project – is a question of striking the right balance between these two for-
mal rules (section 13). If there is to be an increase in compliance with the criterion, then 
manufacturability with three test runs will result in a six to nine month delay (section 14). 
Both rules can therefore only be complied with simultaneously if an interpretation is made 
which aims to define what the appropriate action would be. The participants also raised the 
issue of up-scale production, which despite a number of test runs, could actually fail (see 
sections 15-19 on the issues of unanticipated contamination from the previous product or 
residues that could contaminate the next):   
 
13. Unidentified participant: “I agree, I have a lot of sympathy [for this posi-
tion], because the launch to market period will increase significantly. So 
we need to find the right balance. And I do not think we are going to solve 
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this issue at this meeting here. But you should be aware of what this could 
mean …”. 
 
14. Unidentified participant: “This delays the time to market by six or nine 
months”. 
 
15. [Simultaneously discussion] 
 
16. Unidentified participant: “The worst thing that can happen to you is suc-
cess with the test run…”  
 
17. [Many laugh] 
 
18. Unidentified participant: “… and then you launch to market and the second 
[attempt] does not work, and then you are really in trouble”. 
 
19. Unidentified participant: “I think we should also take into account with the 
launch phase which [products] you need to produce more than once”.  
 
The decision is again made to approve the project for finalization, despite the concerns 
raised. In fact, the chairman made this decision three times (sections 7, 12, and 20) and 
eventually removes the issue from the meeting altogether. 
 
20. Chairman: “We shall take this up outside the forum – it is a very important 
point, [so] we approve it. The next one”. 
 
In project no. 23 (expected NPV: €1.9 million), lack of compliance to the rule was specifi-
cally noted by the vice president and, here again, the meaning of the rule of manufacturabil-
ity is subjected to interpretation and discussion:  
 
1. Vice president: “… sorry for waking up late but anyway there were two or 
three projects that were sent in which are not now on the list for the stage-
gate; some were moving from detailed development to launch, for instance, so 
it is [more] a question of procedure as to how we manage this”. 
 
2. Chairman: “Are they not here?” 
 
3. Unidentified participant: “It is in the presentation you got from [… 10.03]”. 
 
4. Chairman: “That is perhaps a problem with [portfolio manager] has to…” 
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5. Vice president: “I understand [portfolio manager’s] dilemma in this but to … 
yes okay next one. This is the […] going from detailed development to launch 
and if you see the – in the checklist. The formal agency check is not finalized. 
So, one way of doing that would then be to, let us say – okay when we have 
the formality the consistency of your reasoning […] we should have that, if 
you agree on the other points; that it […] there, we will move to launch”. 
 
6. Unidentified participant: “There is a formality in the agency check. And that 
is a serious one that should be properly done”. 
 
7. Vice president: “My comment to that is that it is impossible to get an answer 
from the other functions, from product liability and manufacturing, we are just 
not getting the answers. In this case …there are no new chemicals, there are 
chemicals that we are working with already, so from that point of view, there 
is nothing odd with it, but formally it has to be answered by production and 
…”. 
 
8. Unidentified participant: “Why do not get the answer then?” 
 
9. Unidentified participant: “So why not get the answers then, if it is something 
new, it should be no problem to answer”. 
 
10. Vice president: “That is an issue, but I think we have to get those answers, I 
mean physically […] it should just put under their noses and signed. But if 
you take the … I do not know, should we have just a quick … I think there 
could be one question on that. I think if you move one slide back …  so this is 
launching this higher density direct into the reactor, which is given slightly 
lower production rates, but we need this for the market segment of smaller 
conductors, which is necessary for our penetration of the market”. 
 
11. [Several people sigh ] 
 
12. Vice president: “Yes”.  
 
13. Unidentified participant: “How much is slightly…?” 
 
14. Vice president: “A ten percent lower production rate … is where we are, but 
anyway what it can replace is also the compound in the product, the forty-four 
twenty-five [?] Which we are mixing high density [‘analogy’ 12.42]. It is the 
aim that we would replace that so far. The total production cost then it should 
be … eh”. 
 
15. [Many start talking] 
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16. Vice president: “No the questions is can we go from the detailed development 
to launch?” 
 
17. Chairman: “Yeah … and you had one problem with accuracy from manufac-
turing”. 
 
18. Vice president: “When that is over with we will take it to launch”. 
 
19. Chairman: “And we will take it according to what we have done before, you 
can get a decision between if you have the […] in order”. 
 
The dialogue in sections 1 to 4 suggests that the vice president in charge is reporting to the 
portfolio manager about progress on the individual project, referring to a report he submit-
ted, and so which has not been generated through utilizing the databases. The chairman was 
in the belief that all projects that were to be addressed were actually on the list, which fur-
ther indicates that the innovation databases are not providing the decision-forum with a 
comprehensive picture of stage-changes in a project. This is, however, something that must 
be specifically made available. Section 5 discloses that the agency check has not been final-
ized. An unidentified participant consequently draws attention to the inappropriateness of 
not following the formal rule in this case. It is the identity of the vice president that elicits 
the action of presenting a project for stage change even though not all rules have been com-
plied with, which also illustrates the results of having two time-lines. In sections 7 to 9, the 
vice president discusses the rule-violation with an unidentified participant, who does not 
accept the argument that there is a lack of formality in the liability and manufacturing de-
partments. This prompts an explanation that a higher density in the reactor is producing 
“slightly lower production rates”. However, the vice president wants to return to discussing 
the project because of an argument relating to market conditions:  
 
“[…] but we need this for the market segment of smaller conductors, which is 
necessary for our penetration of the market”.  
 
The response to this argument amongst the participants was one of dissatisfaction: sev-
eral participants expressed their criticism in section 11, and one participant even quizzed 
the choice of the word “slightly” (section 13). In response, the vice president admitted that 
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the production rate was lowered by ten percent (section 14), but a positive and unantici-
pated benefit had been that another compound could be replaced, which additionally gener-
ated a new project objective, ‘forty-four twenty-five’. Nevertheless, it was further admitted 
that ‘total’ production cost was lower since another additive could also be replaced. The use 
of this latter argument generated a tentative ‘yes’, if the vice president were able to solve 
the problem with a lower production rate (“accuracy”, section 17). It should, however, be 
noted that the expected NPV calculation of project 23 changed from €1.9 million in the 
formal report from the September PFMM to €2.82 million in November: an increase of al-
most €1 million. According to the argument of saved costs and a reduced total production 
cost, this is an example of post-fact information gathering (March and Feldman 1981).  
In sum, the criterion of manufacturability is not a ‘straightforward’ rule to follow. The 
criterion is related to ambiguity since the vice presidents tend to discuss the number of test 
runs required to secure product performance (even though they recognized the impossibility 
of this). Nevertheless, the end discussion was finalized through reaching an understanding 
only to undertake one test run, although everyone was aware that this would not reduce 
ambiguity satisfactorily. In another discussion, the manufacturability criterion was finally 
interpreted as not only “90 percent” but also “not impossible to produce”, albeit defining 
the rule in negative terms. The criterion therefore competes with the color-rules in terms of 
not being delayed, but rather also through securing the manufacturability positively. The 
rule is interpreted as including one test run and many vice presidents were therefore hoping 
for a negative outcome as additional test runs would be considered legitimate. This would 
reduce subsequent ambiguity in the project. In addition, one purpose for participation in the 
meeting participation was to be part of the rule interpretation, as well as to present the ar-
gument in favor of more test runs. Surprisingly, the chairman of the meeting was not aware 
of this rule, which added complexity to the situation. 
 
7.3.4 Calculations 
Calculation influences the mind-set of vice presidents and project managers, but figures are 
perceived to be ambiguous to the extent that the vice president in charge of any particular 
project can promise to increase the figures if he is required to do so since ambiguity is ap-
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propriately recognized by the other participants. Rules affect behavior by influencing what 
is to be expected by actors, but ambiguity also influences decision-making by legitimizing 
subsequent changes in norms since alternatives and their consequences cannot be fully 
comprehended at any one time. Changes in assumptions are regarded as legitimate as indi-
cated in the example below:  
 
… all in all this went quite well. The only problem we had was that the … mar-
ket in Europe is really down, and that means that the companies producing … 
profiles are competing like hell with each other, which means they are not pre-
pared to invest in new tools and new systems (vice president). 
 
March also reports that ambiguity influences decision-making: 
 
Behavioral studies of decision-making in organizations indicate that the por-
trayal of decision-making and information found in decision theory ignores of 
significantly underestimates the ambiguities of choice (1987: 153). 
 
Project managers suggest that calculation can easily be a subject of manipulation. For ex-
ample, product development projects in the business units receive the sales price (margin) 
and the expected volume from the sales- and marketing department, but manipulation is 
generally possible by modifying the numbers for expected development costs and license 
fees (particularly with technological projects). In this way, one test run can cost  €1 million. 
The calculation of the expected NPV is therefore heavily influenced by the expected num-
ber of test runs (since three test runs are costly to PLASTIC). The costs of process im-
provement projects are easier to estimate since the ‘market side’ of the calculation is known 
and the investment in new plants and equipment can be easily factored. The meaning of the 
business case is interpreted by project managers and produces additional complexity be-
cause rule-makers (portfolio manager and board of directors) normally choose to manage 
all new product developments, process improvement and long-range projects within the 
rule-system already described in chapter five. R&D project managers (managing all types 
of projects) tended to follow the rules of making an expected NPV calculation, but as the 
portfolio manager explained at the gate review meeting in September 2003, it was not 
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obligatory to produce NPV calculations for long-range projects (despite the formal rule). 
The upshot of this is that the way the formal set of rules is designed can add complexity to 
using rules by making them too general and not elaborating on them, say by making differ-
ent sets of rules for each type of innovation project. The respondents argued that long-range 
projects are more ambiguous than product development projects at PLASTIC. In recogni-
tion of the difficulty of calculating the expected consequences of such long-range projects, 
the portfolio manager attempted to influence the interpretation of this rule during the Sep-
tember PFMM by stating that it was not necessary to undertake this activity. The expected 
NPV calculation was to be ideally updated throughout the lifetime of the project, in the 
portfolio as well as prior stages. However, both project managers and vice presidents re-
mained unsure as to whether the NPV-calculations were to be updated on a continual basis 
(due to the rules being unclear). Some project managers interpreted the rule such that an up-
date was made only when new information was available. Others interpreted the rule so that 
the NPV was updated before a steering committee meeting, whereas yet others only up-
dated the calculation if the project was stage gating and therefore due to be addressed at the 
gate review meeting. No systems are in place to monitor the output of a project in terms of 
the expected NPV, whose performance is only measured by the portfolio management in 
the amount of kilotons sold. No consensus could be discerned among the vice presidents on 
the subject when interviewed about the precision of calculations made by the project man-
agers. Some claimed that they were accurate whereas others mentioned a ratio of 50 percent 
precision.  However, as the General Manager (chairman of the gate review, September 
PFMM) stated when interviewed on this issues:  
 
The purpose is not to produce precise calculations, but to influence the mind-set 
of people and make them think in terms of profitability [emphasis added]. 
 
Even though rules were seen to be influencing the gate review meeting as well as the 
behavior of the vice presidents, the symbolic perspective (March 1999) was clearly visible 
in the meeting in several respects. For example, emphasis was placed on securing the value 
of the business unit’s portion of the portfolio, contrary to the predictions of the instrumental 
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perspective, which demands that projects leave the portfolio ‘pool’ as soon as possible be-
cause resources could therefore be freed for other and more profitable projects, thus conse-
quently accelerating the positive cash flow. In several cases, the value (expected NPV) was 
de-coupled from the project because the vice president (and the other participants of the 
meeting) wanted to protect the value of the business unit’s sub-portfolio. Apparently further 
meetings were held prior to the gate meeting itself where business plans of the business unit 
were presented, which is part of influencing the group identity in terms of assisting each 
other to fulfill the promises made in these business plans (including budgets) rather than 
create conflicts. This behavior also influenced the chairman33 because the formal goal of 
€90 million for new projects was well exceeded, largely through the protection of values 
and the vice presidents’ decision to ‘stand together’ rather than engage in open competition 
for resources between the business units as a consequence of identity. Moreover, the par-
ticipants wanted the September PFMM to be an ‘operations’-meeting and were therefore 
positively inclined towards the possibility of top-management participation (the cancella-
tion of the R&D Director’s participation via video conference did not generate any observ-
able disappointment).  
Ambiguity also influenced some projects which were halted prior to the gate review 
meeting – due to unforeseen problems with the technology (including manufacturability) of 
the project (see section 7.3.1 on red projects). Project 30 was presented (stage gating pro-
ject), and during the presentation other identities were evoked than those of the group. This 
defined the decision not to discuss each other’s projects, because the manufacturability cri-
terion in their opinion had not been fulfilled. The issue of manufacturability appears to play 
a central role in the individual identity of some vice presidents, to the extent that action was 
undertaken – in terms of expressing a dissenting opinion – regarding the vice president’s 
claim that the criteria had been fulfilled. The vice president agreed with these opinions and 
subsequently resorted to using an additional economic argument by claiming that the pro-
ject would produce a higher expected NPV as a result of the additional benefits in posi-
tively influencing ‘total production costs’. The economic argument stopped further discus-
                                                 
33 The portfolio manager attempted to evoke the rule of prioritization of projects, but no evidence suggests 
that this attempt succeeded. 
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sion on the criterion of manufacturability, perhaps because this type of argument was am-
biguous to the vice presidents. No one seemed to question the reason why this argument 
had not been made part of the calculation prior to the meeting. 
Thus, calculable rules are not distinct and the meaning of the rules requires interpreta-
tion in the organizational practice of PLASTIC, which is itself one purpose for participating 
in the meeting other than prescribed by the rules. Another purpose of the meeting was to 
discuss new rules, for instance the RAID rule-system, but the functionality of these rules 
turned out not to be fully understood by the respondents when interviewed on this issue – 
most mentioned the aspect of complexity. Since the beginning of the formal implementa-
tion of the new rule systems, the rule of dealing with projects above €2 million has been 
designed to distinguish between activities and the portfolio, which is part of the formal 
rule-system (see chapter five). Thirteen projects were active in the September portfolio 
even though they were below this rule. During the September PFMM, projects with a value 
below €2 million were only briefly introduced as a problem, most conspicuously by a 
promise from the portfolio manager to specifically address these projects at the next meet-
ing. The rule was evoked in the September PFMM only on one occasion when a new pro-
ject (no. 80) was presented to the portfolio participants. The business manager responsible 
for the project was not, however, (formally) aware of this limit, and was surprised to learn 
about the rule. Despite this, he was however supported by the portfolio manager, who had 
pre-approved the project, and emphasized its ‘strategic importance’. The business unit 
manager in turn supported the portfolio manager, stating that:  
 
“We can easily increase it [the value]” (responsible vice president) [emphasis 
added], and subsequently  
“… perhaps we should add more benefits just to show these are the baseline” 
(chairman). 
This project had a high claim to legitimacy because of the issue of ‘strategic importance’ 
that was introduced by the portfolio manager. The formal report from the next portfolio 
manager (November 2003) showed the same value of €1.1 million, which suggested that 
the cut-off rule of €2 million was deviated from. Despite the statement of the chairman, 
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new benefits were not added (and also did not form part of the formal report of the follow-
ing meeting). Thus, the €2 million rule is perceived to be an inappropriate standard to fol-
low by the vice presidents and is thus only evoked in connection with other criteria. In ad-
dition, while the rule-design of this €2 million hurdle was motivated by a desire to simplify 
the PFMM-meetings, it nevertheless opened up new room for interpretation since the busi-
ness units were responsible for managing projects below this figure. The evidence suggests 
that one business unit has designed a simplified portfolio-rule model to undertake portfolio 
management of projects within the business unit, which are typically low risk product 
modification projects. One respondent claimed, however, that these projects were consum-
ing too many resources compared to the portfolio-projects, since the management of these 
projects had been moved outside the portfolio.  
 In sum, the calculable rules are subject to interpretation because of competing rules with 
inconsistent demands. Time-to-market cannot be accelerated or the project will not be on 
time, providing manufacturability is complied with satisfactorily with more than one test-
run. Moreover, the identity of the vice presidents as a group is more likely to evoke the cri-
terion of manufacturability because the organizational identity is that of a technical and 
process-oriented company whereas calculation is not distinct and considered to consist of a 
number of complex phenomena. The numbers are, however, not treated as equivalent to the 
more complex reality they represent, contrary to what is claimed by March:   
 
[T]hey create “magic numbers” (e.g., “profit”, “cost of living”) for complex 
phenomena, treating the numbers as equivalent to the more complex reality 
they represent (1988: 26). 
 
Emphasis on calculation is new to the vice presidents when compared to the previous set of 
rules (PD&I, chapter five) and, as has been argued by March (1994), actors are more likely 
to more effectively internalize rules they fulfill than those they do not, which on the other 
hand does not mean to say that this creates competence in the use of new rules. Thus, com-
petence in using rules can impede competence in creating new rules. Moreover, the vice 
presidents have not been provided with any training to develop such competence, for in-
stance, in portfolio decision rules.  
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7.2.5 The use of rules in gates 
Within the vision of a limited rationality, choices are a result of a deliberate, consequential 
and management-based decision-making process, and they must answer to four basic ana-
lytical questions (March 1999), which were set out in chapter four. The rules in the SG ap-
proach have programmed this activity into a set of rules, whereby through following these 
rules a decision is ideally reached. The rules prescribe the way a decision is made by setting 
the criteria for decision-making and the activities needed to be carried out in a gate meeting 
(observed at the September PFMM). The organizational practice which encompasses the 
rules in a gate meeting does, however, suggest that the stipulations of the rules are inconsis-
tent, which adds additional uncertainty to the interpretation of the criteria or calculable 
rules and rather puts emphasis on how the rules are designed. Moreover, the design of rules 
has produced two time-lines where the gate meeting is detached from the progress of the 
individual project, which has created a situation where decisions that are either made prior 
or subsequent to the meeting are considered an appropriate undertaking by the vice presi-
dents.  
The rules prescribe who should attend the meeting and what activities are to be carried 
out, But actors tended to engage in interpretation of the rules, sustaining the group identity 
and legitimizing decisions made prior to the meeting by the vice presidents. Moreover, rule 
deviation with some rules became standard rather than simple and ‘automatically’ follow-
ing those prescribed. Ambiguity influences many projects, but the competition that arises 
between the color-system rules (monitoring delay) and the rules in SG produces complexity 
which requires further criteria rules to be constructed through interpretation (e.g. the crite-
rion of manufacturability). The end-date was discussed in many projects and linked to is-
sues of manufacturability, technical feasibility, project scope, customer testing and re-
sources. In this sense then, the decision process has become more important than the deci-
sion itself, mainly because the decisions have been transformed into a set of rules. If the 
project is not technologically feasible, the vice president is expected to take action without 
prior approval. Only in project 46 did the chairman surprise the participants by ‘stopping’ a 
project, which was nevertheless not killed as the formal report later encouraged the project 
to be reformulated and resubmitted for approval.  
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It is inappropriate to evoke the portfolio decision rules for reasons of group identity, 
which would thereby be constructed by the participants. The motive for interpretation 
amongst the participants does, however, also include an element of sustaining group iden-
tity and thus securing the perception of what is considered inappropriate. This is the reason 
why these rules are not suddenly put into operation despite the multiple identities of the 
portfolio manager and a vice president, who applied these rules (the vice president who 
evoked the inappropriate rules did not participate in the November PFMM). The portfolio 
manager was also influenced by group identity since the formal report was specifically de-
signed with a page for each business unit and not, for instance, according to project num-
bers or project size, which would have prompted a discussion on priority.  
One goal of the portfolio forum was to exceed the amount of €90 million as expected 
NPV each year for new projects. However, this amount was not output controlled by moni-
toring the projects after leaving the portfolio, mainly because one portfolio manager 
claimed the impossibility of making precise post-calculations. The investigator gained the 
impression that it was a common objective of the group of vice presidents to demonstrate a 
value as high as possible of the total value of the portfolio and secure this value not by ac-
celerating projects through prioritization but rather by keeping them inside the ‘pool’. This 
common understanding, part of the group identity, only tends to work against the time-
regime monitoring delays and whether a project is accelerated. Interestingly, the inappro-
priateness of evoking the portfolio rules would make prioritization necessary and in turn 
result in a change of balance change in the resource rules (each business is a profit center 
and therefore has authority over its own resources). As a consequence, it is more appropri-
ate to follow these rules (resource rules) than the rules defined by the SG approach.  
The expected NPV as a criterion is perceived as a complex number and is not monitored 
post-portfolio. The discussion of project 8, for instance, indicates that the expected NPV 
value is loosely connected to the project in the sense that participants focus on securing the 
value of their ‘sub-portfolio’ despite the fact that the project as such was not technically 
feasible. In the specification of the formal report, it was encouraged that the project be “re-
formulate[d] [to bring the] project bring up for approval” even though the value has been 
removed from the portfolio specified by the relevant business unit. From the portfolio per-
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spective, no decisions were made since no projects were halted or killed (apart from one 
which had already been stopped prior to the meeting by the responsible project manager) or 
prioritized. The rule of above €2 million was not brought into effect, perhaps because of the 
complexity associated with this criterion and the intervention in each business unit’s ratio 
of the portfolio. 
Analyzing the distribution of each business unit’s portion of the portfolio measured in 
millions of Euros for quarter three and four, demonstrates marginal changes in each busi-
ness ratio of the total portfolio in percentages (see table 7.4). Although no formal innova-
tion rule regulates the distribution of ratios between the business units, as this would com-
pete with the requirement for making optimal portfolio decisions independent of each busi-
ness unit, the individual business unit’s portion of the portfolio was considered a matter of 
concern by the chairman and the participants in the portfolio meeting, as was illustrated 
during the discussion on many of the red projects. The analysis of the distribution (table 
7.4) indicates an explicit rule governing the ratio of the projects in the portfolio, which is 
substantiated by the discussion of the projects and the decoupling of value from the project 
to protect each business unit’s sub-portfolio. This is exemplified by the case of the vice 
president, who prior to the meeting, had presented his business plans to the other partici-
pants in order to legitimate his ratio of the portfolio.  
 
Table: 7.4: The distribution of each business unit’s part of the portfolio in Quarter 3 and 
Quarter 4 – November PFMM in € million and percentages. 
 
 A B C D E F G ∑AG 
Active Q3 44 32 40 18 35 7 46 221 
Active Q4 60 33 52 19 40 7 56 267 
Percent of ∑Q3  20% 14% 18% 8% 16% 3% 20% 100 
Percent of ∑Q4  22% 12% 19% 7% 15% 3% 21% 100 
  
The decision situations occur quarterly, but are detached from the individual progress re-
ports of a project, which might be a contributing factor for the appropriateness of making 
decisions prior to the PFMM and subsequently to secure formal approval. Thus, rules tend 
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to produce formality, and formal approval is a concern of the participants even though they 
are willing to take prior action and deviate from the portfolio decision rules themselves. 
One peculiarity of the SG approach in PLASTIC is the existence of these two time-lines. 
Project managers do not, however, seem to consider this a problem, because the they can 
contact the chairman of the steering committee – who often is the vice president himself – 
if a decision is required, and will subsequently will get formal approval from the portfolio 
meeting (no projects are killed). Fifty-eight percent of projects, however, reported that they 
did not have a designated chairman of the steering committee (analyzed below) and some 
project managers argue (even criticize) that decisions are often made outside the PFMM. 
The informal decision-making that takes place in the gap between the two time-lines opens 
up the opportunity for what Weber (1968) characterizes as ‘friction’, despite the fact that in 
Weber’s understanding rule should reduce ‘friction’ (see chapter four).  
As was outlined above, the color-rule system competes with the stage-gating rule and 
also generally with the performance of the project itself (Rosenau 1993).  Here the data 
suggests that not all criteria can comply simultaneously as time is also a scarce resource. 
Evidence further indicates that time is connected to the ‘scope of the project’ and the crite-
rion of ‘manufacturability’, and more generally can be considered a driver for interpreting 
the meaning of rule criteria in the rule system which was formally implemented at the be-
ginning of 2003. Thus, the color-rule system in particular (relating to the end-date) appears 
to have influenced the PD process34 more than the gate reviews have intervened in the in-
novation process with objective decision-making as required by the normative system (see 
chapters two and five). In addition, the participants recognized that much more time needs 
to be allocated to the meeting itself, especially for detailed discussion of all projects rather 
than merely red and stage-gating projects.  
Rules affect behavior by influencing the identity of the actors, but ambiguity also influ-
ences decision-making by legitimizing subsequent changes in NPV-values, especially be-
cause the consequences of these decisions cannot be fully comprehended at the outset. 
Changes in conditions are, however, legitimate as was indicated in the discussion of pro-
                                                 
34 Davila investigated the drives of management control in new product development and indicates: “[…] that 
management control systems in product development, following project management techniques, are focused 
around time” (2000: 399). Davila was, however, focusing particularly on budget rules. 
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jects that particularly dealt with technical issues. Moreover, rule-deviation was prevalent in 
gates (62 percent), which relate to competition between the attention granted to formal rules 
inside the SG rule-system, but also with other rule-regimes, such as resource-rules and 
time. The latter has led to the development of a color-rule system that appears to consist of 
the rules deemed most appropriate to utilize from the perspective of the vice presidents’ 
combined group identity. 
The decision situations in the gate review are not entirely like the Garbage Can (Cohen 
et al 1972) decision models, as rules did in fact influence the meeting and produced ‘deci-
sions’ in some situations, particularly in discussions examining whether a project actually 
complied with required criteria. The extent of information and documentation rule-
application demonstrates the highest percentage ratio of application, but the analysis below 
suggests that rule-deviation was in fact most frequent with in the case of documentation 
rules, and that the documented information did not establish a basis for rational decision-
making in the instrumental case because of ambiguity, particularly amongst ‘red’ projects. 
However, the Garbage Can-decision model suggests that the decision process is more im-
portant than the decision itself. Here, similarities can be identified with the decision-
occasion in PLASTIC, which rather served to provide a platform for interpreting rules and 
maintaining the group identity of the vice presidents, including being able to guarantee the 
application of decisions which had already been made outside the formal decision-making 
arena. The participants in the meeting struggled to follow rules, but only to the extent that 
their respective group identity perceives the need to actively employ the rules as being ap-
propriate. Rules that threatened to unbalance a business unit’s portion of the total portfolio, 
and thus its resource allocation, are considered inappropriate to follow, even though the 
identity of one of the vice presidents prompted the question of accelerating projects no. 22 
and 24. 
Although rules influenced the meeting, complexity could not be eliminated. Projects that 
did not follow rules and rule-competition generated complexity. In particular, the color 
rule-system tended to compete with the quality of criteria, as illustrated by the green pro-
jects where the meaning of the criterion of manufacturability was discussed. The vice 
presidents wanted to eliminate uncertainty by undertaking more test runs, but the motives 
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that underlay the design of the color-system in the first place not only obliged that projects 
be finalized as soon as possible but also prohibited the actual requirement for reducing 
quality problems and product performance. The rule of having quarterly meetings was one 
of the few rules that was religiously followed, as were the information rules of project 
dates, even though the rule of having a business plan tended to be deviated from. Finally, in 
this study, calculable rules were interpreted as criteria, and are a construction of what con-
stitutes appropriate behavior, since this ultimately comes down to the identity of the deci-
sion-makers, as the following illustrates: 
 
General Manager: “No, you can do with criteria whatever you want, I mean – it 
can kill or it can support, [31.17] it depends very much on how you look at 
things. It will depend very much on people sitting around the table making the 
decision and to have some people really want to carry it through. Again it 
comes down to how people feel about the whole thing – that will make the dif-
ference that comes out” (emphasis added). 
 
 
The analyses indicated that although rules reduce ambiguity, rule-competition and mul-
tiple identities tended to produce complexity in PD, adding to ambiguity. Rule-competition 
existed between the color-system rules and the rules requiring projects to be decided upon 
when changing stages. Some of the red projects were subject to ambiguity in terms of un-
foreseen technical problems, but other projects were delayed because of the expectation 
that projects would be accelerated, which was largely produced by these rules. As a project 
manager, one does not want one’s project to be red and therefore become the focus of atten-
tion. The calculable rules are subject to interpretation because of competing rules and the 
prevalence of a degree of ambiguity in relation to PD projects. None of the calculable rules 
are distinct, which means that the meeting becomes an arena for interpretation of the formal 
rules and thus for legitimizing subsequent decisions to make additional test-runs. An action, 
however, is not automatically brought about based on the rule (Simons 1954), but subject to 
the filter introduced in figure 7.1.  
To summarize, the question was initially raised as to how rules are used with respect to 
decision-making (section 7.1), and the answer can be seen to be that rules influence deci-
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sion-making. Some rules are used but require interpretation, whereas other rules are devi-
ated from. The use of rules in decision-making therefore becomes a struggle for the partici-
pants between both following and deviating.  
 
 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
 
Although the objective of rules from the instrumental rule-perspective is to reduce rational 
decision-making to a programmed set of rules by prescribing the activities to be carried out 
in stages, how information is produced and documented, the activities needed to be carried 
out in the situation itself and which criteria to apply, the analysis of the use of rules in 
PLASTIC suggests that the use of rules is subject to the ‘filter’ of appropriateness, as was 
also identified in the cross-case analysis (chapter six). Nevertheless, rules do indeed influ-
ence PD activities in PLASTIC.  
The analysis in this chapter was structured into two parts. First, the extent of rule-
following was analyzed in PLASTIC and thus consequently the extent of rule-deviation 
that was also prevalent. Second, an analysis of the use of rules in the September Portfolio 
Management Meeting (PFMM) presented a number of explanations of rule-following and 
rule-deviation.  
The first section asked the question to what extent rules were used in the PD activities of 
PLASTIC. The answer to that question is summarized in table 7.4 above, which showed the 
percentages of the rule-following in PLASTIC with respect to gates (38 percent), informa-
tion (67 percent) and stages (40 percent). Earlier, in chapter six it was indicated that gates 
were normally kept formal, but the analysis in this chapter suggests that formality is par-
ticularly concerned with the holding of quarterly gate meetings, having an agenda and dis-
cussing the projects addressed because of rules, whereas rules concerned with portfolio 
management in particular were not evoked during the meeting. The information and docu-
mentation rules indicated the highest rate of rule-following (and lowest rule-deviation) in 
percentage terms, but also that the databases into which the information was uploaded and 
to some extent documented, were not utilized during the meeting, which instead relied on a 
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form that was to be filled out by the respective vice president before the meeting. The 
analysis of the stage rules pointed to the use of rules particularly in the pre-portfolio activi-
ties (stage 1 and 2) and the low level of rule usage in the last stage (6) concerned with the 
lessons that could be drawn from the project’s launch.  
The first section yielded a number of analytical observations with respect to the use of 
rules. Rules solve problems and problems that are not solved produce problems for other 
rules because of their inherent interconnectivity. The lack of portfolio decision-making 
pushed the problem of prioritization ‘downwards’ in the organization. Learning occurs and 
problems not solved through rules in the case of PLASTIC do not lead to the reformulation 
of rules but rather to the creation of new rules, which in turn are perceived as complicated 
because of a lack of training and the high degree of complexity in the new rules. Some pro-
ject managers followed the rules more out of a sense of duty than through any internal 
commitment since no one really wanted to be singled out in the meeting because of a prob-
lem concerned with quality or information and documentation. However, the action of re-
porting did not lead to a general behavioral change amongst some project managers since 
these rules had not been internalized. The intake of new projects was limited due to 
stretched resources, as was argued by one respondent who pointed out that increasing the 
project by 0.01 people was a waste of time. The resources were stretched in PLASTIC be-
cause of the reluctance to prioritize projects of indeed the and unwillingness to kill a pro-
ject. This has led to the establishment of many small projects and some projects which are 
even a combination of up to eight old projects. Moreover, the new set of rules which have 
been valid since the beginning of January applies to all projects, which has in turn produced 
additional complexity in using rules. Finally, evidence of vice president responsibility was 
absent in the first two stages of the SG approach of PLASTIC.  
The second section of this chapter set out to ask how rules are actually used with respect 
to decision-making (gates), and this was observed through a gate meeting (PFMM) that 
took place in September. The section set out three questions as its point of departure, which 
jointly leads to an understanding of how rules are used with respect to decision-making. 
The color-rule system addressed all delayed (red and yellow) projects but was seen to com-
pete with the stage gating rules since three projects that shifted stages were not addressed. 
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The business units that owned these projects did not, however, have any red projects and 
therefore did not draw attention to these rules. Appropriate rules are evoked and the color-
rule system seemed the more appropriate system to utilize as rules tend to influence deci-
sion-making. Inappropriate rules in contrast to group identity were, however, also evoked 
because of multiple identities among decision-makers in the case of projects 22 and 24, 
where the owner (vice president) of these projects wanted to accelerate them with added 
resources and, consequently, found it more appropriate to follow the portfolio management 
rules than the other participants. The vice president, however, abandoned the delegated de-
cision authority in the process. The latter was in itself a deviation from the rules, which re-
quire decisions to be made in the gate meeting. As a consequence, the real option available 
to the vice president was to accelerate the projects with the resources available through his 
own business unit. Problems not regulated by rules also surfaced in the meeting, for exam-
ple, where project 62 was addressed in terms of its ownership, which suggests that rules do 
not only relate to problems that can be discussed at the gate meeting. The criteria by which 
projects are compared are not distinct and therefore require interpretation. The most com-
monly discussed criterion were those that were influenced by ambiguity. For example, 
where one successful test-run was considered to sufficient with regard to whether the pro-
ject product could be successfully manufactured, but the number of test runs could be re-
duced if the rules placed contrary demands on the criteria. The color-system rules require 
rules to be on time (i.e. not delayed) whereas the quality of the product could consequently 
be compromised. Problems that were not solved in some cases produced subsequent quality 
problems which required resources and, in turn, resulted in the resources that were avail-
able to PD being even more stretched and unmanageable.  
Another criterion is calculations, which not was treated as equivalent to the complex re-
ality they purported to represent. No consensus was detected among the respondents with 
respect to issues of precision, but the wide acceptance of ambiguity and, in some cases, un-
foreseen technical difficulties also served to influence the perception of calculations, which 
tended to be perceived as indicators rather than exact numbers. This might explain the con-
struction of an ‘important’ project when the expected NPV value had reached a level of, 
say, €7.5 million. As a consequence, the participants in the meeting engaged in a discussion 
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when a project was successful (e.g. project 40) and accepted that a vice president can in-
crease the value of an expected NPD when ‘pushed’, as the comment: “We can easily in-
crease it” serves to prove. This behavior was widely accepted among the participants, 
which further demonstrates that the calculation was rather regarded as a construction than 
an absolute number. However, the vice presidents (or project managers) were not provided 
with any training in relation to the rules, and a competence trap could to some extent con-
sequently be identified, especially since the criterion of manufacturability was an aspect 
which proved more readily comprehendible to the vice presidents than the calculation.  
March (1994) argues that actors are more likely to fulfill roles when they possess com-
petence. Resource-rules constituted another rule-regime in competition with the rules in the 
SG approach, as illustrated in table 7.4. The resources are linked to the budget of each 
business unit (a profit center) and, as consequence, the values of the project became loosely 
coupled to the extent that the value of a terminated project (initiated by the vice president) 
was protected and the vice president was encouraged to fill the slot with another project in 
order to secure each business unit’s portion of the portfolio. These rules are more appropri-
ate to evoke than the portfolio management rules (table 7.1) and a role which is easier to 
adopt than the role of instigating rules that require prioritization and, consequently, upset-
ting the balance of consensus.  
 The initial aim of this chapter was to understand the use of rules from the perspective of 
appropriateness in PLASTIC. The evidence suggests that the notion of appropriateness pro-
vides a fitting explanation as to why and how some rules are used whereas others are not. 
The theory of appropriateness is indeed a ‘filter’ between the formal rules and the actions 
of the actors, as was illustrated in figure 7.1 above. Actors apply a different form of ration-
ality (March 1994) which makes more sense for them to use one set of rules over others. 
This puts much more focus on behavioral issues and the role of superiors when attempting 
to understand rules in the SG approach as a managerial technology, which will be the focus 
of the next chapter. The boxed area in figure 7.1 draws attention to the constructedness of 
appropriateness. This will be summarized and elaborated in the following chapter, together 
with a discussion of the two perspectives taken together. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Summarizing two perspectives on decision-making in 
practice: the case of PLASTIC 
 
 
 
 
This chapter summarizes the two perspectives by which rules have so far been analyzed 
throughout this study (instrumentality and appropriateness) with special reference to 
PLASTIC. It further aims to elaborate how appropriateness is constructed according to 
the interpretations made by the actors involved. Moreover, the chapter attempts to pro-
vide a better understanding of the mobilization patterns which were identified in the 
previous chapter, where rule-following and rule-deviation were analyzed with respect to 
gates, information and documentation, and stages. 
 
 
8.1 INSTRUMENTALITY AND APPROPRIATENESS 
 
Cyert and March originally presented the theory of appropriateness in the epilogue to A 
behavioral theory of the firm (1992: 230-32). However, in their treatment the authors 
fail to discuss the implication of this theory with respect to each instrumental rule, 
which were subsequently analyzed as part of the standard operating procedure (instru-
mental perspective), precisely because they were not considered within their context of 
appropriate application. So far in this study, rules have been categorized in task per-
formance rules, information and recording rules, and planning rules. In this chapter, 
however, rules will be elaborated in terms of the specific rules that were designated to 
each category by Cyert and March (1992), see the instrumental rules listed in table 4.2 
above. 
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Table 8.1: Rules in two perspectives 
Normative SG rules 
 
Rules in context: Appropriate application 
Coordinative mechanism Projects are not awaiting formal decision(s). It is inappro-
priate since time-to-market is dominant in the mind-set of 
the actors, demonstrated by the detachment of the gate re-
view from the individual progress of the project. 
Gate tasks according to a stan-
dardized format  
 
 
The gate rule mobilization pattern (see table 7.1), and be-
cause of competition from the resource rule regime, those 
which are connected to organizational structure business 
units. Portfolio management rules in particular are not 
evoked.  
Stage activities according to a 
standardized format  
 
Formal rules prescribe the activities to be undertaken in the 
stages, but particularly in the two first stages many activities 
prove inappropriate, which inhibits innovation – as analyzed 
in the mobilization pattern (see table 7.2) for these rules, 
due to unclear responsibilities. 
Gate keeper activities required 
to be undertaken  
More appropriate for the Gatekeeper to seek consensus in 
the group than to evoke rules that would disrupt consensus. 
The identity of what a proper vice president actually does is 
rather defined by a fellow vice president than corporate con-
cern.  
Project managers generate in-
formation to be used in gates  
 
Project managers generate some of the information, but 
generally rules are not followed, and only limited informa-
tion is available for decision-making. Some project manag-
ers are eager to generate information whereas others rather 
follow rules as a ‘duty’. The organizational identity is not 
homogenous in this respect. 
Information production is de-
termined by the activities taking 
place in stages  
 
New projects entering the portfolio as well as existing pro-
jects can lack information. In one case, information was ex-
plicitly generated to validate a decision that had already 
been made.  
The information must be re-
ported (documented) to the de-
cision-makers  
Not all information is documented. A project manager can 
record that the business plan has been made, but in some 
cases documentation is nevertheless not uploaded. The port-
folio manager has devised a template to be filled out by the 
vice president and used during a meeting. 
The reporting format follows 
the stages, which must include 
marketing, production (techni-
cal issues) and finance. 
The design of the rules in PLASTIC prescribes the same 
criteria to be applied throughout the entire process. The re-
ported information is constantly modified as more informa-
tion is generated but reporting is interpreted differently by 
the project managers. 
Performance criteria, should 
and must meet  
 
The normative design of the rule system does not include 
should and must meet criteria. As such, the rule-system is 
not designed for disclosing disagreement with respect to 
portfolio decision-making.  
Project plans (including end-
dates)  
In approximately half the cases, a project plan has not been 
uploaded (see figure 7.2), but the end-date set at gate 3 
when entering the portfolio does indeed seem to be an ap-
propriate rule to follow. 
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The table suggests that rules are interpreted in their context. The section below therefore 
attempts to take the issue further by seeking to construct appropriateness as it is applied 
in PLASTIC.  This is done in order to yield possible explanations to the rule mobiliza-
tion patterns identified and summarized in table 7.3, which illustrated that 38 percent of 
the rules are evoked at PLASTIC whereas the remaining 62 percent are not. 
 
 
8.2 CONSTRUCTING APPROPRIATENESS IN PLASTIC 
 
The second theme of this chapter is concerned with how appropriateness is constructed. 
The center box in figure 8.1 below illustrates the room for interpretation in the three 
processes inherent in the theory: the process of self awareness – to clarify identity; the 
process of recognition – to classify the situation in which actors finds themselves; and 
finally the process of search and recall – to match appropriate rules to situations and 
identities. The variables influencing the three processes are illustrated by a narrow line 
in the figure. The number refers to the content of the box whereas the number and the 
lower case letter refer to the process by which the three processes are influenced. The 
interpretation of rules can, for instance, be influenced by inconsistencies in formal rules 
(1 and 1a); observation of others, which can influence how identity is defined (2 and 
2b); and the context, which influences how situations are understood (3 and 3c). More-
over, learning processes influence the interpretation of rules too (4 and 4d). Here, action 
is considered to be a result of these three processes and is therefore not singled out for 
analysis. The discussion of the construction of appropriateness that follows is a further 
elaboration on the argument so far put forward, in particularly in the previous chapter. 
Each box and its respective process is discussed in more detail below. It should, how-
ever, be noted at the outset that it is not being claimed that variables cannot also have 
mutual influences on each other. That they can do, will become evident in the discus-
sions below. Moreover, it should be noted that this model is only an attempt to compre-
hend how appropriateness is constructed by the actors in PLASTIC. Compared to figure 
7.1, the model presented here does, however, include more variables and is generally 
considered to be an elaboration. 
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Figure 8.1: How actors construct appropriateness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) Rules 
The set of rules in PD and the color-rule system were not initially designed to be part of 
the set of rules that became valid from January 2003, and are summarized in table 8.1 
below. However, another rule-regime relating to the organizational structure of PLAS-
TIC can also be seen to be influencing PD. This rule-regime lies outside the rules in PD 
and links resources to the business units, which are independent profit centers with an 
individual budget and their own resource responsibility. The set of rules in PD include 
rules for gates, for instance, calculable rules (criteria) by which compliance of the pro-
ject is analyzed, rules for stages and rules for information and reporting. The color-rule 
system was added by the portfolio management to manage the PD process, and moni-
tors whether the project has been delayed from the planned end-date. Other monitoring 
rules include the quality information systems, which are designed to monitor whether 
the information and recording rules are actually applied by the project managers. 
 
(1a) Rules influence on interpretation 
The set of rules in PD competes with the color-rule system. The color-rule system em-
phasizes time over other criteria such as manufacturability, as was shown earlier, and is 
Application  
of rules 
(2)  
Observation  
of others 
(1) Rules 
Situation recognized 
(3) 
Contexts 
Actions
(1a) 
(2b)
(4d) 
(3c)
(4) 
Learning 
Multiple 
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Identity 
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a more appropriate rule to apply. Observation of the November PFMM showed that no 
projects were designated red, compared to the September PFMM where 11 projects 
were deemed red and 2 yellow. At the meeting, the portfolio manager stated that it was 
inappropriate to have delayed projects in a business unit and suggested to the vice presi-
dents that they should be more aware of this in the future. The reduction in the number 
of delayed projects suggests that the situation has now been recognized, where project 
delays are not permitted. As a consequence, end-dates become subjects of negotiation, 
as has also been suggested by the research of Jönsson (2004) who describes the situa-
tion where an upcoming gate review at VOLVO was negotiated in favor of postpone-
ment due to ambiguity in the development project of the S/V40-model. The evidence in 
PLASTIC suggests that end-dates can be changed informally, which nevertheless had 
the consequence of causing some confusion with one project. More importantly, rule 
competition resulted in interpretation of the criterion, where manufacturability changed 
from “90 percent possible” to “not impossible to produce”. In this respect, March states: 
 
“Decision-makers may be faced with deadlines that are inconsistent with re-
quired procedures” (1994: 75). 
  
The mobilization pattern of rules in gates was analyzed in the previous chapter and is 
summarized in table 7.1, which indicates that 38 percent of the rules were applied to all 
projects in PLASTIC. In particular, portfolio management rules were not evoked in the 
gate meeting, which can be ascribed to competition from another rule-regime linking 
resources to the business unit’s budget. The discussion that developed with regard to 
projects 22 and 24 and later observation and documentation provide proof of such rule-
competition. In this case, the vice president who was responsible for these two projects 
recognized the situation as a decision-situation according to the formal set of rules and 
therefore evoked these rules in order to requesting more resources for his projects. This 
was accepted as being part of his identity as an appropriate decision-maker, which was 
in turn one of the identities constituting his collective self. The vice president was given 
the decision authority to make these decisions by himself, but this in itself was a devia-
tion from the rules. The chairman’s interpretation was not accepted by the vice presi-
dent and was in any case inconsistent since the report of the subsequent gate review dis-
closed that no changes had been made with respect to the end-date or resource alloca-
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tion of these projects. Moreover, the options that were realistically available to the vice 
president were limited since the resources to accelerate these projects could only come 
from their re-prioritization within the vice president’s portfolio. The situation, formally 
described as Portfolio Management Meetings (PFMMs), was no longer recognized as a 
decision situation by the vice president, which might explain his reason for allowing the 
development managers of his business unit participate in the next meeting, as well as his 
decision to leave the gate meeting two hours early. The last issue on the agenda was 
portfolio management. The vice president had the group identity imposed on him and 
was therefore subject to accepting the inappropriateness of evoking these particular 
rules. The vice president did, however, seem to have difficulties accepting this identity 
since he chose not to participate in the subsequent meeting35.  
To sum up, therefore, not only were the rules in SG inconsistent, due to the addition 
of a set of rules to monitor delay, but they were also subject to competition from another 
rule-regime. March explains this thus: 
 
Violations of rules due to inconsistent demands will increase as rules multi-
ply and become more complex, where coordination is weak, and where in-
dependent authorities have the right to impose rules (1994: 74). 
 
 Moreover, while the rules in the SG approach generally require decisions to be made, 
it does not however make sense for the participants to make decisions they presume will 
not be carried out by their colleagues and project managers. Motivation and acceptance 
are central issues in this respect, as was identified by the vice president albeit in the mis-
taken belief that killing a project was practically impossible in PD because of the exis-
tence of highly motivated and educated personnel. “It’s impossible to stop a project in 
R&D; people are very motivated and highly educated.”36 This in turn suggests that deci-
sions must be motivated in order to have an effect as a behavioral change. Similar ob-
servations could also be heard among the project managers:  
                                                 
35 It has been attempted to address the dynamics of appropriateness in figure 8.1 (and 8.2) by adding 
learning as a variable, but as such, is the dynamics of e.g. internalizing an identity not built-in which re-
mains an issue for future research.  
36 One vice president raised the problem of continuing a project which had formally been terminated be-
cause it did not have a project number cost allocation in SAP etc., but on the other hand revealed that pro-
ject descriptions could be so broad at PLASTIC that they did not say anything about the real content of 
the project in practice. A terminated project can easily be camouflaged without the portfolio-manager (or 
vice president) being aware of this. 
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Project manager: [laughing] we have also seen in this building up here that 
(50:46) when a scientist wants to work in this direction, he works in this di-
rection.  
 
Investigator: […] despite what has been decided? 
 
Project manager: Despite this. That is exactly what I meant, despite what 
has been decided […]. 
 
According to another project manager: 
 
If people are not participating in the project, then no matter how fine are the 
forms you have there is no way you are able to make a decision unless you 
have enough interest to listen to it and to take part in it […] I mean you can 
buy a technology now, you can buy people with the skills, you can buy a 
whole business area if you like, but you cannot buy the [0:50:34] scientist if 
he doesn’t want to be bought […] when a scientist wants to work in this di-
rection, he works in this direction [emphasis added]. 
 
March argues that “accepting an identity is a motivational and cognitive process” (1994: 
62), and as this citation suggests, the acceptance of rules is vital if the rules are to call 
forth the intended as prescribed by the normative system. A distinct output of a deci-
sion-meeting is important in the instrumental perspective, but the evidence indicates 
that an output from a gate meeting is viewed jointly with an evaluation of the behavioral 
change on the project management-level, so as not to become a ‘pseudo decision’ with 
no behavioral impact. With one exception, all projects that were terminated at the gate 
meeting had in fact been halted prior to the meeting and only once the vice presidents 
(and the project managers) had come to the conclusion not to pursue them any further. 
In this respect, it should be noted that it can take up to 14 days for the decision to be 
communicated to the project manager, an issue which also was raised at the gate meet-
ing. The vice presidents are, however, aware of the importance of motivation with re-
spect to decisions. As one of the project managers says: 
 
Yes, but you can twist the project in many ways and [34.03] it goes under 
[…] another project, so that is one of the challenges to get right in these un-
official things, and to get people to work on what we committed them to 
work upon. 
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Interestingly, the multiple identities that constitute the ‘collective self’ (March 1994) 
also encompass an identity that evokes a feeling of duty. Thus, for instance filling out 
templates in the databases and, in some cases, uploading the documentation required 
without accepting the role defined by the rule will nevertheless make a project manager 
continue in his/hers own direction according to another role that determines the behav-
iour of a proper project manager. In these situations, a difference emerges between what 
people say they do and they actually do afterwards. Similarly, Argyris and Kaplan 
(1994) analyzed another management technology, that of Activity Based Costing, and 
identified what they describe as both internal and external commitment to the manage-
ment technology in question. Within their own terminology it could be argued that the 
identity constituted by performing a duty is nevertheless based solely on external com-
mitment. In this respect, March argues that: 
 
[S]trong external threats or dramatic rewards can be used to explain behav-
ior without the need for internal commitment, so fail to stimulate internali-
zation (1994: 66).   
 
The information and documentation rules, particularly the former, might constitute a 
strong external incentive to the project manager who wants to upload information to the 
database so as to ensure that his/her project does not gain any attention (i.e. becomes red 
or yellow) on account of lacking information. On the other hand, the documentation 
rules are not followed to the same extent since the majority of project managers inter-
viewed had apparently learned that a lack of compliance did not necessarily lead to any 
negative sanctions other than the portfolio manager emphasizing improvements in this 
area at the beginning of the gate meeting. As a consequence, rule-following with respect 
to information and documentation increased by 11 percent from the September PFMM 
to the November-PFMM, but this could still be based on actions resulting from a sense 
of duty (contractual identities) rather than on internal commitment (internalized iden-
tity). Consequentially, March puts more emphasis on motivation through rewarding an 
identity than rewarding behavior:37 
 
                                                 
37 The managerial implications of this will be discussed in a forthcoming chapter.  
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People are asked, for example, to sign a petition to show they are ecology- 
or community-minded. The act is minor, but the interpretation of being a 
certain kind of citizen is made explicitly by outsiders. This is, of course, 
usually in the context of being rewarded for being that kind of citizen (1994: 
66-67). 
 
Finally, actors are more likely to fulfill identities where they see themselves as effec-
tive (March 1994). Here, the evidence suggests that it is more fulfilling for actors not to 
be concerned with being delayed, according to the distinct criterion of time, than to 
evoke rules where the necessary criteria are not fully understood, either due to their am-
biguity and or their conduciveness to manipulation. Compared to other criteria, time is 
therefore a more distinct criterion to mobilize.  
The vice presidents have different backgrounds, which fall into two broad categories: 
either economic or what can be described as ‘technical/chemical’. The vice president, 
who attempted to mobilize the portfolio management rules with respect to projects 22 
and 24 had a background in economics, but the majority of the vice presidents have 
gained their education at a technical university. Furthermore, the new portfolio man-
ager, who also had a technical/chemical background, argued for the impossibility of 
making post-calculations. Assuming this impossibility is a common perception among 
decision-makers at the gate meetings, where the economic criteria do not seem to be a 
legitimate rule for others to evoke if they do not have a background in economics. By 
this, it is however not being claimed that actors with the technical/chemical background 
cannot comprehend calculation, only that the criteria associated with this role is per-
ceived as more effective to apply and therefore more frequently evoked than other crite-
ria. This line of reasoning might be one motive for not introducing output control of the 
expected NPV calculation after the product has been launched. Instead, only sold kilo 
tons is monitored.  
 
(2) Observation of others 
As March notes, “An identity is a conception of self organized into rules for matching 
actions to situations” (1994: 61) and is fulfilled by observing others, since actors aim to 
be socially reliable. The gate meeting was one such occasion for participants to observe 
each other’s behavior and to confirm their interpretation of what ideally constitutes a 
decision-making situation. A member of the executive committee should have partici-
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pated through video-conference, but was unable to do so due to technical difficulties. As 
a consequence, the participants did not have an opportunity to observe a higher level of 
hierarchical behavior, but vice presidents are nevertheless aware that rule-deviation is 
not sanctioned by the executive committee. The same applies for the project managers, 
who observed that vice presidents did not use the uploaded information and documenta-
tion despite the fact that several projects had complete information and documentation 
available. 
 
(2b) How observation of others influences rule interpretation  
As already established, the decision situation does not involve portfolio management 
decisions but rather the attention that is being paid to whether each individual project 
complies with the calculable rules (must meet criteria). The formal rules do, however, 
force respondents to recognize the situation, also as a portfolio decision-situation – as 
became evident when interviewed about the gate meeting. In this sense, the set of rules 
prescribe how the situation ought to be recognized, but, on the other hand, social ap-
proval is also gained by fulfilling the identity that has been outlined above, since atten-
tion is directed outward toward the group rather than inward to the participants. A vice 
president reflects his self-image in other fellow vice presidents, confirming his interpre-
tation of the situation and the identity as a proper vice president rather than with the be-
havior of the member of the executive committee who did not participate (and might 
have required decisions). Furthermore, in order to be socially reliable with the group, 
inappropriate actions disrupting the distribution of resources were not undertaken, as the 
example of the vice president and projects 22 and 24 illustrate (see section 7.3.2 above). 
Social reliability could, however, have affirmed a new role for the vice president 
through the participation of the member of the executive committee and his potential 
efforts to evoke the rules that otherwise were perceived as inappropriate by the group of 
vice presidents at the gate meeting. As a consequence, one role of the vice president is 
to protect his budget and the resources of the business unit; a possible cut in projects 
would also mean a cut in resources. 
The rule-mobilization pattern for information and documentation rules was shown in 
figure 7.2 above, where it was indicated that documentation rules in particular were not 
followed and that a project manager could still indicate that a business plan has been 
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made although it had not been uploaded as the market plan. The project managers ob-
served that rules were deviated from in the gate meeting and furthermore recognized 
that it was a situations where portfolio management decisions were not to be made. 
Some project managers, however, were concerned at the outcome of the meeting, par-
ticularly if their projects had been designated as red, since they recognized that the 
situation constituted a formal check on project progress but necessarily one of being a 
decision situation. Moreover, the newly appointed portfolio manager suggested that a 
problem of motivation arose for project managers when vice presidents did not use the 
rules, as the project managers then observed that higher hierarchical levels deviate from 
rules as much as they observe their colleagues to do so. In sum, what rule is appropriate 
to use depends also on observation. Proper behavior is defined through observation and, 
consequently, establishes social reliability. 
 
(3) Contexts 
The company has a history of creating breakthrough innovations and has the reputation 
of being an innovative company (according to respondents). Many of the actors have 
already been part of the company’s merger with four other companies since it was es-
tablished in 1994. The respondents argue that different company cultures are no longer 
a problem, but that national differences can pose a problem particularly with regard to 
differing attitudes towards rule-following. The social context is to some extent influ-
enced by a corporate identity that has been implemented as a new set of corporate val-
ues, ideally to influence the behavior of actors. The interviewed respondents, however, 
suggested that these values are defined so generally that they cover just about every-
thing. Nevertheless, downsizing in R&D, the removal of decision authority, and the or-
ganizational placement of ‘D’ under the Business Units, indicated to the project manag-
ers that (long term) innovation was no longer considered a legitimate concern. Stretched 
resources and thus a lack of funds for experimentation together with the emphasis 
placed on customer-driven development by the business units suggests that PLASTIC is 
currently in a phase of exploitation rather than exploration (March 1994). The company 
has an operating profit of €85 million (2003), corresponding to 2.5 percent of the turn-
over, and all respondents – including project managers – argued that this constituted a 
serious problem for the future of the company. Project managers particularly from 
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R&D, however, maintained an attitude of resolving this issue through exploration since 
they believed that the key to future profits lay in radical innovation and the development 
of new products for other business areas currently not yet defined. This difference in 
attitudes between R&D and the business units might also be a reason why the issue of 
selling patent licenses is still unresolved at PLASTIC, which to R&D is crucially per-
ceived as a key to increasing profitability whereas the business units perceive the devel-
opment of new products as taking turnover away from existing sales. Finally, the actors 
perceive the context itself as ambiguous, which, for instance, sometimes makes it le-
gitimate to terminate a project that was considered technically infeasible. On the other 
hand, market reasoning does not seem to constitute the same legitimacy, perhaps in this 
case because of the vice presidents’ respective backgrounds.  
 
(3c) The influence of context on rule interpretation 
Many actors are influenced by the historical context of a company where exploration 
was once considered legitimate, but is now witnessing an increased focus on the short- 
term and exploitation. This is a possible reason why the vice presidents are focused on 
demonstrating short-term results, which, as a consequence, invariably lead actors to 
seek fulfillment of an identity rooted in securing their budget and their ‘own’ resources 
rather than concerned with the company as a whole. This would otherwise have made 
changes in resources legitimate through the mobilization of portfolio management rules, 
as can be seen in table 7.4, where the distribution or ratio of the portfolio is settled 
amongst the vice presidents. Moreover, whether radically new products can actually 
come out of the work of R&D is considered to be more a result of chance than deliber-
ate management on behalf of the vice presidents, even though respondents did not as-
sume that the rules impede any form of radical innovation instead of facilitating the in-
novation process. The vice presidents are in fact more focused on incremental customer-
focused developments which are undertaken in the business units as a substitute for 
push-based radical innovation from R&D. The overall impression of the company’s 
own interpretation of its situation is that of an attitude which is more fixed on exploita-
tion as a substitute for exploration. This also goes some way to explaining why the de-
sign of the new set of rules, including the disenfranchisement of project managers and 
the decision not to design rules that would facilitate portfolio decision-meeting e.g. the 
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should-meet criteria and the 10-point-Likert scale, illustrates the level of agreement and 
indeed disagreement between decision-makers in the gate meeting.38  
In conclusion, it seems to make more sense to the decision-makers to recognize the 
situation as one of exploitation and therefore seek to secure their ‘own’ portfolio. The 
mobilization pattern identified in table 7.1 is consequently intentional and does not arise 
as a result of, say, overlooking rules or deficiency in competence. This interpretation, 
moreover, seems to be stable, since it remained unchanged in the following meeting. 
Information from the latest PFMM-meeting, however, suggests that two new projects, 
which had been pre-approved prior to the meeting, were in fact not approved in the sub-
sequent meeting. This was the first attempt to initiate resource decisions approximately 
one-and-a-half years after the introduction of the new set of rules. Project managers also 
recognized the seriousness of the economic situation, which further influenced their 
identity and, together with the monitoring of possible delays, made their attempts to se-
cure the project according to the project plan more appropriate than reformulating the 
project altogether. Even when a better idea was developed in the course of the project, 
this was identified as problem by some project managers. In addition, the criterion of 
manufacturability was interpreted to include the appropriate number of test rules re-
quired.  
Moreover, since the context was often perceived as ambiguous, this necessarily had 
an influence on the criteria that were evoked during the September PFMM. Calculable 
rules, such as the expected NPV calculation, would have been one of the should-meet 
criteria enabling a closer analysis if the projects had been discussed in the gate meet-
ing.39 The actors in the meeting did not, however, raise any objection or even make a 
comment when one meeting participant stated baldly that “we can easily increase it”. 
This suggests that calculations are not treated as equivalent to the more complex reality 
they purport to represent, as was suggested by March: 
 
They create “magic numbers” (e.g., “profit”, “cost of living”) for complex 
phenomena, treating the numbers as equivalent to the more complex reality 
they represent (1988: 26). 
 
                                                 
38 For differences in the normative systems, see section 5.4. 
39 Refer to chapter two for a description of the normative system as outlined by Cooper et al. 
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As was also argued by a General Manager, the purpose of the new calculation rules (cri-
teria) was not to generate programmed behavior (Simons 1954) that conformed to rules 
within the instrumental perspective, but rather was not to: 
 
...produce precise calculations, but to influence the mind-set of people and 
make them think in terms of profitability. 
 
The numbers represents a complex reality to the vice presidents, but they still insist on 
project managers making these calculations. The immediate purpose is, however, not to 
produce rational calculations in the instrumental perspective, but rather to influence the 
identity of project managers, as is evidenced by the above quotation. This aim is differ-
ent from the normative rule system.   
 
(4) Learning 
The interpretation of rules is also influenced by learning. Rules do not fit all situations, 
and therefore require some fine-tuning through experiential learning in which the out-
come of actions forces actors to interpret rules and subsequently teaches them how to 
interpret rules when the next situation occurs (March 1994). In this study, this learning 
process could be identified with respect to both project managers and vice presidents. 
The latter learned that the problems relating to portfolio management were not resolved 
according to the formal rules. Instead of evoking these rules, however, which were in 
fact impeded by competing rules (see section 1 and 1a) and which were not recognized 
as a decision-making situation at the gate meeting, the portfolio manager designed new 
types of rules to regulate the problems. As previously analyzed, the vice presidents did 
not, however, possess sufficient competence in using these new rules and therefore did 
not evaluate them as appropriate either. Neither was the problem appropriate to solve.  
 
(4d) Learning, rule interpretation and application 
The application and interpretation of rules can be influenced by the complexity of rules 
and competence in using rules. A common criticism of project managers was the gen-
eral lack of training in the new rules, as well as the recognition that rules did not fit all 
situations and therefore had to be interpreted. As one respondent put it: 
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But after, say, three, four years of usage people had already realized how to 
use it effectively and that was, that was the thick book on how to use, PD&I, 
but only say one fourth of the book […]. 
 
Some project managers in fact learn when a deviation from the rule is more appropriate 
since the rules of the SG approach do not fit all projects in all situations either. In this 
way, a project manager claimed that his project was unique and went on to describe 
how he had wasted two months on market research, which ultimately proved the proc-
ess infeasible. This outcome did not, however, trigger the formal development of more 
elaborate rules or even the abandonment of this rule, as would have been expected. 
March indeed argues that rules are more likely to be deviated from when the rules are 
not easily changed, “Violations in the name of effectiveness are more likely when the 
rules are relatively rigid than when they are easily changed” (1994: 74). 
This citation emphasizes that performance (effectiveness) is an important issue when 
evoking performance arguments over, say, rules prescribing activities to be carried out. 
In this case, the experience of wasting two months led the project manager to suggest 
that he would henceforth seek the help of a more experienced project manager, and 
work out which rules to use before starting the project. The outcome of using that rule 
therefore made the project manager more discretionary in rule application. March 
(1994) suggests that the ‘hallmark’ of the experienced decision-maker is knowing when 
to deviate from the rules. The same can be observed at the project management-level 
where rigidity (not changeable rules) and insistence on formality in PLASTIC added to 
the complexity of working with projects in PD, and the hallmark of the experienced pro-
ject manager really was to know when to break rules. However, as one respondent testi-
fies, the rule of making a ‘business case’ in stage 2 was not compatible with all situa-
tions: 
 
I went through everything and I tried to do … I tried to do a market plan, 
which is impossible for my project, which it only turned out to be after I had 
tried it for two months (project manager). 
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Figure 8.2: How decision-making in practice is constructed by actors 
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As already mentioned, learning also took place for the portfolio manager where the prob-
lems associated with portfolio management were not solved. This in turn gave birth to a 
new set of rules to handle resource-allocation. At the time of the interviews, vice presidents 
had only limited competence in these new rules, but were generally very skeptical of them, 
maybe due to the inappropriateness of making resource decisions across business units and 
because of an awareness that the solution needed to be found elsewhere. Instead of evoking 
the existing rules, the portfolio manager designed a new set of rules to solve the problems 
through visibility in resource-constraints on the organization. As suggested previously, two 
new projects were terminated one-and-a-half years after the new set of rules had been in-
troduced into PLASTIC, and it seems an obvious conclusion to suggest that the vice presi-
dents will in turn deviate from these rules. Moreover, the vice presidents also learned that 
compliance with the €90 million goal was accomplished not by accelerating projects and 
maintaining the interpretation of deviation from the portfolio management rules, since these 
were not sanctioned. Most focus seemed to be placed on budget, which required each busi-
ness unit to manage resources according to their own interpretations. Social reliability was 
achieved by not disrupting the interpretation of the appropriate rule mobilization pattern. 
 
 
8.3 CONCLUSION 
 
The construction of appropriateness in PLASTIC is summarized in figure 8.2, where the 
boxes in grey represent a summary of the discussion above. Rules in the SG approach be-
come a management technology through actors. Actors base their actions, either intention-
ally or unintentionally, on achieving a match between what they interpret as appropriate 
when recognizing a situation with the identities defined. This line of reasoning is, however, 
different from the rationality inherent in the normative management technology, where ac-
tions are assumed to be conformed in accordance with prescriptions. As such, the rational-
ity claimed by the normative SG approach is derivative of appropriate rule application. 
Only if rules representing instrumental rationality are appropriate to evoke are they applied. 
Thus, it can make sense to actors in the organization not to follow the prescribed rules, as 
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the analysis suggests, but it can also make sense to follow the rules if they are considered 
appropriate, which seems to be the most widespread attitude amongst the project managers 
interviewed.  
 The instrumental rule perspective claims that some of the deviations can be ascribed to 
the design of the rules, but without the acceptance of actors, the rules in the SG approach 
become illusory. PLASTIC maintains the formality of rule-following, but at the same time, 
the company is in a phase of exploitation with respect to resources, which includes exploit-
ing the present portfolio of new projects and continuing to strain resources, to the extent 
that the required 20 percent allocated for experimentation is not made available. The proper 
behavior of the vice presidents is to focus on their own business unit and secure the neces-
sary budgets and resources, instead of concerning themselves with the company as a whole. 
Group identity is strong and one vice president who attempted to behave inappropriately 
while at the same time following the formal rules waived this undertaking and, to some ex-
tent, consequently had the group identity imposed upon him by way of sustaining social 
reliability.  
 Formality is maintained in PLASTIC, but it could prove a viable rule strategy to make 
rule-following a discretionary matter, which seems to be the appropriate interpretation in 
practice anyway. Instrumentality would, however, claim to increase not only elaborateness 
but also exhaustiveness, which, within this line of reasoning, would make the PD process 
more manageable through, for instance, the use of should-meet criteria. Interestingly, MA-
CHINERY seems to have accomplished manageability by paying attention to both perspec-
tives. The owner of the company was present during the gate meetings, and thus able to 
make decisions, and R&D was regarded with more legitimacy. A designated department 
was responsible for securing learning’s with rules and project managers were, moreover, 
expected to apply rules only as a guideline (appropriate to their project). Through this, ri-
gidity was avoided, even though the level of elaborateness (and exhaustiveness) was in-
creased simultaneously.  
It is obvious that one can speculate more about the possible implications and ramifica-
tions all this has for management. This will be the focus of the next chapter, which will also 
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return to the questions framed in the first chapter of this study in order to provide some an-
swers. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Conclusion and implications 
 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to return to the problem stated in the introductory chapter 
and formulate a conclusion and answers to the questions framed there. Moreover, the 
chapter will take the findings and the conclusion one step further by speculating about 
the implications for the management of PD processes and discussing the implications 
for theory and future research. Finally, the contributions are summarized. The chapter is 
structured accordingly.  
 
 
9.1 CONCLUSION 
 
Returning to the first question framed in the initial chapter of this study, the SG ap-
proach has been described. Conceptually, the PD process is a management technique 
dividing the PD process into distinct stages divided by gates (decision-making points) 
and prescribes the activities in the stages and gates that are necessary to undertake in 
order to achieve the promised performance, such as increased effectiveness and reduced 
time-to-market. The analysis suggested that prescribed activities which should be car-
ried out are more elaborate in the gates, but also that the research underlying the model 
was based more on instrumental research than a sociological understanding of actors 
and their behavior.  
The notion of bureaucracy and rigidity raised by the previous literature inspired the 
study to understand the SG approach as rules, which was underlined by the number of 
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similarities between the ideal Weberian bureaucracy and the normative, conceptual 
model of SG. The primary characteristic of a bureaucracy is rules and subsequently, the 
SG approach was translated into a set of rules as a way of understanding rules in the or-
ganizational practice surrounding PD. Standard operating procedures were introduced 
by Cyert and March (1992), and the analysis indicated that the set of rules in the SG ap-
proach could be aligned with the types of rules inherent in a standard operating proce-
dure. These authors, however, in the epilogue to their book, introduced the notion of 
appropriateness, but did not elaborate on the implications for the standard operating 
procedure based on this very notion, which is one of the contributions of this study. 
Thus, answering the second question framed in the first chapter of this chapter, formal 
rules in organizations can indeed be studied through the perspective of instrumentality 
inherent in an standard operating procedure and the ideal Weberian bureaucracy, but 
also through the perspective of appropriateness which enabled a behavioral understand-
ing of the relationship between actors and rules by which the activities are not automati-
cally conformed (Simon et al 1954). 
 The third question concerns the implications of the instrumental perspective. At – 
what was characterized as – the organizational level, three analyses were carried out. 
First, it was established that the five companies in question all employed an SG-
influenced model for designing the formal rules of their PD processes, but that variation 
could be detected with respect to the two dimensions of exhaustiveness and elaborate-
ness. Secondly, the formal and structured approaches appeared to provide the process 
with stability and predictability, but the rules were changed, however, two or three 
times in a ten-year time perspective when the companies had gained sufficient experi-
ence. Thirdly, some of the promised effects of the Weberian bureaucracy could be iden-
tified including the removal of ‘random’ projects and ‘friction’, but PLASTIC, in par-
ticular, could not remove lobbying, even though some friction had been reduced. Stabil-
ity could also be accomplished in the short term of two or three years. The company had 
recently reverted to a facilitated SG approach rather than the third generation and was 
the only company under investigation where rules were analyzed as very exhaustive and 
with a normal level of elaborateness. In addition, PLASTIC and PAINT were the only 
companies that met the requirement for formal compliance with the formal rules. The 
rules in PLASTIC were disclosed at the level accessible for investigation (limitations 
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were described in the initial study), and the detailed analysis of exhaustiveness pointed 
to a number of differences, such as that the rules of PLASTIC not included should meet 
criteria and therefore support consensus among decision-makers.  
The final question departed from the perspective of appropriateness. Among the find-
ings in the first chapter analyzed from this perspective was that the general attitudes to 
rules differed among the analyzed companies. Three companies viewed rules as guide-
lines, whereas at PLASTIC and PAINT rules must be followed obediently. Moreover, a 
variation with respect to gates, information and documentation and stages was identi-
fied. Rules seemed to be applied at the discretion of the project managers, whereas the 
gate rules and preparation of documentation were kept formal. Rules influence the iden-
tity of actors but not homogenously since differences could be identified among differ-
ent groups with different educations and departmental associations. The conclusion of 
the first appropriateness chapter was to argue that rule-‘following’ is a construction of 
which appropriate rules should be applied, rather than programmed activities shaped by 
rules (Simons, 1954). Building on this chapter, the next chapter first of all undertook an 
analysis of the variation in rule application and disclosed a rule mobilization pattern 
with respect to gates (38 percent), information and documentation rules (67 percent), 
and stage rules (40 percent). The percentages express the extent of rule-following and 
the difference to 100 percent is the deviation from rules. Subsequently, the chapter in-
vestigated rule deviations and attempted to explain why only some rules are followed 
whereas others are not. The analyses indicated that rules in the SG approach in particu-
lar create inconsistent demands, and rule-regimes from outside compete with the rules 
of the SG approach. Moreover, analyses in both chapters indicate that in some cases 
rules have to be fine-tuned to the situation, and the ambiguity omnipresent in PD makes 
some projects unique. The findings in PLASTIC also included the fact that problems 
not solved by the rules generated problems elsewhere in the organization. Yet even 
though rules are designed to cope with these problems, it may be inappropriate to solve 
them. Consequentially, rule-following in the instrumental perspective is subject to a ‘fil-
ter’ of appropriateness, and subsequently, the last analytical chapter attempts to under-
stand how appropriateness is constructed in PLASTIC but also to summarize the impli-
cations of applying the instrumental rules within the context of appropriateness. More-
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over, the aim of the last analytical chapter is to understand the rule mobilization pattern 
and point to possible explanations as to why rules are deviated from.  
Returning to the problem initially stated to guide this study, the rules in the SG ap-
proach do become a management technology through these very rules since they indeed 
shape the actors. The performance imperatives claimed to be an effect of SG can be 
achieved to some extent, but the management of the PD process does not seem to be as 
straightforward, however, as otherwise claimed by the normative literature and the 
management technique. Without recognizing members of the organization as actors pur-
suing another type of rationality than the instrumentality normatively inherent in SG, 
the technique becomes an illusory technology. The collective self of an actor consists of 
multiple identities that are dynamic and, furthermore, these identities are evoked under 
circumstances that must be made apparent if the PD process is to be managed. Rules 
require an interpretation of the context in which they are to be applied. As a result, dis-
cipline can result from an appropriate application of rules, but is not an automatic effect 
of formality and rigid rule employment. As such, the rationality inherent in the concep-
tual model of the SG approach becomes a derivative rather than an existential condition 
in PD. 
Companies maintaining the requirement to comply with the rules to the full experi-
ence resistance within the organization, since it makes sense to the actors in some situa-
tions not to follow the rules because the situation cannot be recognized as being in ac-
cordance with the rules, thereby making it more appropriate to apply other rules. More-
over, inconsistent demands can be placed on actors in PD, and the interpretation de-
pends on how actors identify themselves and recognize the situation. A particular model 
of appropriateness was developed based on the analyses of PLASTIC including the in-
terpretations of the situations and how and why actors identified themselves as they do. 
This model is also a contribution to the understanding of appropriateness, and does for 
instance disclose that the perception of situation of PLASTIC as severe makes the inter-
pretation of time-compliance more appropriate than securing manufacturability and 
freeing resources for experimentation. The situation of PLASTIC was interpreted as ex-
ploitation. The identity of the vice presidents as a group is strong and the interpretation 
of the situation is stable since the vice presidents – evoking an identity of mobilizing 
portfolio management rules whereby the projects could have been prioritized – waived 
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this undertaking in order to be socially reliable. Compared to the cross-case analysis, the 
analysis indicates that gates might be subject to rule-deviation more than stages. More-
over, some performance-monitoring rules can constitute such an external threat to the 
actors that the evoked identity is more contractual than internalized and subsequently 
without internal embedment because of a lack of commitment.  
In summary, the rules in the SG approach can become a management technology, but 
since the application of rules is determined by recognizing the situation, evoking or de-
fining a new identity, competence in applying the rules, motivation and commitment 
(see figure 8.1 and 8.2 in chapter eight).  
Previous research involving the SG approach focuses on decision-making functional-
ity, suggesting that the model is an impediment to creativity, and finally brings attention 
to the issue of rigidity. Furthermore, Hamel (2000) advocated that structured and for-
malized approaches like SG become ‘bureaucratic’ and therefore impede innovation. A 
return to decision-making rules is indeed influencing here. Also from an instrumental 
perspective in which projects are compared with the criteria prescribed by the rules, but 
which are inconsistent in practice influenced by ambiguity as an underlying condition, 
rules created inconsistent demands on the actors. Emphasis by the chairman of the meet-
ing is on consensus rather than disagreement which was explained by competition from 
another rule-regime. Performance measurement and performance focus were never a 
distinct purpose of this study, but the evidence seems to indicate that neither creativity 
nor innovation are impeded by rules. Quite the contrary, since the rule-mobilization pat-
tern showed 80 percent rule-deviation in the first two stages of the SG approach in 
PLASTIC. Respondents did not complain about a lack of ideas, even though it could 
appear so, since the deposits of the idea bank were the not usable, but complained about 
a lack of resources for making experimentation with these ideas in order to substantiate 
their validity as a viable idea. Returning to the issue of rigidity raised by the previous 
literature, rigidity is a complex phenomenon to comprehend and requires understanding 
from both perspectives. Cyert and March (1992) argue from the perspective of instru-
mentality that choice and control depend on the elaboration of standard operating pro-
cedures, and the data seem to support that more elaboration could reduce some com-
plexity. Furthermore, some problems are not solved, which moved the problems down-
ward in the organization. From the other perspective of appropriateness, rules are not 
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perceived as either rigid or bureaucratic by the actors if they are interpreted as appropri-
ate, which comes back to the model and what is required to make rule ‘following’ ap-
propriate.   
In conclusion, within the limitations previously described, it is claimed that innova-
tion can be managed through rules, but that making it work in an organizational practice 
is a complex undertaking, however. The management technique can become a technol-
ogy through the appropriate shaping of actors, which requires leadership rather than 
management since the keywords are commitment, identity and promoting an identity, 
rather than controlling behavior. Rules should be appropriate to ‘follow’. 
 
 
9.2 SPECULATING ABOUT MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
March et al (2001) presented four images of rules40: Rules as rational efforts to organ-
ize. This was the initial motive by top-management when employing the management 
technique and the motive for the design inherent in the conceptual model described in 
chapter two through the division of the PD process into phases and structured activities. 
Similarities between the SG approach and Weberian bureaucracy were also identified in 
chapter four. Rules as proliferating mechanisms that generate even more rules. Project 
managers learned that some projects are unique and therefore cannot be distinctly cate-
gorized into a set of rules, which in turn constitutes a new rule of not following the ex-
isting rules, but since only formal rules were subject to investigation, it is difficult to 
develop this further. Interestingly, however, based on an analytical approach41, new 
rules were designed in PLASTIC. The problems of no portfolio management and the 
evaluation of projects compared to other projects were solved by designing new rules, 
instead of following the formal rules ideally to solve these problems. The rules were 
inappropriate to evoke as the mobilization pattern showed in chapter seven, however. 
The evidence could suggest that rules generate more rules, since the new rules were de-
signed to solve an ‘old’ problem, and also indicated that the new rules became just as 
inappropriate to evoke since the problem in itself was inappropriate. Rules as construc-
tions of meaning have already been established in the previous chapter and in the dis-
                                                 
40 Please refer to chapter one. 
41 March (1994: 78) describes five processes by which the rules and environment are intertwined. 
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cussion above, for instance, with calculations, but the evidence does not support an 
analysis of whether an organization wants to be known for these rules. Nevertheless the 
CEO of MEDICO precisely stated that the reason for the success of innovation efforts 
(winning the innovation award 2002) was the military discipline by which they em-
ployed the SG approach. As chapter six indicates in particular, the practice surrounding 
PD differed somewhat, possibly indicating that at this company, rules were a symbol to 
the surrounding world. Rules as coding of history were precisely what was observed at 
PLASTIC. Rule dynamics were never an explicit subject of analysis, but the problems 
of too many projects were associated with the empowerment of project managers which 
was the reason for the new version of the set of rules for managing PD. To sum up, the 
four images described above propose an understanding of how rules are used through 
the two perspectives employed in this study: instrumentality and appropriateness.  
Within the appropriateness perspective, the role of management should be associated 
with leadership rather than control when the innovation process is to be managed. Bass 
& Stogdills argue that, “What leaders really manage in organizations are the employee’s 
interpretations or understanding of what goes in the organization,” (1990: 10, emphasis 
added). The perspective of appropriate rule application is precisely concerned with in-
terpretations, but particularly with recognizing the situation in which the actor finds 
himself matched with the definition of the identities possessed by each individual. In-
terpretation requires motivation and commitment and, moreover, actors are generally in 
constant pursuit of being socially reliable. The latter is observed by observing others 
and was a result of the different variables identified and described in the previous chap-
ter. As such, management techniques become a technology through leadership. Thus, it 
could be argued that insisting on formality and maintaining a structured approach, di-
viding the PD process within an instrumental perspective, is not the way to manage the 
PD process. As discussed in appendix F, the practice surrounding PD indicates that 
PLASTIC is integrating stages, yet formality is not upheld, although this is mandatory. 
This is remarkable, since the SG approach is associated with precisely these properties.  
Appropriateness revealed a complexity of rule ‘following’, but also that, for instance, 
MACHINERY had devised a number of anti-anti-programs (Latour 1991) in order to 
make the PD process manageable including the division of R from D with two distinct 
processes, particularly reducing the technical uncertainty of development. A department 
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was given the responsibility of ensuring learning with rules in order not to produce a 
perception of rigidity with the increasing elaborateness of rules which in turn reduced 
the level of complexity when managing projects, the participation of top-management in 
selected gate meetings (3 and 5, see appendix F), and a centralization of the R&D or-
ganization. Although stability was demonstrated as an instrumental effect in the short 
term (2-3) years it must be supported in a dynamic perspective where the learning is 
picked up, since standardization can only be accomplished to some extent and uncer-
tainty reduced. Ambiguity still makes some projects unique (see appendix H).  
Weber argued for the dehumanization of the ideal bureaucracy: “Je mehr sie sich ent-
menschlich[en], je vollkommener” (Weber 1972: 563). The ideal bureaucracy cannot be 
identified to a full extent due to ambiguity, and actors pursue another type of rationality, 
although rules actually influence the PD process. In Weber’s statement, the organization 
is more important than human beings. But the findings in this study indicate, however, 
that without recognizing people in organizations, the management of innovation through 
rules turns out to be an illusion. Rules influence identities (but organizational identity 
does not become homogenous), they impart meaning as a language, they are interpreted 
and some are followed unconsciously; some are followed in an interpretation whereas 
other rules are more appropriate to evoke. Moreover, mandatory rule application from 
an instrumental perspective does not seem to be an appropriate way to undertake the 
management of innovation through rules exemplified by the companies applying a third 
generation, compared to companies that insist on a second–generation, facilitated, SG 
approach, which PLASTIC reverted to.  
Finally, Davila (2000) requested more enquiries in the initial chapter on why control 
systems are important to performance, and although performance never was a distinct 
object of analysis, the evidence suggests that management control systems can affect 
performance through appropriate rule application. Even so, the relationship between 
control systems and performance can be much more complex than assumed by norma-
tive management techniques. The causal relationship is more indirectly shaped than di-
rectly – as also argued by Miller and O’Leary (2002) – through the interpretation proc-
esses described. Studying the appropriateness model can, within limits, be regarded as a 
contribution to management control in innovation since the focus has been on explain-
ing. Whether calculations can be precise in PD is still an unsettled issue, but as explic-
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itly argued by a respondent, the purpose of management control is through calculations, 
not precise calculations, but calculations that influence the mindset of actors to think in 
calculation: an example of indirect shaping.  
 
 
9.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The study has produced a number of implications for existing literature, which in turn 
point to further research in a number of areas separated in the two perspectives of ap-
propriateness and instrumentality respectively: 
 
9.3.1 Appropriateness 
Appropriateness was constructed in the previous chapter. The model of appropriateness 
proved to be quite complex, and it could prove to be an interesting path to pursue by 
mapping out the relationships between these variables in more detail than done here, 
including an observation of the project managers. The model was not particularly fo-
cused on the dynamics of appropriateness albeit learning was built-in, and a new role or 
an internalized identity will also have an effect on how rules are interpreted or which 
rules are evoked, which suggest that the model of appropriateness should be further ex-
plored with emphasis on dynamics.  
Furthermore, an attempt could be made to understand the “matching” of situations 
with identities and the search and recall process in which rules are applied more com-
prehensively. This could be a lifelong undertaking, but might be interesting since organ-
izational identity seems to be an increasing concern, also with respect to change and 
brand management. March (1994) argued that identities could be imposed but also cre-
ated, which suggests a closer understanding of the processes in the perspective of ap-
propriateness, particularly with actors in PD, perhaps through more psychological fo-
cused literature e.g. Weick (1979, 1982). Part of this analysis should include norms and 
informal rules in general, since these are one of the limitations to the study undertaken 
here. The findings indicate that the interconnectivity among rules is also important, 
since they compete for the actor’s attention. Yet they also indicate that the rules are in-
terconnected since problems can move around different organizational hierarchical lev-
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els without being solved, but also across organizational areas – like the financial re-
sponsibility of the business unit to R&D – and that seemingly functional areas far from 
each other compete for attention.  
The notion of ‘objective’ decision-making with ‘objective’ criteria was challenged 
by the findings of these studies. The information to be documented for decision-makers 
was compromised and, even though it was available, the information was not used by 
the decision-makers. Appropriate decision-making is much more complex, and it did 
not make much sense to the vice presidents to make decisions when they suspected the 
decision would not be executed, for instance. Consensus appears to be important to PD 
practice, by contrast with the normative theory on PD that emphasizes, for instance, that 
disagreement among decision-makers should be disclosed, and it could be interesting to 
pursue the role of consensus vs. non-consensus in decision-making even further. 
 
9.3.2 Instrumentality 
Instrumentalists might also take a further interest in appropriateness but would focus, 
for instance, on how long time it takes before an identity is imposed by a rule system. 
The SG approach, and probably many management techniques in general, is trans-
formed into a set of rules in an organizational practice, and instrumentalists would like 
to identify things like the limits of rules in the sphere of actors, which cues evoke which 
identities, etc. Moreover, the total numbers of procedures that actors can cope with 
would be of particular interest and raised a number of ‘design rules’ for employing 
management techniques in an organization. 
All investigated companies operate as B-t-B, and it would be interesting to have in-
cluded B-t-C companies in the investigation as well in an attempt to analyze whether 
contingencies such as industrial conditions are different if they are more volatile, for 
instance. In general, it might prove interesting to develop the contingencies and include 
performance issues more directly in the study. Moreover, rule application could be in-
vestigated, as could a linking of the balance between formal rules and norms with the 
competitiveness of the company. 
The evidence indicates that not all performance criteria (calculable rules) can be ap-
plied simultaneously to the same extent. Time appears to be the most important criteria 
to comply with at PLASTIC, due to the interpretation of the exploitation situation and a 
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short-term focus, demonstrating quick results, but which also may be due to a percep-
tion of this criterion as more distinct than other criteria that require interpretation. Qual-
ity could be compromised as the number of test runs, for instance, had been reduced, 
which in turn made resource management even more complex because more resources 
had to be allocated to fixing problems with products already launched on the market. 
Rosenau and Moran (1993) pointed out the problem of complying with all criteria si-
multaneously but did elaborate on the relationship between these variables, which could 
be an issue for further enquiry. 
The cross-case analysis conducted in chapter five (and six) could be further devel-
oped with a stronger focus on the differences among the case companies based on a 
contingency perspective (e.g. Lawrence and Lorsch, 1957). For instance, it could be in-
teresting to pursue the link between the strategy of the company and how they design 
structured and formal approaches to PD. Moreover, performance issues could be further 
elaborated and linked to how formal and structured approaches are applied also within a 
contingency perspective. 
 
 
9.4 CONTRIBUTIONS IN SUMMARY 
 
As in the first section of this chapter, the four questions raised in the first chapter (see 
section 1.4) are addressed by an accordingly structure where the contributions to each 
question are framed in summary based on what has been learned in this study. 
 
 
(1) What constitutes the SG approach and what issues have been raised regarding 
the approach in the previous literature? 
 
o Previous studies on SG were analyzed in chapter three and it was found that 
these studies have been dealing with the main issues of idea generation, rigidity, 
the division of the PD process in stages. These studies have been based on a 
number of different approaches such as single and multiple case studies, con-
sultant observations, and surveys – and almost all from a normative perspective. 
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o The contribution from the present work compared with prior studies is that my 
study makes an explicit theoretical standpoint (instrumental and appropriate per-
spectives), I study the SG approach in a "rule perspective", have done both ex-
ploratory multiple case studies and a in depth case study, and have included 
general observations and detailed observations from decision making situations 
(gate meetings) 
 
o The SG approach was analyzed (in chapter four) and was identified as: An ad-
ministrative management technique, based on sets of rules regarding information 
needed, calculations to be performed and how to make decisions. Overall one 
could characterize the SG approach as based on a rational choice model to be 
applied on the innovation and product development process (an engineering 
view). Thus, the present study represent a new approach to the study of SG by 
introduction of the appropriate perspective on decision making. 
 
 
(2) How can rules in organizations be studied? 
 
o The study of rules is not new in research on organizational behavior, but this 
perspective is new when studying management techniques for management of 
product development and innovation. In chapter four, previous research on or-
ganizational rules was outlined, and a framework for the study of "innovation 
rules" was derived. This is a contribution from the present work. The developed 
framework focuses on the study of rules by analyzing how rules are applied ap-
propriately to the PD process. The model presents important factors and some 
processes that can explain how organizations and decision makers make "appro-
priate" gate decisions. 
 
o Another contribution to the study of rules for product development management 
is the definition and application of two perspectives on rules: The instrumental 
perspective, and the appropriate perspective (in chapter four). 
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o The instrumental perspective is based on the assumption that actors follow ad-
ministrative rules in a programmed way (Simons, 1954) with ‘no questions 
asked’, ideally to the extent where the organization is dehumanized (Weber, 
1968). There are four types of instrumental rules: information, records and re-
porting rules, plans and planning rules and task performance rules which all 
could be aligned with the SG approach (see table 4.2). 
 
o The appropriate perspective is based on the assumption that individuals (or or-
ganizations) are assumed to ask the following questions: what kind of situations 
is this (recognition), what kind of person am I (identity), and a match between 
these two: what does a person a person like me do in a situation like this (rule 
application). March (1994) suggests the logic of appropriateness also is rational 
but however of another type than the instrumental perspective. 
 
o Also, a model for the study of how rules, organization and actors engage in the 
"appropriate decision making" is developed and presented in chapter seven and 
eight. This model is new in the study of organizational decision making and in 
the study of product innovation. The model is subsequently applied to analyses 
in chapter seven and eight.   
 
o The application of these two perspectives on rules in product development is 
new, and it is also new to apply two perspectives on the study of rules in the 
same study, but also a challenge for the researcher doing the research. 
 
 
(3) What are the implications of rules in an instrumental perspective? 
 
o Even if rules originates from same set of theoretical foundations, they are modi-
fied, adapted and implemented in different ways in companies, based on cross 
case analysis. The actual design and use can differ in various ways, but it seems 
that one significant driver for the design and re-design (changes in rule regimes) 
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are managers concerns about strategic (re) orientation(s). Rule development, de-
sign and modification becomes related to strategic issues, and rule design are 
used as one way that management can influence organizational orientation by in-
fluencing mindsets of actors and their behavior.  
 
o Rules produce some organizational effects. Stability, predictability, reduction of 
political “friction” (Weber, 1968) was accomplished to some extent as the evi-
dence illustrates within a 2-3 years timeframe (based on multiple cases). 
 
o Rules does however not create an administrative bureaucracy in product innova-
tion since rules are applied on a discretionary basis based on four possibilities 
towards rules: (1) refuse, (2) interpretation, (3) find alternative rule, and (4) de-
velop a new rule.  
 
 
(4) What are the implications of rules in a perspective of appropriateness? 
 
o Rules become a management technology through appropriateness as showed in 
figure 8.2 (see chapter eight) where the application of rules depends on the illus-
trated variables including social interaction with other actors.  
 
o The shaping of appropriate decisions on product development are processed ac-
cording to rules, but influenced by how various actors makes interpretations of 
the organizational setting, strategic situation and organizational setting, while at 
the same time considering how other actors are behaving, what common practice 
is and how the actual obedience (or negligence) to rules makes them a respected 
member of the organization and group. Even rather "clear" rules are subject to 
such interpretations, and established and created norms about appropriate behav-
ior seems in many situations to be of higher importance than the official poli-
cies, e.g. the norm that divisional managers does not interfere on projects in di-
visions controlled by other managers, even if these projects does not comply 
with important requirements in the rules. 
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o Miller and O’Leary (2002) suggested that technologies of management “shape 
or influence them [actors]”, and the logic of appropriateness developed in figure 
8.2 with respect to rules in product innovation, has made the relationship (shap-
ing) between actors and management tools more sophisticated through the insti-
tutional mechanisms on rules within the social collectivity. 
 
o Using the notion of technologies of managing (versus management techniques) 
has been especially developed in management accounting, but has not prior been 
used to study management of product development. The concept has helped to 
distinguish more clearly between management techniques (mostly studied in an 
instrumental perspective and the technologies of managing (here studied through 
the lenses of appropriateness).  
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Appendix A 
 
 
Overview empirical activity  
 
 
Date Activity Position h Documentation pp.3 Firm 
24.09.04 Reporting the 
findings and 
conclusions 
Different top 
positions 
1 Recording  - PLASTIC 
09.03.04 Car meeting and 
coffee in airport 
New portfolio 
manager 
1 N/A (no rec.)6 - PLASTIC 
11.02.04 IW, R&D Site Project manager 1 Recording - PLASTIC 
11.02.04 IW, R&D Site Project manager 1 Recording - PLASTIC 
11.02.04 IW, R&D Site Product 
Development 
Mgr 
1 Recording - PLASTIC 
12.12.03 Observation, HQ Various 1 Handwritten field 
notes,   
recording  
6 PLASTIC 
24.11.03 Observation, 
Portfolio Meeting 
Different top 
positions 
5 Handwritten 
notes,  
recording  
5 PLASTIC 
13.11.03 Telephone 
interview 
VP BU  ½ Recording - PLASTIC 
10.11.03 Telephone 
interview 
General Mgr 
Asset PP 
1 No rec.1, notes 
reconstructed 
(attempt) 
1 PLASTIC 
05.11.03 Interview, site 
visit 
Project Mgr. 
(long range) 
1 Recording  
Transcribed 
 
32 
PLASTIC 
05.11.03 Interview, site 
visit 
Group leader 1 Recording  
Transcribed 
 
42 
PLASTIC 
05.11.03 Interview, site 
visit 
Plant Dev. Mgr. 1½ Recording  
Transcribed 
 
54 
PLASTIC 
05.11.03 Interview, site 
visit 
Project Mgr & 
Group Leader 
1 Recording  
Transcribed 
 
48 
PLASTIC 
04.11.03 Interview, site 
visit 
Project Mgr 1½ Recording  
Transcribed 
 
42 
PLASTIC 
04.11.03 Interview, site 
visit 
Controller 1 Recording  
Transcribed 
57 PLASTIC 
04.11.03 Interview, site 
visit 
Group leader & 
Task Mgr 
1 Recording  
Transcribed 
 
47 
PLASTIC 
04.11.03 Interview, site 
visit 
Head of pilot 
plant 
1 Recording  
Transcribed 
 
41 
PLASTIC 
03.11.03 Interview, site 
visit 
Head of R&D, 
one country 
1½ Recording  
Transcribed 
 
71 
PLASTIC 
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03.11.03 Interview, site 
visit 
Project Mgr & 
Group Leader 
1½ Recording  
Transcribed 69
PLASTIC 
03.11.03 Interview, site 
visit 
Project Mgr 1 Recording  
Transcribed 45
PLASTIC 
21.10.03 Follow up 
meeting 
HR Mgr R&T 1½ N/A - PLASTIC 
21.10.03 Telephone 
interview 
General Mgr 
Asset  
1 Recording  
Transcribed 
20
PLASTIC 
21.10.03 Telephone 
interview 
VP BU  1 Recording  PLASTIC 
16.10.03 Telephone 
interview 
Chieff Scientist 
R&D  
1 Recording  PLASTIC 
13.10.03 Telephone 
interview 
VP R&D ½ Recoding  
Transcribed 18
PLASTIC 
13.10.03 Telephone 
interview 
VP BU 1 Recoding  
Transcribed 20
PLASTIC 
08.10.03 Telephone 
interview 
Chief Scientist 1 Recording  
Transcribed 24
PLASTIC 
12.09.03 Observation, 
Portfolio Meeting 
Different top 
positions 
5 Recording  
Transcribed 
Handwritten 
notes 
170
7
PLASTIC 
10.09.03 Presentation of 
project, R&D 
management 
meeting 
Different top 
positions 
1 N.a. PLASTIC 
24.06.03 Start up meeting Portfolio manager 
HRM Mgr R&T 
Database-
designer 
1½ Recording 
Handwritten 
notes 
5 PLASTIC 
13.06.03 Telephone 
conference 
Portfolio manager 1 Handwritten 
notes 
3 PLASTIC 
03.12.01 Interview Project Manager 1 Transcribed2 
 
20 MACHIN
ERY 
03.12.01 Interview Project Manager 1 Transcribed2 
 
25 MACHIN
ERY 
03.12.01 Interview + 
presentation of 
the SG approach 
Process Manager 2 Transcribed2 
 
51 MACHIN
ERY 
23.11.01 Interview Project Manager 1 Transcribed2 
 
18 PAINT 
07.11.01 Interview Project Manager 1 Transcribed2 
 
19 MEDICO 
24.10.01 Interview5 Project manager 1 Transcribed2 
 
23 CONTRO
L4 
16.10.01 Interview Project Manager   Transcribed2 
 
19 MEDICO 
11.10.01 Interview5 R&D Mgr 1½ Transcribed2 27 PAINT 
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11.10.01 Interview R&D Mgr 1 Transcribed2 
 
16 INGREDI
ENTS 
09.10.01 Interview5 Research Mgr 1 Transcribed2 
 
17 CONTRO
L4 
 
1 Technical problem with recording device; only investigator’s voice recorded. 
2 Recorded with cassette: no digital recording. All other recordings are digitally. 
3 Approximately 1,062 pages transcribed interviews (800 single-case study and 235 
pages multiple-case study) 
4 Interviews were conducted with a Medico firm not formally applying a SG approach. 
The firm was very focused on research and the early stages of the SG approach and our-
sourced the development of new drugs to global companies. Development was also 
conducted in a gate process because of the governmental requirements e.g. on testing on 
humans. Interestingly, the firm applied informal controls of research by employing 
people with the same background (pharmacists) instead of doctors who were claimed to 
have hierarchical training. The company did not want subordination. The data indicated 
that that it made no additional empirical points to include a company with no formal 
rules, since the focus was on formal rules and not for instance norms, which however 
would have required this kind of company. 
5 With Professor John K. Christiansen. 
6 Impossible to record because of noise in my car (21 years old); the talk was undertaken 
by driving the new appointed (Feb 1st, 2004) portfolio manager to Copenhagen Airport 
(CPH) from Corporate Headquarters. 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Nodes used for coding in Nvivo  
 
NVivo revision 2.0.163  
Licensee: Claus Varnes 
Project: PLASTIC  
User: Administrator Date: 30-08-2004 - 18:01:32  
 
NODE LISTING 
 
Nodes in Set: All Nodes 
Created: 13-10-2003 - 13:24:08 
Modified: 13-10-2003 - 13:24:08 
Number of Nodes: 79 
 
4 (100) /RULE DESCRIPTION 
5 (100 1) /RULE DESCRIPTION/Comparison SG and PLASTIC 
6 (100 1 1) /RULE DESCRIPTION/Comparison SG and PLASTIC/Stages 
comparison 
7 (100 1 2) /RULE DESCRIPTION/Comparison SG and 
PLASTIC/Info+docu comparison 
8 (100 1 3) /RULE DESCRIPTION/Comparison SG and PLASTIC/Gate 
rule comparison 
9 (100 2) /RULE DESCRIPTION/Rule description gates 
10 (100 3) /RULE DESCRIPTION/Stage rule description 
11 (100 13) /RULE DESCRIPTION/Info+docu rule description 
 
12 (200) /RULE APPLICATION 
13 (200 1) /RULE APPLICATION/Gate rule application 
14 (200 2) /RULE APPLICATION/Stage rule application 
15 (200 3) /RULE APPLICATION/Info-docu rule application 
 
16 (300) /RULE INFLUENCE 
17 (300 1) /RULE INFLUENCE/Competence 
18 (300 2) /RULE INFLUENCE/Identity influence by rules 
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19 (300 3) /RULE INFLUENCE/Decision-making 
20 (300 4) /RULE INFLUENCE/Rule regime competition 
21 (300 5) /RULE INFLUENCE/Innovation rules competition 
22 (300 7) /RULE INFLUENCE/New rules 
23 (300 15) /RULE INFLUENCE/Bureaucracy 
24 (300 25) /RULE INFLUENCE/Ambiguity 
25 (300 32) /RULE INFLUENCE/Implementation 
26 (300 33) /RULE INFLUENCE/Idea generatioon+Creativity 
 
27 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003 
28 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 10 
29 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 11 
30 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 12 
31 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 14 
32 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 15 
33 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 16 
34 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 17 
35 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 18 
36 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 19 
37 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 2 and 3 
38 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 20 
39 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 22 and 24 
40 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 23 
41 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 25 
42 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 27 
43 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 28 
44 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 29 
45 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 30 
46 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 31 
47 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 32 
48 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 33 
49 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 34 
50 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 35 
51 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 36 
52 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 37 
53 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 38 
54 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 39 
55 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 4 
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56 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 40 
57 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 41 
58 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 42 
59 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 43 
60 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 46 
61 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 47 
62 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 5 
63 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 50 
64 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 59 
65 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 6 
66 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 60 
67 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 62 
68 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 63 
69 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 66 
70 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 67 
71 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 68 
72 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 69 
73 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 7 
74 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 70 
75 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 71 
76 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 72 
77 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 8 
78 .PFMM Sep 12, 2003.Project 9 
79 .PLASTIC 
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Appendix C 
 
 
Interview guide single-case analysis, non decision-makers  
 
1. The respondent 
 
- Date of interview (IW) 
- Name of the respondent 
- Title 
- Position, duties 
- Number of years with the company 
- Number of years with that position 
- Former education 
- Formal education 
 
2. Company situation 
 
- Describe how you perceive the current situation of the company? (Market and 
customers, strategic challenges, technological and innovation challenges, 
financial situation, managerial and management control issues, competence 
related challenges etc.). 
 
3. Information and documentation [documentation rules] 
 
- How is information organized?  
- What is level of availability of information?  
- Are all relevant of information made available for decision-making? 
- Are all information explicitly documented? 
- Are all information used? (Are all documented information used?). 
- Is it possible to compile all information for decision-making? 
- Is it necessary to document information? 
- In your experience, what is the link between the documentation and the quality 
of decisions? 
- What is the quality in decisions?  
 
4. Decisions [decision rules] 
 
- Are decisions made as usual? 
- Are the goals explicit and easy to understand? What are they? And are they 
hierarchical?  
- Are all alternatives (in your opinion) for reaching the goals expressed in the 
formal setting?  
- Is it possible to comprehend the consequences of the alternatives? 
- What criteria are applied when evaluating the project?  
- Do criteria’s have the same weight? Are new criteria added?  
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- Describe the outcome of the formal meeting? 
- What was the outcome of the meeting (relevant)? (Has a project ever been 
terminated?) 
- Are all relevant persons participating in formal meetings? 
- (In your opinion) what are the consequences of the decisions made 
- In what way do you feel formal decision-making is useful? 
- Are decisions influenced by other rules/procedures within the organization? 
- Is time a pressure on decisions and if so, what are the consequences on decision-
making? 
 
5. Influence [of rules] 
 
- Are the preferences stable over time or can a decision suddenly be looking less 
attractive later on? If ‘yes’ what happened? 
- In your experience are the decisions made relevant and precise? 
- Are the decision made a representation of consensus among the meeting 
participants? 
- What are the greatest challenges of decision-making in product development? 
- Do you believe that the formal meetings have en influence on the activities taken 
place within the R&D department? 
- Have a formal meeting ever been skipped and if ‘no’ why are the formal 
meetings of particular importance for product development? 
- In your opinion what are the effects of having a management system for product 
development? 
- In your opinion, is the decision made corresponding to the feeling in the team 
(would they have made the same decision)? 
 
6. Competences/learning (rule change) 
 
- Why was the Innovation Process redesigned? 
- What have been changed? Describe the differences between the old innovation 
processes compared to the new IP? 
- Was the change part of a conscious improvement process? 
- (In your opinion) is the company in need of an entirely new or even better way 
of organizing the product development process (problems that are not solved 
with the new process)? 
- In your opinion, does the R&D organization gain competence in working with 
the procedure for product development?  
- If so’ has this competence gain ever resulted in new rules (procedural changes) 
besides the recent change in the new Innovation Process? 
 
5. Resources, evaluation and performance measurement 
 
- What are the relation between the strategic goal and the development activities? 
(close, ongoing discussed, not open for debate) 
- What is the role of considerations concerned with starting and prioritizing 
development activities? (is the relationship between the necessary and present 
resources considered) 
- Are the development activities monitored in terms of performance? (what, how, 
when) 
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- Does a final evaluation of the development activities take place? 
- How would you evaluate the benefits of the development activities in company 
today (do the activities bear up with the resources used? Do they contribute?)? 
- How would you evaluate the results and benefits of product development 
(satisfactory, room for improvement etc.)? And describe the results in terms of 
time-to-market, effectiveness, and efficiency.  
- Does the R&D department become continuously better in achieving the 
specified goals of NPD? 
- Have radically new products come out of the process or is it more gradual 
improvements? 
- What formal methods and tools are applied for planning, reporting, and 
management of individual development activity?  
 
8. Future and wishes 
 
- In your opinion, what are the substantial challenges in NPD today? (does anyone 
agree on this?). 
- Are dilemmas apparent and/or in conflict in relation to coordination of 
development activities (describe)? 
- What would you change – if you could (without asking others or agree with 
them)  
- (In your opinion) has something relevant not been addressed with the questions 
asked and do you like to add anything? 
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Appendix D 
 
 
Interview guide single-case analysis, gate participants (decision-makers)  
 
1. The respondent 
 
- Date of interview (IW) 
- Name of the respondent 
- Title 
- Position, duties 
- Number of years with the company 
- Number of years with that position 
- Former education 
- Formal education 
 
2. Company situation 
 
- Describe how you perceive the current situation of the company? (Market and 
customers, strategic challenges, technological and innovation challenges, 
financial situation, managerial and management control issues, competence 
related challenges etc.). 
 
3. Information and documentation [documentation rules] 
 
- How is information organized?  
- What is level of availability of information?  
- Are all relevant of information made available for decision-making? 
- Are all information explicitly documented? 
- Are all information used? (Are all documented information used?). 
- Is it possible to compile all information for decision-making? 
- Is it necessary to document information? 
- In your experience, what is the link between the documentation and the quality 
of decisions? 
- What is the quality in decisions?  
 
4. Decisions [decision rules] 
 
- Are decisions made as usual? 
- Are the goals explicit and easy to understand? What are they? And are they 
hierarchical?  
- Are all alternatives (in your opinion) for reaching the goals expressed in the 
formal setting?  
- Is it possible to comprehend the consequences of the alternatives? 
- What criteria are applied when evaluating the project?  
- Do criteria’s have the same weight? Are new criteria added?  
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- Describe the outcome of the formal meeting? 
- What was the outcome of the meeting (relevant)? (Has a project ever been 
terminated?) 
- Are all relevant persons participating in formal meetings? 
- (In your opinion) what are the consequences of the decisions made 
- In what way do you feel formal decision-making is useful? 
- Are decisions influenced by other rules/procedures within the organization? 
- Is time a pressure on decisions and if so, what are the consequences on decision-
making? 
 
5. Influence [of rules] 
 
- Are the preferences stable over time or can a decision suddenly be looking less 
attractive later on? If ‘yes’ what happened? 
- In your experience are the decisions made relevant and precise? 
- Are the decision made a representation of consensus among the meeting 
participants? 
- What are the greatest challenges of decision-making in product development? 
- Do you believe that the formal meetings have en influence on the activities taken 
place within the R&D department? 
- Have a formal meeting ever been skipped and if ‘no’ why are the formal 
meetings of particular importance for product development? 
- In your opinion what are the effects of having a management system for product 
development? 
- In your opinion, is the decision made corresponding to the feeling in the team 
(would they have made the same decision)? 
 
6. Competences/learning (rule change) 
 
- Why was the Innovation Process redesigned? 
- What have been changed? Describe the differences between the old innovation 
processes compared to the new IP? 
- Was the change part of a conscious improvement process? 
- (In your opinion) is the company in need of an entirely new or even better way 
of organizing the product development process (problems that are not solved 
with the new process)? 
- In your opinion, does the R&D organization gain competence in working with 
the procedure for product development?  
- If so’ has this competence gain ever resulted in new rules (procedural changes) 
besides the recent change in the new Innovation Process? 
 
5. Resources, evaluation and performance measurement 
 
- What are the relation between the strategic goal and the development activities? 
(close, ongoing discussed, not open for debate) 
- What is the role of considerations concerned with starting and prioritizing 
development activities? (is the relationship between the necessary and present 
resources considered) 
- Are the development activities monitored in terms of performance? (what, how, 
when) 
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- Does a final evaluation of the development activities take place? 
- How would you evaluate the benefits of the development activities in company 
today (do the activities bear up with the resources used? Do they contribute?)? 
- How would you evaluate the results and benefits of product development 
(satisfactory, room for improvement etc.)? And describe the results in terms of 
time-to-market, effectiveness, and efficiency.  
- Does the R&D department become continuously better in achieving the 
specified goals of NPD? 
- Have radically new products come out of the process or is it more gradual 
improvements? 
- What formal methods and tools are applied for planning, reporting, and 
management of individual development activity?  
 
8. Future and wishes 
 
- In your opinion, what are the substantial challenges in NPD today? (does anyone 
agree on this?). 
- Are dilemmas apparent and/or in conflict in relation to coordination of 
development activities (describe)? 
- What would you change – if you could (without asking others or agree with 
them)  
- (In your opinion) has something relevant not been addressed with the questions 
asked and do you like to add anything? 
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Appendix E 
 
 
Templates to be used as preparation for the gate meeting by vice presidents  
 
Stage Gate Transfer Approval
Project name IPNr. Status*
From**Launch to Final
Key deliverables in finalised Stage Target Result
• …………..
• ………………...
• …………………..
• ……………………...
• ………………………..;
……………...
……….
…………
………
………...
………...
………...
………
…………
………...
………
...
** Indicate CD to DD or DD to Launch or Launch to Final         * drag colour corresponding with project progress status
………..
…………..
M€ exp NPV
see checklist in IP Bordocs
…………..
Stage Gate review criteria Signed***off Comment
Innovation process checklist run
Business case updated
Launch plan updated +Step 1
Plant Test run approved by Asset Dev Mgr
Commercial production approved
PM
MM
MM
ADM
ADM
End of Launch approved by Commercial Mgr CM
…………..Final Report and post learning to Portfolio Mgr PFM
*** 
Mark      
to   
confirm  
done
Concept
Develop-
ment
Detailed
Develop-
ment
Launch Review
………..
 
Innovation Project candidate summary “Title”
Notes: graphic: copy paste picture from Business case / project team members by name or function otherwise
Project description
? ……..
? ……..
? ……..
? ……..
Resource requirements
Key characteristics
? Technology platform: HP Autoclave
? Recom. Project manager: ………………...
? Exp. NPV (€ M): 5
? Forward looking IRR (%): -
? Strategic fit: 2
? Probability of success.: 60%
? Investment total (M€): 0.75
? Project start: 01/04/2003
? Launch date: 31/09/2004
? Launch end : 31/05/2005
Project team FTE 03 04 05 06 07
- 1 ,0
0 ,0
1 ,0
2 ,0
3 ,0
4 ,0
5 ,0
6 ,0
7 ,0
8 ,0
2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7
M  E U R
Cash Flow
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Appendix F 
 
 
INTEGRATION OF STAGES  
 
The first implication relates to the coordinative mechanism, which was mentioned in 
chapter four and formally regulates whether stages are allowed to overlap and gates 
therefore not are enforced. In PLASTIC, no formal rules directly prohibit overlapping in 
the stages, but the intention was clearly by the rule makers to secure objective decision 
making by dividing the process into distinct stages which ideally should enable 
objective decision-making on new projects. The organizational praxis surrounding PD 
discloses, however, that the behaviour of actors in some cases are concerned with 
integrating the activities rather than keeping them separate otherwise required by the 
formal system, The instrumental perspective would ascribe this to the design of rules 
and probably argue that the two timelines between the gate meetings and the progress of 
the individual project enforces an integration in practice rather than attempting to secure 
distinct stages and based on this learning change the rule. One project that skipped a 
stage (and therefore also a formal decision point) was encouraged rather than sanctioned 
by the vice presidents (maybe also because it was delayed).  
From the appropriateness perspective, vice presidents are making decisions prior to 
and after the gate meeting, reasoning that the time-to-market criterion is more 
appropriate than awaiting formal decisions. This issue was raised by the literature 
(Ottosson 1996; Jenkins et al. 1997; Perel 2002). Not to stop a project and await a 
decision, seems to be a logic inherent in the identity of the actors in PLASTIC and made 
more sense to them than following the rules of making portfolio decision-making which 
would require all projects to be stopped prior to the meeting and all information and 
documentation uploaded to databases including the expected NPV calculation and 
business plan. Moreover, the physical production system is mobilized when confusion 
on the current status of the project in terms of stages is to be comprehended. In that 
sense, the physical plants, test plant and the laboratories are competing with the 
administrative management system since these also can be an actant (Latour, 1991). 
Takeuchi and Nonaka (1996: 137) argued for abandoning a “sequential approach” to PD 
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but in his most recent work, Cooper (2002b) does maintain the requirement for distinct 
gates where stages are stopped while awaiting decisions.  
The issue seems to be unsettled but PD practice analyzed in this study seems to 
suggest that an implication for management could be that the gates prior to development 
(gate 3 in the conceptual model) and before launch (gate 5 in the conceptual model) is a 
particular concern whereas everything else prior to gate 3 and also between 3 and 5 is 
could be more relaxed. Moreover, vice presidents in PLASTIC rely on the project 
managers to kill a project themselves in accordance with the criteria formulated by the 
project managers themselves more in line with the IPD approach accentuated by 
Anderson (1996)42  based on contractual empowerment although the contract not is 
formal.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 Refer to chapter three. 
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Appendix G 
 
 
CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION 
 
The second implication is concerned with a distinction between creativity and 
innovation (Levitt 2002). A standardized format was addressed by Smith and others 
(1999), Shaw and others (2000), Hughes and Chafin (1996), Stevens and others (1999) 
and Perel (2002), when criticizing the SG approach for not being creative and fuzzy in 
the front end, which however not can be substantiated in the single-case analysis of 
PLASTIC. Rather, as argued by Buggie (2002), the notion can be supported here, that 
fuzziness is occurring at the front-end of the SG approach in PLASTIC (first two 
stages), which relates to the low level of rule-following as established in previous 
chapter (20 percent rule-following), the MATT-process (downsizing of R&D), and the 
lack of responsibility by business units for mobilizing the rules in the first two stages 
(pre-portfolio) for instance in the first stage where ideas must be selected and inventors 
rewarded.  
In this respect, Hamel (2000) advocates that new opportunities not can be facilitated 
by structured and formal approaches applied in innovation because they become 
‘bureaucratic’, but the evidence indicates that the level of radicalism in new ideas and 
number of new ideas not negatively are influenced by the SG approach, but on the other 
hand not is supported – since rule-deviation in the gate meetings not produced any kill 
decisions and freed the necessary resources for the 20 percent of time assumed to be 
free for specifically idea generation and very preliminary experimental work. In this 
respect, it should however be mentioned that one project manager explicitly argues that 
the deadline impedes creativity as the project moves closer to the deadline since entirely 
new ideas to design the project, not can be exploited if the deadline is to be complied 
with (although the rules supports this).   
Compliance with time-limits is an imposing identity on actors in PLASTIC which 
was the opposite point-of-view in the conceptual SG approach earlier described, where 
quality is emphasized over time. The conceptual SG approach reasons that time-to-
market is reduced by looking at all projects as one entity and can be reduced since 
 MANAGING PRODUCT INNOVATION THROUGH RULES 222
unprofitable projects are filtered away. The logic inherent in the conceptual approach 
suggests that by focusing on quality in producing information, little rework is needed as 
the project progresses and projects not eligible are terminated. Normatively, the SG 
approach is an administrative management system for securing no stages were skipped, 
decision-making is objective and undertaken in a manner ‘killing’ ideas not profitable 
enough (compared to others) - and thereby facilitating the innovation process but is not 
assumed to be a creativity management system and also emphasized by the appointed 
vice president of R&D43: 
 
Because this process, if not – managed carefully – is also an excellent killer 
of ideas. You have actually organized the killing of ideas – if talking very 
careful management – and that’s why I think the decision-makings – should 
be much more decision-making meetings and really understand what you 
decided or not. And maybe stop some of the [30.37] development are room 
for some of these very innovative things, but that will be the success or the 
failure of the innovation process. If we manage to let some of these very 
innovative things come through or not […] the process will not contribute 
with generating ideas. The process will only allow dealing with ideas in a 
proper way - generation has to be stimulated through the organization and 
through the people, but the process as such will not generate any ideas. It 
will only support ideas generated or not. 
 
The assumption underlying the ideal SG approach is that the both push and pull 
driven ideas can be administered in the process from idea to launch. PLASTIC is 
experiencing problems with the input of new projects as emphasized by several 
respondents on both the project management- and vice president-level, and the literature 
mentioned above (Smith and others 1999; Shaw and others 2000; Hughes and Chafin 
1996; Stevens and others 1999; and Perel 2002) would claim that formal and structured 
approaches are killing too many ideas. However, this claim cannot be supported here 
based on the evidence available, which indicate that the problem not is the termination 
of ideas, but instead the link between the idea and the process into the administrative 
system which is to managed by the business units in PLASTIC. Moreover, this is an 
indication of an avoidance to make kill decisions since the decision makers not are 
aware which projects will be radical and therefore will avoid this decision in order to 
allow these (unidentified radically) projects to pass.  
                                                 
43 The R&D vice presidency was vacant until February 1, 2004. 
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In summary, the administrative system is an innovation system and as such not 
concerned with producing creativity. In addition, evidence does not suggest that 
creativity is impeded by the rules. Rather vice-versa. A possible implication to 
management is that they avoid enforcing rules, but the set of rules in PLASTIC has 
however yet to prove that radically new products can come out of the process. An 
instrumental response in this respect is to add criteria for measuring the level of 
radicalism in new products44.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 This type of criteria was not among the criteria in the normative system previously described in chapter 
two. 
 MANAGING PRODUCT INNOVATION THROUGH RULES 224
 
Appendix H 
 
 
WHAT IS BUREAUCRATIC? 
 
Hamel (2002) argued that structured and formal approaches can be ‘bureaucratic’, 
which raises the implication generally to management whether this should be avoided as 
claimed by Hamel. Gate activities according to a standardized format requires distinct 
decisions, but the evidence suggest that PD practice reveals several other decision types 
than the normative conceptual approach including “conditional kill”, “ownership 
transfer”, and “stop but reformulate” (see appendix K, column H). Problems not solved 
by the normative rules are also brought up for discussion but however addressed on the 
basis of the stage-gating rule and color-rule system. A vice president argued that if the 
rules for portfolio management not were mobilized and thereby produced the intended 
consequence, the rules would be perceived as ‘bureaucratic ‘in terms of just being 
paperwork as also mentioned by several project managers. The previous rule-system in 
PLASTIC, (PD&I), was associated with ‘bureaucratic’ because PLASTIC late in the 
period of 1997-2002 needed a “real reason” for having this particular version of the SG 
approach in place. Respondents are concerned with an emergent and similar perception 
of the new rule system:  
 
If we don’t implement the fundamentals [26.19] which are behind it – the 
prioritizations, the idea generation, the proper decision-making […]. If it is 
properly managed, yes. And we really start to implement as is it was intended - 
then yes. If it is a bureaucracy, it will delay. 
 
The previous analyses suggested that rules for making portfolio-decision making 
including resource decisions, not were mobilized in the gate meeting, because of other 
an agreement (rule) not to criticize colleagues, but particularly the other rule-regime 
where resources followed the business unit and not the project, was shaping the actors 
in this role rather than the rules ideally in the SG approach. Thus, rules in the SG 
approach are impeded in being used in accordance with their initial intention by other 
rule regimes, which in turn produces the increasing perception of the new set of rules as 
‘bureaucratic’.  
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Thus, rules are not automatically linked to the adjective of ‘bureaucratic’ by the 
actors, but perceived as such particularly if the activities to be conducted according with 
these rules not has a consequence in terms of solving the problems intended, which 
suggests that if the problems are solved as required by the Weberian-bureaucracy (the 
formal set of rules) the rules are not perceived as bureaucratic. Moreover, the term is 
associated with work that has no affect on the innovation ability of the company. In 
other words, if a rule is accepted and associated with the role of the actor, the rule is not 
‘bureaucratic’. Interestingly, rules designed for resource prioritizations (portfolio 
management rules) are legitimate to mobilize by project managers but by vice 
presidents who are to carry out these rules. Limited resources are considered legitimate 
by the project managers.  
Another issue relating to the perception of bureaucratic is rigidity. The perception of 
rules is also influenced by the time required to comply with e.g. information and 
documentation rules, which in turn depends on the level of detail and numbers of papers 
to be filled out and the number of databases that are not communicating with each other 
in PLASTIC. The latter renders it necessary to “fill in a lot of numbers” to SAP for cost, 
time in another system, project characteristics in the innovation database, and 
documentation in the archival system.  
 
[A]nd I would probably try to simplify the system, se we don’t’ have the separate 
[47.47] databases and everything. 
 
The respondent linked paper to templates and the general impression was that the previous 
rule system, PD&I, contained slightly more templates and that there now is more freedom to 
present a project and have templates to remember what for instance is required in for instance 
the final report. The perception of ‘bureaucratic’ is also connected not only to rule 
competitiveness with resources and the lack of consequence (as previously discussed) but also 
to the color-rule system monitoring deviation from the planned end date. These rules are 
imposes what appropriate behavior is. The rules are interpreted (as intended) to allow for 
redefinition of a project, but the color-rule system puts emphasis on finishing the project in time 
no matter whether an entirely new idea for making the product happen comes up late in the 
process (see above). The design of the rules does not prohibit a redefinition of a project, but the 
mentality is influenced by the time-rules (color system-rules): 
 
[…] but mentally I think there is so much focus that you have to deliver what you 
promised that is a kind of the borderline of going to be too rigid. 
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The respondents mention that it would be enough to have informal controls in terms of 
clear defined roles and a sense of responsibility, but on the other hand they do 
understand the requirement for control in terms of templates and reporting systems 
because the resources available for R&D is limited.  
Central to appropriate rule-following, is the identity of the individuals including 
mentality and attitude towards the rules, which in turn is influenced by rules and rule-
competition that consequently will add to the ambiguities of one or several identities 
constituting the collective self. Some project managers, more than others, are 
predisposed for following rules due to their educational background where particular 
engineering is mentioned as a background familiar with ‘boxes’ whereas others consider 
it a “duty”, but also the national background of actors was mentioned as a factor in the 
predisposition towards rules.  
Gate activities according to a standardized format has so far been concerned with the 
instrumentality perspective to rules, and that increasing elaborateness and mobilization 
of rules actually not impede innovation, but evidence suggests that in some cases, tasks 
cannot be standardized as also suggested by Olin and Wickenberg (2001) who claims 
that rules might be broken when rules becomes to standardized and therefore not can be 
aligned with the specifics of each particular situation. In one project, a project manager 
wasted two months on complying with a rule, which not could be complied with. This 
suggests that even though tasks is standardized and maybe even made very elaborate, 
they on the other hand are needs to be general and therefore require situational 
interpretation in some cases since some projects can be unique. 
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Appendix I 
 
 
Quality information (projects 4, 9, 22, 23, 24, 33, 36, 47) 
 
Basics 4 9 22 23 24 33 36 47 
Innovation Objective in archive database 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 2 
Description 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Innovation Objective Keeper 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
URL for further reading 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Innovation database                 
Project in Innovation Data Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Target 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Description 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Project category 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Technology Platform 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Proprietory Technology 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Business owner 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Chairman steering Committee 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Project Manager 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Decision forum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Project file 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Project Dates 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Task specified (1Q pt /task) 1 1 1 2 5 2 3 2 
Allocation and Cost / SAP order Nr 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 
Metrics                 
Probability of success 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Business case 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cost and FTE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Documentation                 
Business case 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Market Plan 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Killer Variables status in market plan 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Project Plan 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IPR Evaluation/status 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Innovation Tasks                 
Description 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Stage 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Status 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Task leader 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Task Time and Cost 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
HSE Evaluation : check status 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
HSE Check document URL 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Task Member insert 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 
Task Bottle neck Resources insert 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 2 
  4 9 22 23 24 33 36 47 
Rule-deviation 42% 27% 12% 3% 3% 24% 27% 9%
Rule-following 58% 73% 88% 97% 97% 76% 73% 91%
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Note: Zero equals rule-deviation and is marked with yellow. Numbers above zero is a 
weighted expression.  The red indicates a quality information problem. Source: 
PLASTIC. 
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Appendix J 
 
 
Active projects in the September 2003-portfolio 
 
In order to understand the gate meeting all active 62 projects in September 2003 are 
summarized in the table below and are structured as follows: 
 
o Column A is the project number (please note that in two cases were two projects 
addressed simultaneously). The total expected NPV of these projects is 
approximately €¼ billion (the sum of column K).  
o Column B indicates whether the project is addressed in a Boolean-expression 
suggesting that 35 projects were addressed at the meeting with a total value of 
€120.5 million € (T=true).  
o Column C indicates the color of the project according to the color-system 
described in the case-description of the Plastic firm which is designed to 
illustrate the delay of the project. More than two months delay is labeled ‘red’, 
less than two months is ‘yellow’ and ‘green’ indicates that the project is within 
the formal end date that was approved when the project entered the portfolio in 
the gate “Entry into portfolio” after the second stage of preparing a business 
case.  
o Column D indicates the formal stage of the project prior to the meeting.  
o Column F is the owner of the project (business unit).  
o Column G shows the criteria that were mobilized in the discussion during the 
discussion of the particular project. 
o Column H the ‘decision’ made45.  
o Column I is the minutes spent on the particular project. 42.5 effective minutes 
were spent on ‘red’ and ‘yellow’ projects, 93.5 effective minutes were spent on 
new projects, and 19 effective minutes spent on green projects which suggest 
that emphasis was placed on new projects compared to existing projects. Please 
note the correlation coefficient is calculated to -0.011222 between time and the 
                                                 
45 This is within the investigator’s interpretation (since it was difficult to identify when and what a 
decision actually was made in the instrumental perspective) 
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expected NPV, which shows that there is practically no correlation between the 
economic size of the project and the time spent on the discussion of it. This 
allocation of attention underlines the impression of a decision making situation 
which is focused on the inflow to the ‘bathtub’ as characterized metaphorically 
previously.  
o Column J is also a Boolean-expression indicating whether the project was 
specifically mentioned in the formal report on the meeting, which was sent to 
the participants after the meeting. The table discloses that projects no. 22, 24, 
and 43 were discussed but not specified in the formal report from the meeting, 
and that projects 12, 29, and 63 were specified in the report but not made part of 
the discussion during the PFMM September.  
o Column K stipulates the expected NPV on each project with exceptions due to 
no access to reports from the meeting prior the September-meeting.  
o Column L indicates whether complete fulfilled criteria were mobilized as an 
argument when the project was discussed at the meeting. 
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A B C D E F G H I J K L 
Project Disc. Color SG Stage BU Criteria Decision Min. Report NPV Checklist 
Project 22, 24 T Green F CD A End date + resources Approved ressource change – delega 1,00 F 25,30 No 
Project 47 T Green T Launch A Manufacturability Conditional launch 0,50 T 4,10 No 
Project 31 T Green T To final A NA Conditional go delegate 1,00 T 0,80 No 
Project 30 T Green T To final A Manufacturability Approved 3,00 T 1,60 Comp. 
Project 27 T Green T Launch A NA Approved 1,00 T 0,40 Comp. 
Project 23 T Green T To launch A Agency check – manufacturability Conditional go delegate 3,00 T 1,90 Not compl.
Project 62 T Green F DD B Steering committee Ownership transfer 4,00 T 2,60 No 
Project 70 T Green T To final C Sales Approved 2,00 T 9,50 Comp. 
Project 50 T Green F CD F Business case and NPV Portfolio material from long range 3,00 T 9,80 No 
Project 2, 3 T Green T Final G N/A Taken out of portfolio 0,50 T NA No 
Project 74 T New T  N/A B N/A N/A 7,00 T 2,00 No 
Project 76 T New T CD C N/A N/A 10,50 T 6,30 No 
Project 77 T New T  N/A C N/A N/A 9,50 T 2,60 No 
Project 78 T New F DD D N/A N/A 14,50 T 3,80 No 
Project 79 T New T  N/A E N/A N/A 6,00 T 6,10 No 
Project 64 T New T  N/A F N/A N/A 11,50 T 14,80 No 
Project 65 T New T  N/A G N/A N/A 8,00 T 2,20 No 
Project 80 T New T  N/A G N/A N/A 6,30 T 1,10 No 
Project 81 T New T  N/A G N/A N/A 20,30 T 4,00 No 
Project 28 T Red T Launch A Manufacturability and then < 2 mio Taken out of portfolio 4,00 T NA Not compl.
Project 43 T Red S Stopped B NA Conditional killed 0,50 F NA No 
Project 42 T Red T To final B Final report Conditional closing 3,00 T 0,90 No 
Project 40 T Red T To final B Final report Conditional closing 4,00 T 7,50 No 
Project 38 T Red T To final B N/A Conditional closing 5,00 T 0,60 Not compl.
Project 37 T Red T To final B N/A Approved 2,00 T 1,20 No 
Project 36 T Red F DD B Enddate Approved delay 5,00 T 3,00 No 
Project 33 T Red F Launch B Enddate + customer test Approved delay 3,00 T 5,60 No 
Project 9 T Red F Launch C Enddate + project scope Accelerated 9,00 T NA No 
Project 4 T Red F Launch C Enddate + customer test Conditional go 0,50 T 2,80 No 
Project 8 T Red S Launch C Manufacturability Reformulate project 3,00 T NA No 
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Project 46 T Red S DD F Driver and business owned Stop but reformulate 3,00 T NA No 
Project 32 T Yellow S Launch A Manufacturability Taken out of portfolio 0,50 T NA No 
Project 60 F Green T CD A N/A N/A N/A F 11,00 N/A 
Project 25 F Green F DD A N/A N/A N/A F 1,90 N/A 
Project 71 F Green F CD B N/A N/A N/A F 9,00 N/A 
Project 34 F Green F DD B N/A N/A N/A F 5,90 N/A 
Project 35 F Green F DD B N/A N/A N/A F 4,20 N/A 
Project 41 F Green F Launch B N/A N/A N/A F 1,20 N/A 
Project 39 F Green F Launch B N/A N/A N/A F 0,50 N/A 
Project 5 F Green F Launch C N/A N/A N/A F 5,30 N/A 
Project 69 F Green F DD C N/A N/A N/A F 5,00 N/A 
Project 59 F Green F N/A C N/A N/A N/A F 4,40 N/A 
Project 6 F Green F Launch C N/A N/A N/A F 3,90 N/A 
Project 7 F Green F Launch C N/A N/A N/A F 3,70 N/A 
Project 72 F Green F CD C N/A N/A N/A F 2,00 N/A 
Project 20 F Green F N/A D N/A N/A N/A F 5,60 N/A 
Project 67 F Green T N/A D N/A N/A N/A F 3,20 N/A 
Project 68 F Green F Launch D N/A N/A N/A F 3,10 N/A 
Project 66 F Green F DD D N/A N/A N/A F 1,90 N/A 
Project 16 F Green F Launch E N/A N/A N/A F 6,80 N/A 
Project 15 F Green F Launch E N/A N/A N/A F 10,00 N/A 
Project 17 F Green F Launch E N/A N/A N/A F 2,50 N/A 
Project 18 F Green F Launch E N/A N/A N/A F 1,70 N/A 
Project 11 F Green F Launch E N/A N/A N/A F 2,40 N/A 
Project 14 F Green F Launch E N/A N/A N/A F 1,60 N/A 
Project 10 F Green F Launch E N/A N/A N/A F 2,80 N/A 
Project 19 F Green F Launch E N/A N/A N/A F 1,00 N/A 
Project 12 F Green T Final E N/A N/A N/A T 2,80 N/A 
Project 63 F Green F CD F N/A N/A N/A T 18,40 N/A 
Project 29 F Yellow T To final A N/A N/A N/A T N/A N/A 
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